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General introduction 
In every hour of every day we are faced with options; which route to take to work, 
where to go for a meal, which stocks to invest in. However, with limitations of 
movement, time and budget, our options are constrained. We are obliged to cut off 
(decide: from Latin dēcīdere, to cut off) and reduce the available options until we are 
left with a single course to pursue. 
Since the 1970s, the decision-making process has been described by the centralized 
view of a good-based model in which options are cut off within the executive brain areas in 
the frontal lobe (Norman & Shallice 1980; Padoa-Schioppa 2011), with the resulting 
choice outcome fed into sensorimotor areas in order to plan the chosen movement. 
More recently, an increasing body of evidence has revealed a decision-making network 
spanning multiple brain regions, including sensorimotor cortices which have been 
found to represent potential motor plans before the decision is made (Cisek 2012). 
Representation of potential actions has been proposed to play a crucial role in 
decision-making: options are first identified so that values can be assigned to each of 
them, then the decision-making process will weigh these options and, finally, produce a 
choice (Rangel et al. 2008). This emerging view regards action-based decision-making, at 
least for decision involving movement, as a competition between movement plans 
(Cisek 2007). Neural activity in the sensorimotor system has been shown to represent, 
before the decision is made, available options (Klaes et al. 2011; Thura & Cisek 2014; 
Yang & Shadlen 2007) and reward expectation (Sugrue et al. 2004; Platt & Glimcher 
1999). Furthermore, perturbation of the sensorimotor systems, via micro-stimulation 
or inactivation of the neural population representing one of the potential action plans, 
has been shown to bias choice probability (McPeek & Keller 2004; Carello & Krauzlis 
2004; Schieber 2000; Oliveira et al. 2010; Cisek 2012). However, to our knowledge, no 
study has so far shown that the effect of imbalanced planning alone, without reward 
contrast between options, could also induce selection bias. 
This thesis deals with the influence of planning on decision-making and comprises two 
main experiments, upon which the structure of this thesis will be organized. First, a 
psychophysical experiment was conducted with human participants, in which 
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behavioral responses were collected and analyzed to provide first insights into how the 
decision-making process deals with different task manipulations. The second 
electrophysiological experiment in monkeys allowed us to record activities at the level 
of single neurons while rhesus monkeys (macaca mulatta) solved choice tasks, yielding 
data with high temporal and spatial resolution. As the behavioral task involved reach 
movements, our sensorimotor areas of interest were the dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) 
and the parietal reach region (PRR), which are known to form the frontoparietal 
network of reach planning. 
This first chapter will start with brief literature reviews of the different perspectives on 
decision-making mechanisms in the brain, then it will introduce the current state of 
knowledge of sensorimotor transformations in the frontoparietal network, followed by 
an overview of known properties of neurons in the areas of interest. It will introduce 
some terminology and experimental paradigms frequently employed in the field, and 
will end with the summarized aim of this PhD project. The second chapter will 
describe and discuss the psychophysical experiment, entitled “I plan therefore I 
choose: Free-choice bias due to prior action-probability but not action-value”. The 
third chapter will deal with the monkey physiology experiment under the title “Biased 
action selection due to imbalanced action preparation”. Finally, the last chapter will 
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Neuroscience of decision-making 
Decision-making is one of the most intensively studied cognitive processes, thanks to 
rich inputs from various fields such as computer science, economics, neuroscience and 
psychology, to name a few. Decision neuroscientists – or, using the more fashionable 
term, neuroeconomists – combine knowledge and theories on decision-making from 
perspectives of economics, psychology, and neuroscience (Glimcher & Rustichini 
2004)  and seek to understand the neural encoding of economical values, such as 
expected value, utility (subjective values), risk, ambiguity, etc. (Dolan & Sharot 2012). 
The main aim is to locate the brain areas involved in decision-making, to characterize 
which steps of the process are involved, and to explain and predict different choice 
behaviors in response to various factors. 
Decision-making in the hedonic brain 
As choice is in general regarded to be driven by preference (Dolan & Sharot 2012; 
Samuelson 1938) or utility (Glimcher & Fehr 2014; Neumann & Morgenstern 1944) 
and a rational decider is considered to maximize benefits and minimize costs, the first 
candidate brain areas for value weighing 
were searched for and found in the 
dopaminergic pleasure centers (see Olds 
& P. Milner 1954). Neural activities 
correlated to reward expectation were 
discovered in dopaminergic neurons 
(Tobler et al. 2005) as well as neurons 
receiving dopaminergic projections in 
the basal ganglia (Kawagoe et al. 1998; 
Knutson et al. 2001) and the prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) (Pearson et al. 2014; 
Padoa-Schioppa 2011) (Figure 1). 
 
FIGURE 1 | Dopaminergic projections 
from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and 
substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) to the 
prefrontal cortex (PFC; hatched area) and striatum 
(blue) in primate brain (figure from Puig et al. 2014) 
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Decision-making in the executive brain 
Problems with decision-making are a typical characteristic seen in patients with frontal 
lobe damage (Bechara et al. 1997; Fellows & Farah 2007). Specifically, patients with 
lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) show poor risk assessment, 
impaired stimulus-reward associative learning, inconsistent preference and an unusual 
way of organizing information during multi-attribute decision-making (Bechara et al. 
1997; Fellows & Farah 2005a; Fellows & Farah 2005b; Fellows 2006). The vmPFC is 
therefore believed to play an important role in combining values from different 
attributes of available options (e.g. color, taste, benefits, etc.) into a single common currency 
for comparing options during decision-making (Levy & Glimcher 2012; Pearson et al. 
2014). This view has been supported by electrophysiological studies in monkeys 
showing that available juice options and the selected juice were represented by neurons 
in the vmPFC and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; an area within vmPFC) (Padoa-
Schioppa 2011; Strait et al. 2014; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad 2006) (Figure 2). In the 
framework of the good-based model, all values are combined and compared within 
vmPFC/OFC, then the chosen good guides an action plan (Padoa-Schioppa 2011).  
 
 
FIGURE 2 | vmPFC and OFC  
(A) High correspondence of regions in OFC 
between humans (left) and macaques (right). 
OFC correponds to all colored brain areas, 
except 10, 24, 25, and 32. (B) vmPFC 
includes regions in the OFC, ACC (Anterior 
Cingulate Cortex), and the nearby medial wall. 
Color blobs illustrate data from previous 
vmPFC studies in humans. (figure from 
Pearson et al. 2014) 
neuroeconomics, in that they demonstrated the power of con-
cepts drawn from economics to assign a specific functional
role to a poorly understood brain region (Montague and Berns,
2002). Yet in the studies where utility signals were found in
OFC, these signals, corresponding to the offered and chosen
values of options, were found in only a small (but highly signifi-
cant) percentage of neurons (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad,
2006, 2008), while in tasks examining a different set of deci-
sion-related variables (Kennerley and Wallis, 2009; Wallis and
Kennerley, 2010), half the neurons in this area were responsive
to some variable (reward, probability of reward, effort cost).
Clearly, signals in OFC carry information about decision vari-
ables, but this information appears to be encoded much more
heterogeneously and diffusely than in better-characterized sen-
sory or motor areas.
OFC versus vmPFC: Distinction with a Difference?
To complicate things further, those subregions of OFC in which
neurons reliably encode utility in monkeys do not correspond to
those regions that show hemodynamic activation during similar
tasks in humans. The vast imaging literature on decision neuro-
science leaves little doubt that both vmPFC and OFC both play
some role in processing reward. Yet confusion persists about
the respective definitions and roles of these regions.
The term ‘‘ventromedial prefrontal cortex’’ is a general
description of a region of the brain and does not correspond to
any cytoarchitectural boundaries. It is not a term used historically
in the anatomical literature and gained popularity with the advent
of functional imaging. Because cytocarchitectonic boundaries
can only be defined in postmortem brains, the use of the term
‘‘vmPFC’’ in the imaging literature is descriptive: a shorter way
of saying, ‘‘somewhere near the bottom of the brain, in the front,
in the middle.’’ Use of the term vmPFC typically corresponds to
regions within anterior cingulate cortex or just anterior to it
(though sometimes ACC and vmPFC are reported as separate
regions), including Brodmann’s areas 32, 24, and 14.
In contrast, the term ‘‘orbitofrontal cortex’’ is commonly used
in the anatomical literature and has been formally described as
being equivalent to Brodmann’s areas 10, 11, 12/47, 13, and
14 (Carmichael and Price, 1994; Petrides and Pandya, 1994).
BA 11, 13, and 14 are the portions of OFC most often implicated
in studies of value and utility, with 11 lying anterior to 13, and 14
lying medial to 13 (see Figure 1A). Area 14 is the most ventral
section of the medial wall and therefore can ostensibly fall under
the heading vmPFC as well as OFC. In fact, connectivity studies
imply that area 14 serves as a bridge between BA 13 in OFC,
which has extensive sensory input but little motor output, and
BA 24 and 32 in cingulate, which has motor output but not sen-
sory input. BA 10 is commonly (though not always) considered
synonymous with ‘‘the frontal pole’’ and is thought to have a
less prominent role in reward processing; and area 12/47 refers
to lateral OFC and is often associated with punishment, rather
than reward. The anatomical maps of OFC are highly similar be-
tween humans and nonhuman primates (Figure 1A; Murray et al.,
2007; Petrides and Pandya, 1994; Wallis, 2007).
Since fMRI-based studies do not provide access to the
anatomical markers that differentiate these various subregions
of cortex, inconsistencies in brain region nomenclature were
inevitable. Consequently, the relationship between frontal cortex
and reward processing can be confusing. For example, activity
ascribed to vmPFC in one paper will be ascribed as OFC in
another, and vice versa, despite similar coordinates (e.g., (0,
44, !12) in [Levy and Glimcher, 2012]; (!4, 37, !7) in [Cox
et al., 2005]; see Figure 1B). Moreover, the location of the
vmPFC held to encode common currency in many fMRI studies
finds its home on the orbital floor in the work of one prominent
group (Hare et al., 2008; Plassmann et al., 2007) and more
dorsally, in ACC, in another highly influential paper (Kable and
Glimcher, 2007) (see Figure 1C). Recent advances like the brain
mapping meta-analysis tool Neurosynth (http://neurosynth.org/)
(T. Yarkoni et al., 2011, INCF, conference; Yarkoni et al., 2011)
have begun the process of disambiguation, but much confusion
persists as to the specific roles of these various subregions of
cortex and how they contribute to decision making and utility
calculation. Moreover, identification of functional differences in
neural networks within any single brain region is not yet possible
using fMRI: voxels in the typical fMRI study are about 2 mm2, a
smoothing kernel of approximately 5–6 mm is applied during
Figure 1. The Terms ‘‘vmPFC’’ and ‘‘OFC’’
Are Used Inconsistently within and across
Subfields of Neuroscience
(A) Anatomically delineated regions of OFC have
high correspondence between humans (left) and
macaques (right). Reproduced with permission
from Mackey and Petrides (2010). Based on
nonhuman primate neuroanatomy, OFC proper
corresponds to all colored brain areas, except 10,
24, 25, and 32.
(B) Nearly identical brain coordinates are
described both as vmPFC, left (data from Levy and
Glimcher, 2012; coordinates illustrated using
Neurosynth) and OFC (from Cox et al., 2005).
(C) vmPFC is a descriptive term and is used in the
neuroeconomics literature to refer to regions in the
OFC, ACC, and the nearby medial wall (repro-
duced fromHare et al., 2009), illustrating data from
previous studies (dark blue [Kable and Glimcher,
2007], light blue [Rolls et al., 2008], red [Plassmann
et al., 2007], and green [Hare et al., 2008]).
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neuroeconomics, in that they demonstrated the power f con-
cepts drawn from economics to assign a specific functional
role to a poorly understood brain region (Montague and Berns,
2002). Yet in the studies where utility signals were found in
OFC, these signals, corresponding to the offered and chosen
values of options, were found in only a small (but highly signifi-
cant) percentage of neurons (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad,
2006, 2008), while in tasks examining a different set of deci-
sion-related variables (Kennerley and Wallis, 2009; Wallis and
Kennerley, 2010), half the neurons in this area were responsive
to some variable (reward, probability of reward, effort cost).
Clearly, signals in OFC carry information about decision vari-
ables, but this information appears to be encoded much more
heterog neously and diffu ely tha in better-characterized sen-
sory or mot r areas.
OFC versus vmPFC: Distinction with a Difference?
To complicate things further, those subregions of OFC in which
neurons reliably encode utility in monkeys do not correspond to
those regions that show hemodynamic activation during similar
tasks in humans. The vast imaging literature on decision neuro-
science leaves little doubt that both vmPFC and OFC both play
some role in processing reward. Yet confusion persists about
the respective definitions and roles of these regions.
The term ‘‘ventromedial prefrontal cortex’’ is a general
description of a region of the brain and does not correspond to
any cytoarchitectural boundaries. It is not a term used historically
in the an tomical literature and gain d popularity with the advent
of functiona imaging. Because cyt carchitecto ic boundaries
can only be defined in post rtem brains, the use of the term
‘‘vmPFC’’ in the imaging literature is descriptive: a shorter way
of saying, ‘‘somewhere near the bottom of the brain, in the front,
in the middle.’’ Use of the term vmPFC typically corresponds to
regions within anterior cingulate cortex or just anterior to it
(though sometimes ACC and vmPFC are reported as separate
regions), including Brodmann’s areas 32, 24, and 14.
In contrast, the term ‘‘orbitofrontal cortex’’ is commonly used
in the anatomical literature and has been formally described as
being equivalent to Brodmann’s areas 10, 11, 12/47, 13, and
14 (Carmichael and Price, 1994; Petrides and Pandya, 1994).
BA 11, 13, and 14 are the portions of OFC most often implicated
in studies of value and utility, with 11 lying anterior to 13, and 14
lying medial to 13 (see Figure 1A). Area 14 is the most v ntr l
section of the medial wall and therefore can ost nsibly fall under
the heading vmPFC as well as OFC. In fact, connectivity studies
imply that area 14 serves as a bridge between BA 13 in OFC,
which has extensive sensory input but little motor output, and
BA 24 and 32 in cingulate, which has motor output but not sen-
sory input. BA 10 is commonly (though not always) considered
synonymous with ‘‘the frontal pole’’ and is thought to have a
less prominent role in reward processing; and area 12/47 refers
to lateral OFC and is often associated with punishment, rather
than reward. The anato ical maps of OFC are highly similar be-
tween humans and nonhuman primates (Figure 1A; Murray et al.,
2007; Petrides and Pandya, 1994; Wallis, 2007).
Since fMRI-based studies do not provide access to the
anatomical markers that differentiate these various subregions
of cortex, inconsistencies in brain region nomenclature were
inevitable. Consequently, the relationship between frontal cortex
and reward processing can be confusing. For example, activity
ascribed to vmPFC in one paper will be ascribed as OFC in
another, and vice versa, despite similar coordinates (e.g., (0,
44, !12) in [Levy and Glimcher, 2012]; (!4, 37, !7) in [Cox
et al., 2005]; see Figure 1B). Moreover, the location of the
vmPFC held to encode common currency in many fMRI studies
finds its home on the orbital floor in the work of one prominent
group (H re et al., 2008; Plassmann t al., 2007) and more
d rsally, in ACC, in an ther highly influential pap r (Kable and
Glimcher, 2007) (see Figure 1C). Recent advance like the brain
mapping meta-analysis tool Neurosynth (http://neurosynth.org/)
(T. Yarkoni et al., 2011, INCF, conference; Yarkoni et al., 2011)
have begun the process of disambiguation, but much confusion
persists as to the specific roles of these various subregions of
cortex and how they contribute to decision making and utility
calculation. Moreover, identification of functional differences in
neural networks within any single brain region is not yet possible
using fMRI: voxels in the typical fMRI study are about 2 mm2, a
smoothing kernel of approximately 5–6 mm is applied during
Figure 1. The Terms ‘‘vmPFC’’ and ‘‘OFC’’
Are Used Inconsistently within and across
Subfields of Neuroscience
(A) Anatomically delineated regions of OFC have
high correspondence between humans (left) and
macaques (right). Reproduced with permission
from Mackey and Petrides (2010). Based on
nonhuman primate neuroanatomy, OFC proper
corresponds to all colored brain areas, except 10,
24, 25, and 32.
(B) Nearly identical brain coordinates are
described both as vmPFC, left (data from Levy and
Glimcher, 2012; coordinates illustrated using
Neurosynth) and OFC (from Cox et al., 2005).
(C) vmPFC is a descriptive term and is used in the
neuroeconomics literature to refer to regions in the
OFC, ACC, and the nearby medial wall (repro-
duced fromHare et al., 2009), illustrating data from
previous studies (dark blue [Kable and Glimcher,
2007], light blue [Rolls et al., 008], red [Plassmann
et al., 2007], and green [Hare et al., 2008]).
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Decision-making in the action-planning brain 
The traditional view of decision-making as a serial process – decision-making then 
action plan – has been challenged by recent findings showing that the representation of 
alternative action plans emerges before the decision is made and, importantly, these 
representations also reflect decision values, based on which we could predict 
subsequent choice behaviors (Platt & Glimcher 1999; Sugrue et al. 2004; Klaes et al. 
2011; Thura & Cisek 2014; Yang & Shadlen 2007). According to the action-based view, 
as choice is generally expressed by actions, the sensorimotor network could be one of 
the brain loci where choice occurs as the outcome of competition between action plans 
(Cisek 2007). Information that is crucial for weighing the options, such as sensory 
evidence, values, and others, are provided by other input areas, e.g. the basal ganglia, 
OFC, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Cisek 2012) (Figure 3). 
 
FIGURE 3 | One possible schema depicting the 
decision network.  
Value information from cortical and sub-cortical 
structures converges into a single common value 
representation within the valuation circuitry before 
passing on to the choice-related motor control 
circuitry. Sensory signals can arise from various 
modalities but only visual signals are illustrated here. (1) 
vmPFC, (2) OFC, (3) dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC), (4) Insula, (5) Primary motor cortex (M1), (6) 
Posterior Parietal Cortex (PPC), (7) Frontal eye fields, (8) 
Visual cortex, (9) Amygdala, and (10) Striatum. (figure 
from Levy & Glimcher 2012) 
 
In a broader framework beyond the stage of value comparison, decision-making has 
been segmented into five computational processes: identifying and representing 
potential courses of action (representation), assigning the predicted costs and benefits 
associated with each option (valuation), comparing values and making the choice 
(action selection), evaluating the desirability of the actual outcome (outcome 
evaluation), and finally updating the systems according to this feedback (learning) in 
order to improve future decisions (Rangel et al. 2008; Rangel & Hare 2010). On the 
basis of this framework, action plans first have to be established so that value can be 
associated with each of the action plans, and a decision finally made. 
coordinates, respectively. For the left hemisphere it is
almost a mirror image of the right hemisphere: (!15)–0,
24–60, (!6)–(!21) for x,y,z MNI coordinates, respect-
ively. An additional qualitative analysis we conducted was
to calculate a weighted average of each of the three axes
of the peak voxels using all the studies described in Table
1, which had activations in the vmPFC/OFC subregion.
Note that each peak voxel was weighted-in even if in a
given study there were more the one peak voxel. We
found that for the right hemisphere it is: x = 4.27;
y = 35.18; z = !11.82 and for the left hemisphere it is:
x = !7.29; y = 38; z = !10.57.
From these data we think that a single conclusion seems
at this point relatively straightforward. There is indeed a
small subregion in the vmPFC/OFC that tracks subjec-
tive value on a common currency appropriate for guiding
choices between different kinds of rewards. Indeed, these
data seem to suggest that the average peak voxel we have
identified here can be used as a basis for constructing an
unbiased ROI for further studies of reward and valuation.
Because there are now ample data demonstrating that
areas in the vmPFC/OFC correlate with value signals, it
now seems appropriate to conclude that research can
begin to advance from using whole brain analyses of
fMRI data to a more focused approach reminiscent of
the strategy used in electrophysiological studies. This
could lead to more concrete and testable predictions
using hypothesis testing, rather than the relying on whole
brain analyses aimed only at the cerebral localization of
value. The data suggest, in essence, that fMRI studies of
value have now advanced beyond the point of whole brain
analyses driven only toward cerebral localization and to a
point where the high-resolution physiology of valuation
can become a tractable goal.
Conclusions
Quite a few studies have now demonstrated that a sub-
region of the vmPFC/OFC centered around MNI coor-
dinates in the left and right hemispheres represent
subject-specific reward value in a common neural cur-
rency, the expected subjective value of Neuroeconomic
theory [4,5]. This remarkably small area in both right
and left vmPFC/OFC that is activated in a way that
parametrically correlates with the subjective values sub-
jects attribute to nearly every kind of reward that has ever
been studied in the scanner. The data indicate that when
two disparate kinds of rewards are equally desirable to a
subject, then activity in this area will be of equal magni-
tude for these two rewards in that individual. This is
strong evidence supporting the claim that a subregion in
the vmPFC/OFC tracks subjective value in a single
common currency of the kind first described in the
abstract by economic theory hundreds of years ago. Using
the insights from the current Meta analysis combined
with additional data from many other studies we have
generated a diagram that is a suggested possible schema
for understanding the decision-making networks of the
hum n brain (Figure 6).
It is import nt to note, however, that there is no evidence
to support the claim that the neural common currency of
value arises only in this subregion of the vmPFC/OFC.
Any common currency observed in the brain must reflect
the activation of multiple brain areas. It is almost certainly
the case that other local and network activations lie
beneath the resolution of the techniques used in these
studies. Indeed, the evidence reviewed here suggests that
portions of the striatum and perhaps the insula also
participate in this process.
Before concluding, however, two potential caveats need
to be considered. First, it is important to note that all
studies, which have examined multiple reward-types
have included monetary rewards. Thus, it might be the
case that the vmPFC/OFC region translates all reward
types into monetary equivalents and that in the complete
absence of monetary tasks other brain circuits serve a















Current Opinion in Neurobiology
One possible schema for understanding the decision-making networks
of the human brain. Current evidence suggests that information from
cortical a d subcortical structures converges toward a single common
value representation before passing on to the choice-related motor
control circuitry. Modulatory inputs play a critical role in establishing this
final common representation with those inputs carrying signals related to
arousal, internal state (satiety, thirst, hormonal levels, etc.) and emotional
intensity. In this schema, sensory information from all modalities carries,
among other things, the identity and location of the options. We use
visual signals in this diagram to stand for information from all sensory
modalities. (1) vmPFC, (2) OFC, (3) DLPFC, (4) Insula, (5) Primary motor
cortex (M1), (6) Posterior parietal cortex, (7) frontal eye fields, (8) Visual
cortex, (9) Amygdala, (10) Striatum.
www.sciencedirect.com Current Opinion in Neurobiology 2012, 22:1027–1038
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Models of decision-making 
Another important approach towards understanding of the decision-making 
mechanism is to implement computational models in order to simulate the decision-
making processes and to predict decision outcomes, given various input parameters. 
One of the most influential concepts in the modeling of a selection mechanism is the 
rise-to-threshold process, conceptualizing decision-making as a gradual accumulation 
of evidence until it reaches a threshold, at which moment the choice is determined 
(Smith & Ratcliff 2004). A model can consist of two (or more) accumulators, 
representing the available options, which race to the threshold with the winner 
determining the choice (race model, Figure 4b). Alternatively, the model can consist of 
a single accumulator representing the contrast between two options (decision variables: 
DV) that drifts to alternative bounds, with the bound reached first determining the 
final choice (drift diffusion model, Figure 4a) (Ratcliff 1981; Gold & Shadlen 2007; 
Summerfield & Tsetsos 2012). In both cases, the number of thresholds matches the 
number of options to be considered. 
 
FIGURE 4 | Random walk model or drift-diffusion model (A) and race model (B).  
Noisy evidence is accumulated until it reaches a bound. In the bounded diffusion model (A), the difference 
between the evidence for H1 and H2 is accumulated, whereas in the race model (B), each accumulator 
accumulates evidence for each alternative. If competing accumulators are inversely correlated, the race model is 
nearly identical to a symmetric random walk. (Gold & Shadlen 2007; Shadlen & Kiani 2013) 
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Figure 2
Sequential analysis. (a) General framework. The decisio is b sed on a sequence of observations. After
each acquisition, a DV is calcul ted from the evidence obtained up to that point; then more evidence can
be obtained or the process can be terminated with a commitment to H1 or H2. In principle, both the
fi (· · ·)s, which convert the evidence to a DV, and the criteria can be dynamic (e.g., to incorporate the cost
of elapsed time). e0 can be interpreted as the evidence bearing on the prior probability of the hypotheses.
(b) In random walk models, the DV is a cumulative sum of the evidence. The bounds represent the
stopping rule. If e is a logLR, then this process is the SPRT (see The Sequential Probability Ratio Test).
When the evidence is sampled from a Gaussian distribution in infinitesimal time steps, the process is
termed diffusion with drift µ, or bounded diffusion. (c) In the race model, two or more decision processes
represent the accumulated evidence for each alternative. When there are two alternatives and the
accumulations are inversely correlated, the race model is nearly identical to a symmetric random walk.
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On the basis of this concept, biasing factors can intervene in the decision-making 
process in a few ways: shortening the migration distance of the DV in favor of one 
option, either by raising the starting point or lowering the threshold (e.g. Ratcliff 1978; 
Ratcliff 1985; Bogacz et al. 2006; Mulder et al. 2012); or accelerating migration speed 
(increasing drift rate) towards one option (e.g. Ratcliff 1981; Diederich & Busemeyer 
2006; Roitman & Shadlen 2002). These mechanisms allow the DV to reach one bound 
faster and, as the bound that is reached first determines the choice, results in a higher 
choice probability towards that bound. Which process is involved in which situation 
and which brain areas they occur in are currently topics of ongoing research 
(Summerfield & Tsetsos 2012; Shadlen & Kiani 2013). 
The next question then is what information is taken into account by the DV and how 
this information drives our decision. The influence of reward on behavior has long 
been in the spotlight of various research fields. Reward is well known to attract 
attention, motivate, reinforce, and thus shape our behavior. Robust motivational effect 
of reward can improve performance and speed up actions (Dayan & Balleine 2002; 
Franchina & Brown 1971; Hassani et al. 2001; Hollerman et al. 1998) and directing effect 
of reward has been shown to guide choice preference towards the most highly reward 
option, in various species, known as the matching law (Bonem & Crossman 1988; 
Edwards 1956; Herrnstein 1961; Mir et al. 2011).  
The decision-making process is generally perceived as a value comparison process. 
However, the directing effect of reward is not the only factor on which we weigh the 
options. According to statistical decision theory, there are at least three basic 
computational elements of decision: evidence – information supporting different 
options, value – costs and benefits associated to each option, and prior – the predicted 
probability of a particular event to occur, that will be integrated into a decision variable 
and interpreted by a decision rule (threshold) in order to produce a choice (Gold & 
Shadlen 2007). 
Many efforts have then been spent to investigate each of these decision elements 
within the established computational framework. Previous studies have shown that 
migration distance of the DV can be shortened by (1) prior probability, that induces 
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anticipation of an event to occur and/or facilitates preparation of own movement to 
react, or (2) speed-accuracy tradeoff – whether we solve the task with the focus on 
being fast (shorter distance) or being accurate (longer distance) (Bogacz et al. 2006; 
Simen et al. 2009; Mulder et al. 2012). The strength of sensory evidence can steer drift 
rate (Roitman & Shadlen 2002; Churchland et al. 2008; Shadlen & Kiani 2013). 
However, the influence of reward differences on decision-making process is less clear, 
due to evidences for both baseline shift (Maddox 2002; Bogacz et al. 2006; Mulder et 
al. 2012) and drift rate change (Diederich & Busemeyer 2006). 
In my opinion, the influence of prior, which is the predicted probability of an event to 
occur, is of particular interest for two reasons. First, prior can imply expected 
probability of receiving reward (Gold & Shadlen 2007), in cases where the expected 
event is known to be rewarding. The probabilities of event outcome and reward 
overlap most evidently in the context of risky choice or the two-alternative forced 
choice paradigm that has been extensively employed to investigate valuation during 
decision-making. Facing a risky choice situation, a decider has to choose between 
options associated with different reward probabilities and, after having committed to a 
choice, will get feedback about whether the choice was right or wrong. In this setting, 
the predicted probability of one target being valid is identical to the expected 
probability of receiving reward on that target, which, according to the matching law 
(Herrnstein 1961; Pierce & Epling 1983; Sugrue et al. 2004; Lau & Glimcher 2005), 
matches the probability of the decision-maker choosing that option. With the overlap 
of three different probabilities – probability of each option being valid, expected 
probability of each option delivering reward (reward expectancy), and subjects’ choice 
probability towards each option – it is challenging to infer whether choice probability 
followed reward expectancy or target predictability.  
Second, prior probability is known to allow anticipation. This implies the possibility to 
plan an associated action in advance of expressing choice. As we were interested in the 
influence of action plan on decision, we needed a new paradigm in which two 
situations provided comparable expected values, which are the product of reward 
probability and amount (Neumann & Morgenstern 1944), but only one encouraged 
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movement planning. The distinction between target probability and reward probability 
would allow us to compare whether choice probability matched degrees of movement 
planning in response to target predictability or whether it reflected pure preference due 
to expected reward contrast without the involvement of movement planning. 
Sensorimotor transformation 
In order to properly interact with our environment, our brain has complex tasks to 
accomplish, ranging from integrating information from different sensory modalities (e.g. 
light, sound, taste, smell, etc.), planning a desired action by transforming information from 
sensory coordinates (e.g. image on the retina) into movement parameters (e.g. muscle 
activation), and executing the movement. The central stage, sensorimotor transformation, 
functions in a distributed way over the frontoparietal network both in a bottom-up 
manner when the movement is spontaneously guided by visual stimuli (visual-guided 
movement), and a top-down manner whenever the movement involves higher 
cognitive processes, e.g. context dependency, transformation rules (further details 
below), motivational factors, etc. In the latter case, the sensorimotor network acts in 
concert with higher cognitive area, e.g. the prefrontal cortex (PFC), in order to succeed 
in a given desired movement (Mountcastle et al. 1975; Andersen & Buneo 2002; Wise 
& Murray 2000; Miller & Cohen 2001). 
Brain mechanisms of visual-guided movement planning 
Studies from different neuroscience disciplines have revealed strong reciprocal 
connections between parietal and frontal areas, more precisely the posterior parietal 
cortex (PPC) and the premotor cortex (PMC), which function together for many 
aspects of action planning (Andersen & Cui 2009; Pandya & Kuypers 1969; Kurata 
1991). Involved in visually guided movement planning, this circuitry receives inputs 
from the extrastriate visual cortex (Felleman & Van Essen 1991; Marconi et al. 2001; 
Wise et al. 1997; Tanné et al. 1995), which encompasses visual areas other than primary 
visual cortex and is responsible for specialized, higher-order processing of visual 
signals (Orban 2007; Maunsell & Newsome 1987).  
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The extrastriate visual cortex comprises two systems; one extends ventrally towards the 
temporal lobe, characterized as the “perception for recognition” pathway, and another 
dorsally towards the parietal lobe, the “perception for action” pathway (Ungerleider & 
Mishkin 1982; Goodale & A. D. Milner 1992b; Fagg & Arbib 1998; O'Reilly 2010). 
Furthermore, while the ventral stream extracts features of the object to identify what 
we see via the inferotemporal (IT) cortex, the dorsal stream sends information essential 
for movement planning to the following parietal areas: the inferior parietal lobule (IPL: 
7a and 7b) as well as the medial and lateral intraparietal area (MIP: area 5 and LIP: area 
7ip), the medial dorsoparietal area (MDP) and area 7m of the superior parietal lobule 
(SPL)(Felleman & Van Essen 1991; Wise et al. 1997; Cavada & Goldman-Rakic 1989).  
Further differences between the pathways are seen through to the frontal areas. IT has 
strong neuronal projections into the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) whereas 
the IPL projects further into the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and the SPL 




FIGURE 5 | extended dorsal and 
ventral pathways in the macaque brain  
(A) An artistic view shows the separation 
between dorsal and ventral visual streams 
(auditory pathway also shown is beyond 
the scope of this Introduction). Spatial 
information from the visual cortex 
(purple) reaches the PPC (areas 7a/7b/7ip 
- blue) then reaches further to the dlPFC 
(areas 46/8a - light blue). Feature 
information is relayed at the IT (orange) 
then further transmitted into the vlPFC 
(12 - orange) (figure from Arnsten 2003) 
(B) A schematic view shows further 
connections beyond the extended- dorsal 
and ventral pathways. V1 - primary visual 
cortex, PC - parieral cortex, PM - 
premotor cortex, M1 - primary motor 
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dorsal and extended ventral pathways, respectively (Wise et al. 1997; Cavada & 
Goldman-Rakic 2005; Petrides & Pandya 1999; Petrides 2002; Sakagami et al. 2006; 
Goldman-Rakic 1996). Finally, both pathways converge in the PMC and the motor 
cortex. (Figure 5) 
The PPC, as previously mentioned, has reciprocal connections with the PMC and both 
areas share similar information coding (Sakagami et al. 2006; Johnson et al. 1996; Wise 
et al. 1997).  As well as receiving input from the PPC, the PMC also has 
interconnections with the dlPFC and the vlPFC, which are believed to be the loci 
where information from the ventral and the dorsal streams are integrated (Sakagami et 
al. 2006) (Figure 5b). 
In cases where a movement is directly signaled by sensory cues without invocation of 
high-level cognitive process, e.g. touching a spot on a touch screen, this automatic 
sensorimotor transformation can be processed rapidly in a bottom-up fashion through 
the parieto-premotor circuit (Desmurget & Sirigu 2009; Pisella et al. 2000; Gail et al. 
2009; Sakagami et al. 2006). However, when the movement goal has to be inferred 
based on arbitrary transformation rules, e.g. touching not at the spot on the screen but 
next to it, the abstract rules are believed to join the sensorimotor circuit at the 
premotor counterpart via the PFC (Wise & Murray 2000; Toni et al. 2001; Gail et al. 
2009; di Pellegrino & Wise 1991; Crammond & Kalaska 1994; Westendorff et al. 
2010). 
The combinatorial processing within the frontal and parietal network computes a 
movement-direction vector, but no details of the muscular contraction command 
(Mountcastle et al. 1975). The motor command is then transferred to the effectors via 
the primary motor area (M1), the brain stem and the spinal cord. However, there is no 
clear-cut functional boundary between PMC and M1, rather a functional gradient. 
Motor output to the spinal cord is not limited to M1, as premotor-spinal projections 
also exist (Luppino et al. 2005; Johnson et al. 1996). Finally, the hierarchical distinction 
between the functions of PMC and M1 is more pronounced during sophisticated 
behaviors such as spatial transformation (Wise et al. 1997). 
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Frontoparietal network of reach movements 
The spatial input from the dorsal visual stream progressively diverges into parallel 
subsystems in the PPC (Goodale & A. D. Milner 1992a), each specialized towards the 
demands of different sensorimotor functions and effectors, such as grasping in the 
anterior intraparietal area (AIP) and the ventral premotor cortex (PMv), eye 
movements in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) and the frontal eye field (FEF), and 
reaching in the PRR and PMd (Figure 6) (Andersen & Cui 2009; Mountcastle et al. 
1975; Batista et al. 1999; Snyder et al. 1997; Rizzolatti & Luppino 2001; Baumann et al. 
2009). Each of these subsystems specifies the spatial parameters of different kinds of 
potential actions (e.g. Snyder, Batista & Andersen 2000a; Mazzoni et al. 1996; 
Andersen & Buneo 2002; Baumann et al. 2009; Colby et al. 1996) and plays a direct 
role in guiding their execution during movement (Resulaj et al. 2009; Cisek & Kalaska 
2010; Pastor-Bernier et al. 2012). 
 
FIGURE 6 | Network of reach areas  
Output from PO projects to PRR (MIP and MDP) 
and the rostral aspect of PMd. PRR and PMd are 
reciprocally connected while AIP and PMv are also 
connected. The rostral aspect of PMd also receives 
a projection from the prefrontal cortex (not 
illustrated here). The caudal PMd and M1 are also 
reciprocally linked. (figure from Snyder, Batista & 
Andersen 2000a) 
Parie ta l  reach reg ion (PRR)  is a functional definition for the brain region located in 
the PPC which shows activities related to reach planning. PRR is located in the medial 
bank of the intraparietal sulcus, hence the name MIP (medial intraparietal area) which 
overlaps to some degree with PRR. PRR also includes dorsal aspects of areas parieto-
L.H. Snyder et al. / Vision Research 40 (2000) 1433–14411434
Fig. 1. Schematic of connections of LIP with other brain areas.
suggests that LIP is part of a saccade network. Micros-
timulation of LIP at low currents produce saccadic eye
movements without other body movements (Thier &
Andersen, 1996, 1998). Temporary inactivation of LIP
with muscimol produces saccade deficits (Li, Mazzoni
& Andersen, 1998). Many LIP neurons demonstrate
bursts of activity before saccades (Barash, Andersen,
Bracewell, Fogassi & Gnadt, 1991).
PRR includes area MIP and dorsal aspects of area
PO (area MDP or V6a). These areas receive inputs
from visual extrastriate areas and somatosensory areas
and project to dorsal premotor cortex (Blatt et al.,
1990; Caminiti, Ferraina & Johnson, 1996; see Fig. 2).
Thus, like area LIP for saccades, area PRR appears to
be a node in a reach network and provides a gateway
between sensory and motor areas (Caminiti et al.,
1996).
3. Intentions to saccade and reach
It has been very difficult to design experiments that
dissociate intention related activity from activity related
to attention because monkeys (and humans) attend to
2. Evidence that LIP and PRR are nodes in saccade
and reach networks
Area LIP receives inputs largely from extrastriate
cortex including areas V2, V3, V4, MT, PO and IT as
well as having connections with other visually related
areas of the PPC (Asanuma et al., 1985; Blatt, An-
dersen & Stoner, 1990). Its outputs are directed toward
saccade centers including the superior colliculus, frontal
eye fields, and the cerebellum via the lateral pontine
nuclei (see Fig. 1). A number of other lines of evidence
Fig. 2. Network of reach areas, which include areas MIP and MDP, which appear to be included in PRR. From Caminiti et al. (1996).
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occipital area (PO) (MDP or V6a) (Snyder, Batista & Andersen 2000a). PRR receives 
inputs from visual extrastriate areas and somatosensory areas and projects to PMd 
(Johnson et al. 1996; Snyder, Batista & Andersen 2000a). 
The dorsal  premotor cortex (PMd) is located between the PFC and M1. Most parietal 
input to PMd originate from the PPC and, in parallel, PMd receives additional inputs 
from the PFC as well as the PO that have direct connections with the visual areas 
(Colby et al. 1988; Johnson et al. 1996; Wise et al. 1997). PMd projects motor output to 
both M1 and the spinal cord (Luppino et al. 2005; Johnson et al. 1996). 
Motor goal tuning and rule-based reaching tasks 
Directional selectivity, tuning function, and planning activity 
Electrophysiological experiments in monkeys have shown that PMd and PRR neurons 
are selectively active depending on the direction of the upcoming reach. A directional 
selective neuron will exhibit maximal firing activity when the future reach direction is 
aligned with the neuron’s coding direction, so called preferred direction, with lower 
firing rates when reach is aimed towards other directions, and minimal responses in 
cases of a reach towards the opposite direction. The directional selectivity of a neuron 
can be visualized by plotting a tuning function, depicting a neuron’s activity as a 
function of reach direction (Figure 7).  
The directional selectivity in motor goal tuned neurons emerges (up to several 
seconds) before the movement initiation and is referred to as planning activity 
(Gnadt & Andersen 1988; Batista & Andersen 2001; Quian Quiroga et al. 2006). As 
well as demonstrating selectivity to upcoming movement direction, PMd and PRR 
neurons also show spatial selectivity to visual stimuli (visually tuned neurons), when 
stimuli are presented at different locations in space (spatial cues), and can also be 
selective to the movement direction at the time of movement (peri-movement 
neurons). A single neuron can display different tuning properties evolving throughout 
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cue presentation, movement planning, and movement execution e.g. visuomotor 
neurons (Crammond & Kalaska 1996; Gail & Andersen 2006). 
 
 
FIGURE 7 | Response of a PRR cell to delayed reaches (green) and delayed saccades (red) 
Each plot shows the response to a different direction (shown in the center plot with arrows), with the raster 
plots displayed on top and mean firing rates on the bottom. Gray rectangles mark the time of target 
presentation. The center inset show the spatial tunings of the cells in the time period 150 –750 ms. Reach 
movements start after 1s. This PRR cell is directionally tuned for reaches (green) to the upper direction. (figure 
from Quian Quiroga et al. 2006) 
Memory-guided reach task and transformation rules 
In order to experimentally probe the motor planning activities of the neurons, a 
memory-reach task is typically used. In the first stage of a simple memory-reach task, a 
spatial cue flashes on the screen. The cue indicates the position of the target to be 
memorized but does not yet prompt the subject to move. As soon as the subject is 
aware of the target location, directionally selective neurons start to show sustained 
activities depending on their preference and the future reach direction, with high 
activity if the reach direction matches the neurons’ preferred direction. However, as 
the locations of the flashed spatial cue and the upcoming reach overlap in this task 
design, and given the knowledge that neurons can be tuned for both memorized cue 
location and future reach location, we cannot distinguish whether the neural tuning 
result of the target presentation or the actual movement. To a
lesser degree, there is also spatial tuning to the nonpreferred
movements, i.e., saccades for the PRR cell and reaches for the LIP
cell. In principle, this spatial tuning may indicate that these cells
signal the locus of attention (i.e., the place where the target was
shown) rather than movement intentions. In fact, taking the ac-
tivity of single cells alone, it seems difficult to predict motor
intentions because reaches and saccades may be confused.
Decoding of target locations
We first studied the possibility of predict-
ing target locations as would be favored by
the attention-only argument. Indeed, if
the responses of cells in PPC are solely at-
tributable to attention, then it should not
matter what movement is being planned.
To study this possibility, we pooled to-
gether delayed-reach and delayed-saccade
trials and grouped them according to tar-
get location. Figure 3 shows the decoding
of target locations analyzing PRR (left ma-
trix) and LIP (right matrix) separately and
together (middle matrix) for the first
monkey. In all cases, the decoding perfor-
mance was significantly larger than chance
( p ! 10"9 with PRR cells, p ! 10"3 with
LIP cells, and p ! 10"13 taking both pop-
ulations together). For the LIP cells, there
was a significantly better decoding of the
contralateral (0.50) than the ipsilateral
(0.16; p ! 0.05) field. For the PRR cells,
there were no significant differences be-
tween the ipsilateral (0.62) and contralat-
eral (0.70; p # 0.55) fields.
Results for the second monkey were
qualitatively the same. Decoding of target
locations were significantly better than
chance ( p ! 0.005 with PRR cells, p !
10"4 with LIP cells, and p ! 10"9 taking
both populations together). For the LIP
cells, decoding was significantly better for
the contralateral (0.58) than the ipsilateral
(0.21; p ! 0.01) field. As with the first
monkey, for the PRR cells, there were no
significant differences between the ipsilat-
eral (0.29) and contralateral (0.29; p # 1)
fields.
Decoding of reach and saccade plans
Figure 4A shows the results of decoding
the delayed-reach and delayed-saccade
trials of the first monkey, considering the
populations of PRR and LIP cells sepa-
rately. Cells in PRR (top plots) have a
nearly perfect performance in decoding
reach directions (0.90), with only a few er-
rors caused by confusion of nearby direc-
tions. The performance is very good for
both the ipsilateral and the contralateral
directions, without a significant difference
between them ( p # 0.39). The perfor-
mance of PRR cells for decoding of sac-
cades (0.51) is significantly worse than the
one for reaches ( p ! 10"5) but is still bet-
ter than chance ( p ! 10"5).
For the LIP cells, the decoding of saccades for the contralateral
field (0.87) is significantly better than for the ipsilateral field
(0.33; p ! 10"3). In contrast to what is found in PRR, for LIP
cells, the decoding of reaches (0.34) is worse than for saccades
(0.57; p ! 0.01). The performance of LIP cells for decoding the
“nonpreferred movement” (i.e., reaches) is also larger than
chance ( p ! 0.005). Thus, these two anatomically segregated cell
Figure 2. Responses of a PRR cell (A) and an LIP cell (B) to delayed-reach and delayed-saccade trials. Each plot shows the
response to a different direction, with the raster plots in the top part and the mean firing rates in the bottom. Gray rectangles mark
the time of target presentation. The center insets show the spatial tunings of the cells in the time period considered (150 –750 ms).
Note the tuning for reaches (green) to the upper direction for the PRR cell and the tuning for saccades (red) to the upper right
direction for the LIP cell.
Quian Quirogo et al. • Decoding of Movement Intentions in the Posterior Parietal Cortex J. Neurosci., March 29, 2006 • 26(13):3615–3620 • 3617
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reflects a visual memory trace or motor planning. Such dissociation is made possible by 
integrating into the task transformation rules, which allow the separation of reach 
goals from the cue position. Depending on the rules, the reach goal can arbitrarily be 
located anywhere relative to the cue position.  
 
FIGURE 8 | Anti-reach task. The color of a 
centrally presented stimulus (green/blue) instructs 
pro- or anti-reaches. The movement goal (dotted 
circles; not visible to the monkey) is, in case of a 
pro-reach, at the location (left, right, up, or down) 
of the previously flashed cue (CUE) or, in case of an 
anti-reach, opposite of it. (figure from Gail & 
Andersen 2006) 
One classic paradigm is the anti-reach task, in which the color of the spatial cue 
instructs the subject to either directly reach towards the cue direction itself or to reach 
in the opposite direction (Figure 8). This task design successfully distinguished pure 
motor goal tuned neurons – exhibiting spatial selectivity depending on reach direction 
and not on cue location – from visually tuned neurons, with selectivity depending on 
cue locations (Crammond & Kalaska 1994; Gail & Andersen 2006; Gail et al. 2009; 
Westendorff et al. 2010; Klaes et al. 2011).  
It is noteworthy that as motor goal representations are known to be modulated by eye 
positions and eye movements (Buneo et al. 2002; Snyder, Batista & Andersen 2000b), 
studies on movement intention thus typically require subjects to maintain gaze at one 
position (ocular fixation) throughout the experimental trial. 
Rule-based reach selection tasks  
Since decision-making in the sensorimotor system has started to be in the focus, 
various tasks have been designed in order to reveal various decision parameters in the 
sensorimotor brain areas, such as reward value and probability (Sugrue et al. 2004; Platt 
Everling et al., 1999; Gottlieb and Goldberg, 1999; Everling and Mu-
noz, 2000; Zhang and Barash, 2000) permitted the time-continuous
assessment of sensory- versus motor-related spatial tuning of neural
activity (Georgopoulos et al., 1989; Lurito et al., 1991; Zhang et al.,
1997; Zhang and Barash, 2000, 2004). The dynamics of the sensory-
to-m tor transition revealed context-specific visuomotor transfor-
mations in PRR. During the delay period of a memory reach task,
PRR exclusively represented motor goals, not visual memories.
The latencies of these neural motor goal representations corre-
sponded with subjects’ reaction times, being higher for the incon-
gruent spatial stimulus–response (S–R) mapping during
anti-reaches.
Materials and Methods
Anti-reach task and control of behavioral parameters. Two male rhesus
monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were trained to perform a visually instructed,
center-out anti-reach task in a frontoparallel plane. Two versions of the
task were used, a memory task (Fig. 1 A) and a reaction time task. The
memory task was used for neural recordings to analyze the PRR activity
with respect to motor goal representations during the delay period (as
opposed to motor representations during motor preparation/execu-
tion). The reaction time task was used to test for behavioral effects of the
task rule (pro/anti) on the speed of sensorimotor transformations.
In the memory task, the monkey initiated a trial by fixating a small
central, red fixation spot and touching an adjacent green or blue hand
target (fixation period). The green touch target instructed a pro-reach
trial, and the blue target an anti-reach trial. After a fixed delay (1.0 s), a
peripheral visual cue of the same color as the central hand target was
briefly flashed (cue period, 0.2 s), indicating to the monkey where he later
will have to reach. For a variable duration, the monkey had to keep the
hand fixation (memory period, 1.0 –1.5 s). When the central hand target
turned off (go signal), the monkey had to reach (movement period,
maximum, 1.0 s) either to the memorized location of the previously
flashed cue (pro-reach; green cue) or to the diametrically opposed posi-
tion (anti-reach; blue cue). The monkey received visual feedback about
the correct movement goal (circular patch
stimulus at the motor goal location) as soon as
he acquired the desired position, or after the
maximum movement period expired, in which
case the trial was aborted. The monkey had to
keep his hand at the reach target location (feed-
back period, 0.3 s) to successfully finish the trial
and receive liquid reward.
In the reaction time task, the monkeys had to
reach toward the movement goal immediately
after the visual cue was presented. The memory
period was omitted in this case, and the maxi-
mum allowed movement period (reaction plus
movement time) was reduced to 0.7– 0.8 s. In
every other respect, the reaction time task was
identical to the memory task described above.
Reaction time was defined as the time between
the movement instruction and the monkey’s re-
lease of the touch screen. Movement time was
defined as the time between the release and re-
acquisition of the touch screen at the target
position.
Both versions of the anti-reach task consisted
of eight different trial conditions (four target
positions by two mapping rules, pro/anti). The
four possible peripheral reach targets (right, 0°;
up, 90°; left, 180°; down, 270° direction) were
pseudorandomly interleaved from trial to trial.
Eccentricity was always 9 cm (corresponding to
17–20° visual angles for screen distances of
25–30 cm for the two monkeys). Pro- and anti-
reaches were also pseudorandomly interleaved;
except for 12 of the 60 recording sessions total,
when a block esign was us d (80 trials per block). The data from the
block-wise recordings yield no differences to the randomized recordings
and, therefore, will be presented jointly.
Eye position was registered with an infrared CCD camera (240 Hz;
ISCAN, Burlington, MA). The monkeys had to keep ocular fixation
throughout the course of the trial (tolerance, 3.5– 4.0° visual angle).
Hand position was registered with a 19 inch touch screen (IntelliTouch;
ELO Systems, Menlo Park, CA). The hand stimulus had to be continu-
ously touched within a tolerance window of typically 1.8 cm (3.5– 4.0°
visual angle at 25–30 cm screen distance) for the central, and 2.5–3.5 cm
(4.8 – 8.0°) for the peripheral targets. Otherwise, the trial was immedi-
ately aborted without reward. Visual instruction stimuli were either pre-
sented on a liquid crystal display monitor (19 inch ViewSonic VX924; !5
ms off– on– off response time) mounted behind the touch-sensitive
screen, or rear-projected from a digital light processing projector (U2–
870; Plus Corporation, Tokyo, Japan) onto a tangent screen attached to
back of the touch-sensitive screen. Visual display latencies were recorded
with photo diodes for both systems and corrected for in the data analysis.
Animal preparation and recording procedure. Both monkeys first were
implanted with a head holder. After the monkeys had learned the task,
recording chambers were implanted above the posterior parietal cortex,
contralaterally to the handedness of each monkey, to allow access to the
medial wall of the intraparietal sulcus. Structural magnetic resonance
imaging was used to identify the position of the intraparietal sulcus for
placement of the recording chambers and guidance of the recordings
(Fig. 1 B). Surgical and imaging procedures were conducted under gen-
eral anesthesia. All procedures were done in accordance with National
Institutes of Health guidelines and were approved by the California In-
stitute of Technology Animal Care and Use Committee.
Extracellular neural recordings were made from up to five microelec-
trodes simultaneously using a five-channel microdrive (“mini-matrix”;
Thomas Recording, Giessen, Germany). The raw signal from each elec-
trode was preamplified (20"; Thomas Recording), bandpassed, and am-
plified (154 Hz to 8.8 kHz; 400 – 800"; Plexon, Dallas, TX), before being
subjected to on-line spike-sorting (Sort Client; Plexon). All spike wave-
forms were digitized (40 kHz) and recorded to disk for off-line control of
Figure 1. A, Memory-guided anti-reach task. The monkey had to keep ocular fixation on a small central red dot throughout the
trial. The color of the central hand stimulus (green/blue) instructed randomly interleaved pro- or anti-reaches with the movement
goal (dotted circles; not visible to the monkey) either at the location (left, right, up, or down) of the previously flashed cue (CUE)
or opposite of it. Disappearance of the central hand stimulus after a variable memory period (MEM) instructed the movement
(MOV). Visual feedback (FDB) appeared only after the monkey touched the correct goal on the screen (success) or after a wait time
had expired short enough not to allow posture corrections (failure). B, Localization of recording sites (cross indicates estimated
center) in the PRR in the medial intraparietal sulcus (IPS) of monkey TI. (Shaded areas in the left one-half of the axial view are
imaging artifacts.) C, Typical delay period tuning in PRR. Outer panels, Response profiles (PSTHs; aligned with movement instruc-
tion at t # 0; smoothed with 50 ms Gaussian kernel) of a single example neuron strongly selective for the four different locations
of the cue/reach goal during the standard memory-guided pro-reach. The inner panel shows the corresponding tuning curve with
the resulting directional tuning vector (see Materials and Methods) for the late memory period (shaded area in PSTHs). Smoothed
PSTHs or interpolated curves were only used for illustr tion; all quantitative analyses were performed based on direct spike counts.
Gail and Andersen • Context-Specific Transformations in PRR J. Neurosci., September 13, 2006 • 26(37):9376 –9384 • 9377
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& Glimcher 1999; Lau & Glimcher 2005; Pastor-Bernier & Cisek 2011), evidence 
accumulation (Roitman & Shadlen 2002; Coallier et al. 2015), and decision 
commitment (Thura & Cisek 2014). However, the reward-related signals detected in 
the brain might not directly encode the reward itself but could turn out to represent 
something else, such as motivation, salience, prediction of sensory stimuli or sensory 
outcome (e.g. taste of the juice reward, hand touching money), as well as motor 
responses, which could be both anticipation of movements to receive reward (e.g. 
approaching a prey, reaching for a bottle of milk in the fridge) and consummatory 
responses (e.g. chewing or sucking). The encoding of value and its consequence are 
then worth being properly categorized for a better understanding of value encoding as 
well as learning and decision mechanisms in the brain. (O'Doherty 2014) 
Following the same reasoning, when a decider has to choose between touching two 
icons, each of which is associated with a certain value, we cannot rule out whether the 
neural signals reflect options by encoding the icons associated to different values 
(stimulus value) or to the reach plans towards each of the icon (action value) because 
the sensorimotor system encodes both visual stimuli and future movements.  
Here again, we could employ transformation rules to distinguish stimulus and 
movement encoding. Indeed, a recent study from our laboratory (Klaes et al. 2011) 
showed that the sensorimotor cortices encode both alternative motor goals even when 
the reach goals had to be inferred based on an abstract rule. Furthermore, when the 
monkeys showed biased choice behavior, PMd and PRR neurons also showed biased 
motor goal representation. However, the balanced and biased scenarios were recorded 
in two separate datasets. It is of high interest therefore to investigate whether one and 
the same population of neurons could encode alternative motor goals in a graded 
fashion, reflecting degrees of subsequent choice bias. To achieve this aim, we induced 
graded degrees of movement planning using a prior indicating the probability of two 
potential reach goals, and, importantly, a rule-based reach goals in order to access pure 
motor-goal encoding. 
Of particular interest here is the findings that neural activity in the sensorimotor 
system has been shown to be modulated depending on reward expectation (Sugrue et 
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al. 2004; Platt & Glimcher 1999). In the work of this thesis, experimental 
manipulations of prior probability, in contrast to planning-independent expected reward 
of options at the decision moment, together with the rule-based motor goals, instead 
of motor goals physically marked by visual cue, allowed us to probe whether reward-
independent choice bias would be reflected by degrees of movement plans in 
sensorimotor system.  
Aim of the project 
Since the effect of action planning on decision-making has never been clearly 
distinguished from the effect of reward expectation, the human psychophysical study 
was initiated with the aim of tackling this problem. We designed experimental 
paradigms in which we could directly test whether preliminary action plans, in contrast 
to preliminary reward expectations, can influence choice between equal-valued options. 
As stated at the end of the section Neuroscience of decision-making, effects of prior 
probability and expected value could not be dissociated in the classic risky choice 
paradigm due to an overlap of reward probability, target probability, and choice 
probability. In addition, due to the fact that subjects typically have to immediately 
make a choice once all potential options are offered, this paradigm provides no way of 
preventing subjects from immediately planning towards the higher-value option 
(Figure 9: Risky choice). In order to manipulate action planning in a graded fashion, we 
designed pre-cued instruction tasks, in which a pre-cue indicated two potential 
targets and their assigned probabilities of occurrence as target in a trial. A subsequent 
rule cue validated these assigned probabilities. Subjects had to follow the imperative 
rule cue; if they did not, the trial was considered unsuccessful (Figure 9: Pre-cued 
instruction). The prior knowledge provided by the pre-cue thus helps subjects to predict 
the valid target and encourages them to plan their later movements.  
While increasing target probability, the pre-cue also increases reward expectation for 
that target. We then compared subjects’ response to another task in which we matched 
the expected value (reward probability × amount) while discouraging subjects from 
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planning by not providing information about probability of occurrence. In this second 
task, the pre-cue indicated the amount of reward that subjects would receive in case 
each target would be instructed while we kept the probability of each target to be 
instructed always at 50%. This probability-neutral pre-cue carried no information that 
would be useful to predict the valid target and to start any movement plan. This results 
in two tasks: PROB task – in which the probability was varied and the reward amount 
was fixed – and AMNT task – in which the probability was fixed and the reward 
amount was varied. On top of this, we included choice trials, which were randomly 
interleaved and which always provided equal reward, in order to probe the choice bias 
induced by prior probability and potential payoff. 
 
FIGURE 9 | risky-choice and pre-cued instruction tasks. Risky choice paradigm: a trial starts with 
presentation of two options with different probabilities of occurrence, which matches with the probability of 
reward in this paradigm. Subjects can make up their mind as soon as the options are revealed. After choosing, a 
feedback signal depending on the prior probability, indicates to the subject whether their choice was right or 
wrong (i.e. choice rewarded or not). Pre-cued instruction paradigm: a trial starts with two alternatives with 
different assigned probabilities of occurrence. Subjects cannot choose as soon as they are aware of options but 
have to wait for a subsequent instruction. The rule-cue indicates which cued target is valid for this trial, on the 
basis of the probability previously announced by the pre-cue. The choice (white) rule cue allows subjects to 
choose between both options with equal reward. In this case, subjects are under uncertainty only until the 
instruction appears, afterwards subjects are completely risk-free. 
Next, since the sensorimotor decision-making mechanism has been proposed as a 
competition between action plans, it is then essential to investigate whether motor-
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planning activities in our paradigm show a graded pattern reflecting the graded level of 
prior manipulation as well as graded subsequent choice bias. 
In the pro-anti reach task, one spatial cue generates two movement options with 
unequal difficulties: pro-reach – reaching towards the spatial cue – is easier than anti-
reach – reaching to the opposite direction to the spatial cue. Klaes et al. (2011) 
unexpectedly detected biased choice behavior, probably due to the anti-reach which 
was more difficult for the monkeys and required more intensive training than the pro-
reach (Figure 10: Pro-Anti task). The monkeys were subsequently trained to perform 
balanced choice behavior for the balanced dataset. 
 
FIGURE 10| pro-anti reaches and Clockwise (cw) – counterclockwise (c cw) reaches. Pro-anti reaches 
(top row): the green rule-cue (box framing the centered gaze and hand fixation points) indicates the pro-rule, 
instructing a reach towards the spatial cue (white circle); the blue rule-cue indicates the anti-rule, instructing a 
reach in the opposite direction of the spatial cue; and the white rule-cue announces a choice trials in which 
subject can freely choose between pro or anti reaches. Cw-ccw reaches (middle row): pre-cue triangles 
indicate two potential motor goals, located 90° degree cw and ccw to the pre-cue. Colored (magenta or cyan) rule-
cue instructs a reach to the cw or ccw reach goal pointed by the pre-cue triangle of the matched color (colors can 
be swapped; no fixed association of colors and rules). The white rule-cue allows subject to freely choose 
between cw and ccw rules. Dashed circles indicate correct reach targets for each cue configuration; these were not 
shown on the screen during the experiment. Pre-cue set (bottom): the pre-cue triangles can be of different 
relative sizes, indicating different probabilities of each possible reach goal which is subsequently instructed by 
the rule-cue. 
In our case, as we were directly dealing with bias manipulation, we designed a 
behavioral task in which both reach options were rule-based to avoid any initial bias 
due to unequally difficult rules as options. The clockwise and counterclockwise rules 
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relative to the cue position were introduced with symbolic cues (double triangles), 
guiding reach directions ±90° relative to the cue position (Figure 10: Cw-ccw task). 
Additionally, we applied different degrees of bias manipulation by assigning different 
relative probabilities of each rule, mediated to subjects by the size of the triangles.  
It is worth mentioning that studies of responses that depend on context or arbitrary 
rules are of interest not only because we could obtain neural signals representing motor 
goals during movement planning but, in a broader context, they could also lead to a 
better understanding of other challenging rule-based behaviors such as symbol-guided 
responses and language (Wise & Murray 2000). 
We used rule-based reach selection tasks with both human and monkey subjects for 
the compatibility of behavioral results. 
To summarize, in this PhD work, we aimed to study the influence of planning on 
decision-making between rule-based reach goals. The ultimate aim of the work is to 
gain further understanding of sensorimotor roles on both sensorimotor transformation 
and decision-making. It is hoped that this work will provide another piece of the 
puzzle contributing to a better understanding of neural decision-making mechanism. 
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the manuscript; AG edited the manuscript. Authors discussed the results and 




  22 
I plan therefore I choose: Free-choice bias due to prior action-
probability but not action-value 
In this chapter, we investigated the influence of a preliminary action plan on decision-
making. We induced movement planning using the predictability of target locations 
provided by probabilistic pre-cues (PROB task: varied probability, fixed reward amount) 
and compared subjects’ responses with the case when pre-cues indicated the potential 
payoff (AMNT task: varied reward amount, fixed probability). This design then provided 
seven bias levels with compatible reward expectancies (Probability × Amount) across 
tasks, with preliminary action planning encouraged only in the PROB task. We tested 
whether the preliminary plan towards one option, induced by predictability in PROB task, 
would differentially bias subsequent choice between equally valued options, compared to 
pure preferability, prior reward expectation without preliminary plan in AMNT task. 
The results of this study showed that the target predictability induced strong and graded 
choice bias, depending on the bias degree induced. In addition to choice bias, subjects 
also showed faster reaction times in a graded fashion when choosing the biased option. 
However, the preferability induced only a slight choice bias on average. Indeed, the 
majority of subjects did not show choice bias at all. Importantly, the choice bias, in a 
subset of subjects, resulting from our payoff manipulation was not accompanied by a 
reaction time benefit.  
We interpreted these results in light of the drift-diffusion model (DDM). Among other 
results, the fact that the biasing effect of the probabilistic pre-cue persisted in choice 
trials, where there was no evidence provided and both options offered equal reward, 
supported the baseline shift process. However, such baseline shift process fails to 
describe the limited biasing effect of prior reward expectation, when movement planning 
was discouraged, which then favored the drift rate change explanation. 
This study provided evidence for the influence of action planning on decision-making and 
thereby supports the idea that the underlying mechanisms overlap. 
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I plan therefore I choose: Free-choice bias due to prior action-
probability but not action-value 
Lalitta Suriya-Arunroj1 and Alexander Gail1,2,3  
1 Sensorimotor Group, German Primate Center, Göttingen, Germany 
2 Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience, Göttingen, Germany 
3 Georg August University, Göttingen, Germany 
Abstract 
According to an emerging view, decision-making and motor planning are tightly 
entangled at the level of neural processing. Choice is influenced not only by the values 
associated with different options, but also biased by other factors. Here we test the 
hypothesis that preliminary action planning can induce choice biases gradually and 
independently of objective value when planning overlaps with one of the potential action 
alternatives.  
Subjects performed center-out reaches obeying either a clockwise or counterclockwise 
cue-response rule in two tasks. In the probabilistic task, a pre-cue indicated the 
probability of each of the two potential rules to become valid. When the subsequent rule-
cue unambiguously indicated which of the pre-cued rules was actually valid (instructed 
trials), subjects responded faster to rules pre-cued with higher probability. When subjects 
were allowed to choose freely between two equally rewarded rules (choice trials) they 
chose the originally more likely rule more often and faster, despite the lack of an objective 
advantage in selecting this target.  
In the amount task, the pre-cue indicated the amount of potential reward associated with 
each rule. Subjects responded faster to rules pre-cued with higher reward amount in 
instructed trials of the amount task, equivalent to the more likely rule in the probabilistic 
task. Yet, in contrast, subjects showed hardly any choice bias and no increase in response 
speed in favor of the original high-reward target in the choice trials of the amount task. 
We conclude that free-choice behavior is robustly biased when predictability encourages 
the planning of one of the potential responses, while prior reward expectations without 
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action planning do not induce such strong bias. Our results provide behavioral evidence 
for distinct contributions of expected value and action planning in decision-making and a 
tight interdependence of motor planning and action selection, supporting the idea that the 
underlying neural mechanisms overlap. 
We conclude that free-choice behavior is particularly biased when pre-cues allow the 
planning of one response over another alternative. Our results provide behavioral 
evidence for distinct contributions of expected value and action planning in decision-
making process. The results also provided evidence for the tight interdependence of 
decision behavior and motor planning, thereby supporting the idea that the underlying 
neural mechanisms overlap. 
 
Keyword: reach movement, decision-making, action selection, motor planning, 
bias, prior probability, expected value 
Introduction 
During economic choice, we weigh potential options. In general, the most beneficial or 
least costly option directs our decision. When deciding between equally valued options, an 
economic decision results in choice of either option with equal probability, known as 
matching behavior (Herrnstein, 1961; Lau and Glimcher, 2005; Pierce and Epling, 1983; 
Sugrue et al., 2004). However, factors other than value-based preference can also 
influence our choices. In statistical decision theory, value is one building block, which 
together with prior probability and evidence, forms the three main computational elements 
of decision-making processes (Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Furthermore, choices normally 
require action selection. Independent of the expected reward, differences in physical 
effort between response options can be an obvious motor-related decision factor (Burk et 
al., 2014; Kurniawan et al., 2011; Rigoux and Guigon, 2012). But more than that, covert 
motor-related factors, like prior action planning, could also be expected to influence later 
overt responses, and hence decision outcomes (Cisek, 2007; Gallivan et al., 2015). Here 
we compare the effect of prior motor planning with prior value-based preference on choice 
probabilities and choice reaction times in situations with balanced reward (neutral free 
choice) at the time of the actual decision. 
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Imagine you are late for dinner. Your two alternative routes home are on average equally 
fast but depend on current traffic. In scenario 1, the slow truck in front of you indicates a 
turn to the right. This will likely make you plan a left turn at the next intersection, because 
with the truck going right, the left route now is faster, hence has a higher value. If the 
truck then unexpectedly pulls into a rest area you are free to choose between equal-valued 
options (neutral choice) once you arrive at the intersection (time of commitment). Will 
you stick with your prior plan, even though both alternatives would now be equally 
attractive? In scenario 2, the truck’s indicators are so dirty that you cannot identify an 
indicated direction, but you know that the left route would allow you to overtake the 
truck more easily than the right route. This means the left route has a higher (truck-
conditional) value, as the truck would slow you down less. If the truck then unexpectedly 
pulls into a rest area, both options are equal-valued again. Will you decide based on your 
prior value-based preference? Both scenarios have in common that the value is initially 
higher for the left route, in scenario 1 due to an imbalance in prior probability, in scenario 
2 due to an imbalance in prior value of a decision-critical event that is yet to happen (the 
truck’s actual turn = evidence). Also, in both scenarios, you will be provided with 
evidence immediately before your commitment, and most times (truck turns left or right) 
this will directly instruct your choice (go the other way). Finally, in both scenarios, the 
expected value becomes neutralized when the truck pulls into the rest area, rendering 
both of your alternatives equally valued. The scenarios differ in their intuitive effect on 
action planning. In scenario 1 your initial preference based on the probability of the later 
event encourages you to preliminarily plan your action. Instead, in scenario 2, even 
though you also have an initial value-based preference, the situation discourages specific 
action planning until you know the truck’s actual turn, since each turn is equally likely. 
Will an a priori value-based preference in which action planning is discouraged affect your 
later neutral choice differently to an a priori preference that is associated with an action 
plan? This is the question we address in this study. 
To investigate the effect of motor planning on choice, we need to dissociate planning 
from value-based preference. It is known that movement planning is encouraged by 
motor-goal predictability. For example, tasks with probabilistic pre-cues, as used in early 
attention studies (Posner et al., 1980), have been adopted in sensorimotor studies to test 
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the ability to plan movements in Parkinson’s disease patients (Jahanshahi et al., 1992; Leis 
et al., 2005; Praamstra et al., 1996; Stelmach et al., 1986). In such tasks, the pre-cue 
correctly indicates the location of an upcoming target with a typical probability of 80% 
(cue validity) while in the remaining 20% of trials the non-cued target will be instructed. A 
subsequent imperative cue instructs the subject when and towards which target location 
to act. The prior information contained in the pre-cue encourages subjects to plan the 
movement towards the pre-cued target, confirmed by effects of cue-validity on reaction 
times and, in some cases, movement times (Leis et al., 2005). Following the rationale of 
cue validity, a neutral pre-cue indicating equal probability of occurrence for each target 
should not evoke imbalanced preliminary planning. We used this rationale for testing the 
biasing effect of motor planning on reward-balanced choices. For this we manipulated the 
degree of motor planning by different degrees of motor-goal predictability. 
However, probabilistic pre-cues can confound predictability with preferability of a motor goal. 
Among multiple targets, if the validity of one target becomes larger, the probability of 
receiving reward at that target also increases, and hence the expected value, defined as the 
product of probability and amount of reward (Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Levy and 
Glimcher, 2012; Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), will also increase for the higher-
validity target. In order to disentangle the effect of planning from the effect of reward 
expectation, we designed two tasks with matched expected rewards but only one of which 
encouraged preliminary action planning.  
In the context of probabilistic choice behavior, a prior should have more impact when 
evidence is weaker (Körding and Wolpert, 2004; Vilares et al., 2012). Therefore, the effect 
of the prior is typically investigated in situations when decisions are based on ambiguous 
evidence. For example, using random dot motion stimuli, priors were shown to influence 
the interpretation of ambiguous visual sensory evidence (e.g. Mulder et al., 2012) and 
affect the latency of action initiation (e.g. Carpenter and Williams, 1995). Yet, if the 
perceptual interpretation of the evidence is one-to-one associated with a behavioral 
response then a prior is also likely to invoke preliminary action planning. It can therefore 
be difficult to disentangle whether the effect of the prior on choice is mediated via an 
effect on sensory processing or on action planning. Here we test the effect of prior 
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probabilities without any perceptual uncertainty, emphasizing the effect of action 
planning on choice. 
Even though our experiment did not utilize ambiguous cumulative sensory evidence 
towards a perceptual decision, but rather immediate unambiguous evidence (instructed 
trials) or rule-neutral evidence (choice trials), we find it helpful to conceptualize our study 
in the context of drift-diffusion models (DDM). On the basis of the DDM, 
conceptualizing decision processes as a gradual accumulation of evidence towards one of 
two alternative boundaries (e.g. Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff et al., 1999), bias can be explained 
by different computational mechanisms: (1) a shorter migration distance, either due to a 
baseline shift (Ratcliff, 1985) or a bound shift (Ratcliff, 1978), or (2) a change in drift rate 
(Ratcliff, 1981). These mechanisms allow accumulated evidence to reach one bound with 
smaller reaction times (RT) and higher choice probabilities (CP). Which mechanism is 
responsible for RT reduction and CP increase in which behavioral context is a topic of 
ongoing research (Summerfield and Tsetsos, 2012). In the context of perceptual decision-
making, previous studies showed that prior probability adapts migration distance (Bogacz 
et al., 2006; Mulder et al., 2012; Simen et al., 2009) while strength of evidence steers drift 
rate (Coallier and Kalaska, 2014; Coallier et al., 2015; Hanks et al., 2015; Roitman and 
Shadlen, 2002). However, the effect of expected value as been accounted for by different 
explanations: baseline shift (Bogacz et al., 2006; Maddox, 2002; Mulder et al., 2012) or 
drift rate change (Diederich and Busemeyer, 2006). The diversity of explanations for the 
effect of expected value could be due to insufficient systematic dissociation of other 
factors from the effects of movement planning as previous studies usually involved 
probabilistic choice tasks, which we avoid here. Additionally, we test the specific 
hypothesis that preference leads to the same biasing effects as planning, except for a 
downscaling factor that reduces effect strength (Bogacz, 2007; Maddox and Bohil, 1998; 
Mulder et al., 2012). Such downscaling should be particularly obvious when testing 
multiple levels of bias, in which case it should be possible to estimate the value-based bias 
from the probabilistic bias by applying a fixed gain factor. Instead of using only a single 
level of bias manipulation, we therefore probed for a graded effect of graded prior 
probability as opposed to graded value. 
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To our knowledge, no study has directly tested the proportional effect of action planning 
on choices in which there is no difference in expected value between options. According 
to emerging evidence, neural mechanisms overlap between decision-making and 
movement planning (Cisek, 2007; Coallier et al., 2015; Gallivan et al., 2015; Hanks et al., 
2015; Klaes et al., 2011; Lindner et al., 2010; Scherberger and Andersen, 2007). We 
therefore hypothesize that previously planned actions should bias later neutral choices in 
favor of these actions, independently of reward expectation. 
Methods 
Participants 
43 subjects (30 females, age (mean ± SD): 27.45 ± 4.89) participated in the study as paid 
volunteers. Among the 43 subjects, 31 participated in both AMNT and PROB tasks (on 
two separate days; 19 did PROB task first and 12 did AMNT task first), 10 in only PROB 
task, and 2 in only AMNT task. All subjects were healthy, right-handed, and had self-
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Detailed written instructions were given 
to the subjects before the experiment. Prior to each recording session, subjects were 
familiarized with the set-up and practiced the task. All subjects gave written informed 
consent for participation. Experiments were in accordance with institutional guidelines 
for experiments with humans and adhered to the principles of the Declaration of 
Helsinki. The experimental protocol was approved by the ethics committee of the Georg-
Elias-Mueller-Institute for Psychology, University of Goettingen. 
We included all 43 subjects in the analyses. When comparing among conditions within 
each task with post-hoc tests, we included the 33 subjects who participated in the AMNT 
task and 41 subjects who participated in the PROB task. When comparing between tasks 
with post-hoc tests, we included the 31 subjects who participated in both tasks. 
Rule-selection task with sequential cueing 
The idea of the study was to investigate the influence of rule predictability and pure 
preference on choice behavior. The task implements the idea of the traffic example in the 
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introduction. We designed a center-out reach task with sequential cueing. A first pre-cue 
raised expectations on either the probability or the value of a later rule instruction (Figure 
1). The rule instruction (rule-cue) provided final information on the actual rule and hence 
the action(s) to be rewarded.  Two potential reach goals had to be inferred from the single 
pre-cued location based on clockwise (cw) and counterclockwise (ccw) transformation 
rules. We implemented two variants of this rule selection task, one in which the prior 
probability of either rule to be instructed was announced in advance by the pre-cue 
(PROB task), another in which the reward of either rule, in case it would be instructed, 
was announced (AMNT task). The choice experiment was risk-free, since at the time of 
the required behavioral response (decision), there was no uncertainty about the outcome; 
subjects were either instructed about the correct response immediately before the decision 
(instructed trials = truck turns left or right in the example from the Introduction), or they 
were free to choose among both options with 100% reward probability and equal reward 
amount for each option (choice trials = truck pulls into rest area). Note that the pre-cue 
was only informative about the reward structure of the instructed trials, while free-choice 
options were safe and equal-valued. As a consequence, subjects could achieve 100% 
reward probability with proper performance in all task conditions. The reward delivered 
in each trial was accumulated and translated into the compensation that participants 
received at the end of the session (see below). 
Due to the temporal separation between pre-cue and rule-cue, each choice was preceded 
by a brief planning period (approaching the intersection in the truck example). During the 
planning period subjects were uncertain about the type of trial (instructed or choice), and 
uncertain about what the instruction will be. For optimal performance, subjects in 
response to the final instruction had to either follow their initial expectation or 
countermand it (instructed trials), or freely choose (choice trials).  For example, a pre-cue 
in the AMNT task might raise the initial expectation that a left-side reach would be 
preferable, but the rule cue at the end of the planning period could still indicate a left-side 
or right-side single correct option (instructed trials) or two correct options (choice trial). 
The pre-cue could not be ignored, though, since the rule-cue only was meaningful in 
relation to the pre-cue. 
 
HUMAN PSYCHOPHYSICS  30 
The idea of this task design was that with a majority of instructed trials the pre-cue would 
induce a trial-by-trial behavioral bias, either based on predictability or preferability. In a 
first step, we had to confirm that both manipulations were effective in by analyzing 
subjects’ responses in the instructed trials. In instructed trials the manipulations had an 
actual effect on the reward outcome, hence an effect on behavior had to be expected. As 
the main research question, we test if the variable predictability and preferability had the same 
effects on free-choice behavior. We probed this with randomly interspersed choice trials. 
Since the choice trials were value-balanced and risk-free, any choice probabilities and 
other behavioral biases should reflect the subject’s a priori bias induced by the 
predictability or preferability resulting from the pre-cue, since no further immediate 
evidence supporting either rule is provided during the remainder of a choice trial. 
Importantly, in the AMNT task, we aimed to induce a preference in the subjects without 
encouraging planning of the according action since either rule was equally likely to be 
instructed. On the other hand, the PROB task instead would encourage preliminary 
planning of the action that was associated with the most likely correct option since, in the 
likely case of an instructed trial, the instruction would match the rule expectation. We 
tested the assumption that predictability, as opposed to preferability, would lead to target-
specific motor planning by additionally analyzing movement execution parameters in 
instructed trials. If such test yielded evidence for motor planning in predictable but not in 
preferable trials then any effects of predictability on choice behavior could be explained 
by an effect of motor planning.       
We then compared the effect on risk-free choice behavior of either a preliminary value-
based target preference (henceforth referred to as “preferability”, AMNT experiment) or 
a preliminary motor plan towards a probable target (henceforth referred to as 
“predictability”, PROB experiment). We will first describe in detail the elements of the 
task that are common to both experiments and then the differences in the reward 
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Graded bias manipulation in the rule-selection tasks 
Subjects in both experiments had to choose between either a clockwise (cw) or counter-
clockwise (ccw) spatial mapping rule to infer the reach target relative to the position of the 
pre-cue (rule-selection task). Subjects were requested to perform reaches from the center 
to one of the four cardinal (0°, 90°, 180°, and 270°) targets in the periphery (center-out 
reach) on a touch screen (eccentricity of 9 cm with ~40 cm of screen distance, depending 
on subjects’ reaching range), while maintaining gaze at the screen center (eye fixation) 
throughout the trial. The target locations had to be inferred from an incongruent cue 
location and were not marked by visual stimuli (rule-based movement). 
 
FIGURE 1 | Rule-selection tasks with probabilistic (PROB) and amount (AMNT) bias manipulations. A 
trial starts with eye-hand fixation. Next, a pre-cue appears at one of the four cardinal locations (top, down, left, 
right), indicating two potential goals and the probability of each goal in the PROB task (big triangle - high 
probability), or the reward amount associated with each goal in the AMNT task (big triangle - more reward). In the 
PROB task, the reward amount is kept constant in all conditions, whereas in the AMNT task the probability is kept 
equal in all conditions. After a memory period, the rule-cue appears and either indicates one valid target or leaves the 
options open so that subjects can freely choose. Both options in choice trials always provide equal value. 
Each trial started with a fixation period. Small red and white squares were presented at 
the center of the screen as eye and hand fixation points, respectively (Figure 1). Subjects 
initiated the trial by directing gaze to the eye fixation spot and, at the same time, touching 
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the hand fixation spot (tolerance window: 3 cm radius). After a random period of 500-
1000 ms fixation, a spatial pre-cue flashed briefly (200 ms) at one of the four cardinal 
target positions. The pre-cue consisted of two differently colored triangles, one pointing 
to the cw, the other to the ccw direction. The two triangles indicated the only two possible 
reach targets in a given trial, one at 90° cw and one at 90° ccw from the pre-cue, at identical 
eccentricity.  
There was no fixed association between rules (cw or ccw) and colors. Subjects had to 
remember the pre-cue colors and match these with the subsequent color information of 
the rule-cue to complete the trial correctly. At the end of the following random-length 
memory period (500-1000 ms), the rule-cue appeared. The rule-cue consisted of a box 
framing the fixation points and was either colored to match one of the pre-cue triangles 
(instructed trials), or color-neutral (white; choice trials). In the instructed trials the colored 
rule-cue narrowed down the two potential targets to only one single correct target (cw or 
ccw). The reward probability for the instructed target was always 100%, for the alternative 
target 0%. In the choice trials, both potential targets indicated by the pre-cue were 
rendered valid with 100% reward probability by the color-neutral rule-cue. In choice trials 
the reward amount was always fixed and independent of the size of the pre-cue or any 
previous choice responses (reward-all schedule). Simultaneously with the onset of the 
rule-cue, the hand fixation point disappeared (“go” signal) and subjects had to reach 
toward the instructed or chosen target within a maximum of 1000 ms. In each block of 
six trials, two trials were randomly set to be choice trials, and the remaining four were 
instructed trials. Each unsuccessful trial was reinserted into the trial sequence. 
In case of successful acquisition of a rewarded target, subjects received positive feedback 
in the form of a circular patch at the target position with an encouraging high-pitched 
tone (coin sound). If subjects failed to reach the correct target, the trial was aborted and a 
demotivating low-pitched tone was played. Failure trials included aborted trials due to 
ocular fixation breaks, incorrect reaches to locations on the screen outside the tolerance 
window (3 cm radius) around the valid target(s), and reaches later than the maximal 
response time. Subjects were explicitly requested to respond as accurately and as rapidly 
as possible. 
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Subjects had to perform the rule-selection task in two variants, which differed only in the 
instructed trials, not the choice trials. The idea was to induce a graded level of 
predictability (PROB task) or preferability (AMNT task) between the two possible rules. 
For this, the relative size of the two triangles in the pre-cue was varied in seven steps 
corresponding to seven instructed expectation levels. Note, for convenience we refer to 
these levels jointly as ‘bias conditions’ even though the behavioral bias that will be 
potentially induced by this task parameter is our tested variable. In the zero-bias trials the 
triangles had equal size. In the 100% bias level conditions either only the cw or the ccw 
triangle was visible and larger than in the zero-bias condition. In the intermediate bias 
conditions the two triangles had intermediate sizes. The seven instructed-bias conditions 
used the following combinations of pre-cue triangles (base lengths of the triangle):  
{3.5:0.0, 3.0:0.7, 2.5:1.4, 2.0:2.0, 1.4:2.5, 0.7:3.0, 0.0:3.5}. The bias level was kept constant 
within each block of six trials as will be described below.  
Probabilistic rule-selection task (PROB) 
The idea of the PROB task was to induce a graded level of rule predictability across trials, 
without a difference in the final value of the two motor-goal options. In the PROB task, 
we assigned the colors magenta and cyan to the two pre-cue triangles. The size of the pre-
cue triangles indicated the likelihood with which the cw and ccw rules would be instructed 
by the rule-cue later in the trial. The reward for the targets associated with either rule was 
identical. Seven bias levels corresponded to likelihoods of {6:0, 3:1, 2:1, 1:1, 1:2, 1:3, 0:6} 
for an instruction of the ccw or cw rule, respectively. In the case of a bias level 2:1 towards 
ccw, subjects were offered 4 ccw trials and 2 cw trials. Subjects received 3 reward units for 
each correctly performed instructed trial and 1.5 reward units for either choice in the 
choice trials. Thus, at the 100% bias levels (6:0 or 0:6), the low probability rule had 0% 
chance of getting 3 units in instructed trials and 100% of getting 1.5 units in choice trials, 
resulting in an expected value of 0×3×2/3 + 1×1.5×1/3 = 0.5 reward units. The high 
probability rule had a 100% chance of getting 3 units in instructed trials and 100% chance 
of getting 1.5 units in choice trials, resulting in an expected value of 1×3×2/3 + 
1×1.5×1/3 = 2.5 reward units. The ratios of initially expected values (EV) associated with 
the two rules at the seven bias levels were then {2.5:0.5, 2:1, 1.83:1.17, 1.5:1.5, 1.17:1.83, 
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1:2, 0.5:2.5}. Note that these initial EVs were only valid for the time between the pre-cue 
and the rule-cue. After the rule-cue, the final value for instructed trials was 3 for the 
instructed rule, zero for the non-instructed rule, and 1.5 for both rules in the choice trials. 
Reward-amount based rule-selection task (AMNT) 
The idea of the AMNT task was to induce a graded preference for the different options 
without being encouraged to plan an according movement. In the AMNT task we 
assigned colors orange and green to the two pre-cue triangles. The size of the pre-cue 
triangles indicated the amount of reward that would be associated with each rule in case it 
was instructed later in the trial. The probability of each rule being instructed was kept 
50:50. The reward units at the seven bias levels corresponded to {6:0, 5:1, 4:2, 3:3, 2:4, 
1:5, 0:6}. For example, in the case of a bias level 4:2 towards ccw, subjects got 4 reward 
units for an instructed ccw reach and 2 units for an instructed cw reach, whereas in the case 
of a bias level 6:0 towards cw, subjects received 6 reward units for cw reach but nothing for 
ccw reach (but still have to reach to the unrewarded target to complete that experimental 
block and proceed to the next block). The length of the feedback sound at the end of 
successful trials matched the amount of reward subjects received in that given trial. The 
ratios of initial EV associated with the two rules at the seven bias levels were then 
{2.5:0.5, 2.17:0.83, 1.83:1.17, 1.5:1.5, 1.17:1.83, 0.83:2.17, 0.5:2.5}. Again, these EVs were 
only valid for the time between pre-cue and rule-cue. After the rule-cue, the final EV for 
instructed trials was equal to the reward units assigned to the instructed rule (6:0, 5:1, 
etc.), always zero for the non-instructed rule, and 1.5 for both rules in the choice trials. 
Importantly, we matched the preliminary EVs in the PROB and AMNT tasks as closely 
as possible, given the block structure of trials. In five out of seven conditions the EVs 
matched exactly. In two conditions the EV ratios matched approximately (PROB 2:1, 
AMNT 2.17:0.83). Choice trials and zero-bias trials were identical between both tasks in 
all other respects. Thus, prior to the rule-cue (when subjects did not know yet if a given 
trial will be instructed or choice) and after the rule-cue, the EVs for choice trials in both 
tasks matched. Hence our task design ensures that any observed differences in the free-
choice behavior between the two tasks should be attributable to biases that were 
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introduced by the purposeful manipulation of the expectation for the instructed trials, and 
not to differences in the choice trials. 
We also ran a control experiment for the AMNT task in which we doubled the reward 
contrast between high- and low-valued options. The reward units at the seven bias levels 
in this AMNT-double task corresponded to {12:0, 8.5:0.5, 5:1, 3:3, 1:5, 0.5:8.5, 0:6}. 16 
subjects who had previously participated to the AMNT experiment were invited to 
perform the AMNT-double task. The subgroup selection depended only on subject 
availability and was independent of previous performance on the AMNT task. 
Subject compensation and bonus 
Recording sessions terminated when subjects reached 600 successful trials. By design, the 
same amount of reward was reached in both types of task. In the PROB task, in one 
block of six trials, the four instructed trials (4 × 3 units) and two choice trials (2 × 1.5 
units) led to 15 reward units. To reach 600 trials, subjects needed to complete 100 blocks, 
i.e. a total of 15 × 100 = 1500 units. In the AMNT task, in each biased block, two out of 
four instructed trials delivered high reward and another two delivered low reward, e.g. in a 
1:5 condition block, subjects received (5 × 2) + (1 × 2) = 12 reward units. Two choice 
trials (2 × 1.5 units) added to the same total of 15 units per block as in the PROB task. 
We converted 3 reward units to 2 Euro cent, which finally made 2/3 × 1500 units = 1000 
cent, thus €10 per session. As there was no penalty for aborted trials and subjects had to 
reach the same number of successful trials, the total compensation per session was 
identical between tasks. 
Additional to the baseline compensation of €10 for each accomplished session, a bonus 
of up to €6 for good performance could be achieved: performance under 50%: no bonus; 
50%: bonus of €1; then each step of 5% will add €0.5 until reaching maximal bonus of €6 
at 100%). Alternatively, subjects received a compensation of €6 per hour, if this yielded 
the higher compensation. For example, subjects with very high performance typically 
spent about one hour and received €15-16 whereas subjects who made many error trials 
and/or multiple pauses (self-paced task design) spent about two hours in the setup and 
received €12-13). 
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Pre-recording procedure and balancing 
Subjects were required to maintain gaze at the center of the screen. For this, a calibration 
of the eye-tracking system was first carried out. Then a short (5-10 minutes) training 
session was run to accustom subjects to the task and setup condition. Since our 
experiment aimed at quantifying biasing effects, we wanted subjects to explore the range 
of possible free-choice responses before the start of the experiment. For this, we ran an 
initial balancing session for each subject to discourage subjects from repeating the same 
default reach choices through the rest of the experimental session. The balancing task 
contained only trials with a zero-bias condition (equal triangle sizes) and differed from the 
rule-selection task described above only in the reward schedule that we applied on the 
choice trials. Instead of rewarding both options with 100% probability, we used a bias-
minimizing reward schedule (BMRS). In the BMRS the reward probabilities for free-
choice targets were calculated based on the individual subject’s choice history. The less 
often a target was freely chosen in the previous two choice trials, the higher the reward 
probability in favor of this target was (Klaes et al., 2011): 
p(Rcw)=F(nccw –ncw) 
p(Rccw)=F(ncw –nccw) 
where ncw is the total number of rewarded cw reaches and nccw is the total number of 
rewarded ccw reaches. F was defined as: 
! ! =
1, ! > 1
2/3, ! = 1
1/2, ! = 0
1/3, ! = −1
0, ! < −1
. 
Subjects were explicitly told that chosen targets would successively stop being rewarded 
and they needed to explore all possible reaches to complete this task. The balancing task 
was run until the subject made at least two cw and two ccw reaches at each pre-cue 
position, which means at least 16 choice trials. As choice trials made up 33% of all trials, 
the balancing task then comprised a minimum of 48 trials. 
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Apparatus and data acquisition 
Subjects were seated in a dimly lit room facing an LCD screen (19” ViewSonic VX922) 
mounted behind a transparent touch sensitive screen (IntelliTouch, ELO Systems, CA, 
USA), with a chinrest and forehead band used to stabilize head position. The screen was 
mounted with a tilt of 33° from the vertical for subject’s comfort, with the lower edge on 
the table at ~40 cm distance from the chinrest base and the top edge at eye level. The 
luminance of all colored stimuli was in the range 12-13 cd/m2 (luminance meter LS-100, 
Minolta, Japan). Luminance was measured at eye level when positioning the color cues at 
the top of the four positions used in the experiment, i.e. at a direction of 90° from the 
screen center and with an eccentricity of 9 cm. Throughout the trial, the gaze direction of 
the subjects was constrained at the central fixation point (red square) within a tolerance 
window of 3 cm (~4.3° VA radius). Eye positions were monitored by a camera placed in 
front of the screen’s lower edge (Eyelink 1000, Kanata, Canada). A real-time LabView 
program running on a PXI computer (National Instruments) was used to control the 
tasks and to register relevant stimulus properties, event timings, and subject’s behavioral 
responses in each trial. 
Behavioral data analysis 
The main goal of this study was to quantify the biasing effect of predictability and 
preferability on choice behavior. Since preliminary analysis revealed symmetric effects of 
cw/ccw rule in our data (effects of interaction between Bias and rule types (cw-ccw) on 
reaction times in instructed follow trials: PROB task: t-statistic = -1.59, p > 0.05; AMNT 
task: t-statistic = 0.11, p > 0.05; interaction between Bias and rule types (cw-ccw) on choice 
probabilities: PROB task: t-statistic = -0.07, p > 0.05; AMNT task: t-statistic = -0.44, p > 
0.05, GLMM; see details on GLMM below), we chose the absolute value of the pre-cued 
bias level as the independent variable and merged all trials with different pre-cue 
positions. In other words, we grouped the data into four bias conditions, one zero-bias 
condition plus three non-zero bias conditions. Bias degrees were quantified by the 
contrast in preliminary EV associated with each pair of reward amount or probability: 
higher EV - lower EV / higher EV + lower EV. Bias degrees were {0 0.22 0.33 0.67} for 
the PROB task and {0 0.22 0.45 0.67} for the AMNT task. 
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Additionally, we sorted the data according to rule-congruency, i.e. according to whether 
the reach was conducted to the same (follow) or the opposite (against) direction as the 
direction indicated by the bigger pre-cue triangle (bias direction). Note that follow and 
against responses could occur by instruction in instructed trials and by subjects’ choice in 
choice trials and the instructed trials of the probabilistic task are equivalent to typical cue-
validity tasks in which follow trials would correspond to valid trials, and against trials to 
invalid trials. 
We analyzed error rate (ER), reaction time (RT) in both error and correct trials, and 
movement time (MT) in instructed trials. ERs were defined as the fraction of trials not 
leading to a successful target acquisition within the reach period, either due to mis-
reaching or fixation breaks (often occurring together). As errors other than miss-reaches 
were in general very rare and both targets were considered valid in choice trials, we report 
ERs and error RTs only in instructed trials. RTs were defined as the time between the go-
signal and the subject’s release of the touch screen from the fixation position and MTs as 
the time between the subject’s releases of the fixation point to the time that the subject’s 
finger arrived at the target position. Both RTs and MTs were corrected for display and 
touch screen delays. Trials with invalid RTs (0.5% of total number of trials) were 
excluded from the RT analysis as subjects might have prematurely released the screen 
before the rule-cue was perceived. As rejection threshold we used 2.5 interquartile ranges 
below Q1 (25% quartile) or 100 ms, whichever value was higher. 
We analyzed RTs and choice probability (CP) in choice trials. CP was defined as the 
fraction of correct choices following the bias introduced by the pre-cue. For the zero-bias 
condition we show the fraction of cw choices. 
We tested for biasing effects in all aforementioned dependent variables. For this, a 
generalized linear mixed model (‘fitglme’; MATLAB R2014b) was fitted to assess 
influences of bias degrees on ER, RT, MT, and CP, as well as differential effects between 
PROB and AMNT tasks. Full models included the factors bias degree (Bias: continuous 
variable), rule congruency (Congruency: categorical responses follow vs. against biased 
direction), and task type (Task: categorical variable: AMNT vs. PROB) and all interaction 
terms, as fixed effects. Note that we considered ER, RT, and MT at zero-bias degree in 
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both follow and against categories to keep the zero-bias level included in both follow and 
against fittings. Subjects were included as random effect (uncorrelated random intercepts 
and slopes for bias levels, congruency, and tasks) to account for the variance across 
subjects. The likelihood of the models including or excluding different fixed and random 
effects were compared using the Matlab function ‘compare(model1, model2)’.  
We used the following model to test overall differential effects of bias between follow-
against responses on ER (binomial response), RTs, and MTs with interaction term 
between Bias and Congruency in each task separately: 
X ~ Bias * Congruency + (Bias * Congruency | Subjects),     (M1) 
and to test the differential effects on ER, RTs, MTs between tasks: 
X ~ Bias * Congruency * Tasks + (Bias * Congruency * Tasks | Subjects).  (M2) 
Next, only for RTs, we additionally tested the differential effects on error RTs between 
tasks using the model: 
RT ~ Bias * Error (success/error) * Tasks + (Bias * Error * Tasks | Subjects).  (M3) 
When instructed to go against the bias, DDMs predict short error RTs in case of a bias 
mechanism mediated by a baseline shift whereas long error RTs in case of a drift rate 
change (Simen et al. 2009; Leite & Ratcliff 2011). As errors were rare in instructed follow 
trials and choice trials, we inspected error RTs only in instructed against trials. 
When there was a biasing effect, we asked further whether (a) the biasing effect was 
symmetric for costs (against) and benefits (follow) and whether (b) the biasing effect was 
graded, i.e. scaled with the strength of the bias signal. With the model M1 we computed 
the slopes for follow and against and compared their confidence intervals to test whether 
the absolute values of the slope differed (asymmetry) or overlapped (symmetry) between 
both conditions. Note that the obviously different slopes (Figure 2B) between follow and 
against conditions were the reasons why we introduced congruency as a factor in the 
model. By modeling the data separately for each ‘branch’ of the bias factor separately, we 
got better linear fits than when treating the seven bias levels as a single factor (data not 
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shown). We tested for graded biasing effects versus a single step-like effect of bias, with 
post-hoc tests (paired t-tests with Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons) 
comparing each pair of successive bias conditions. 
We tested biasing effects on CP using a separate full model without the Congruency term as 
there was no follow-against distinction in this case: 
CP (binomial response) ~ Bias * Tasks + (Bias * Tasks | Subjects).   (M4) 
With additional post-hoc tests corrected for multiple comparisons we tested the graded 
effect as introduced above. 
Results 
We probed the biasing effect of motor-goal preferability and predictability on later risk-
free choices in two steps. First, we wanted to confirm that both our value and probability 
manipulations were effective in affecting subject behavior. To do so, we analyzed error 
rates (ER), reaction times (RT), and movement times (MT) in instructed trials. If the pre-
cue had a biasing effect then there should be costs and benefits involved with having to 
go against or being allowed to follow one’s internal bias as a result of an instruction. 
Specifically, follow trials should lead to faster RTs and lower ER than against trials. Second, 
we wanted to test if preferability and predictability have similar or differential biasing 
effects on later choice behavior. For this, we analyzed RTs and choice probabilities (CP) 
in choice trials. If preferability and predictability induce the same biasing mechanism, we 
should observe the same response pattern across tasks. If instead preferability and 
predictability induce different biasing mechanisms, we should observe different response 
patterns. The former hypothesis might still be supported if the behavioral response 
patterns in instructed and choice trials are the same in the PROB and AMNT task, except 
for a potentially reduced effect in the AMNT task compared to the PROB task (Maddox 
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Performance comparison PROB vs. AMNT task 
We first tested if the AMNT and the PROB experiment were different in task difficulty. 
For this we did not compare only the total performance, but particularly the zero-bias 
trials. Zero-bias trials were identical in both experiments, except for the task context. 
Average performance was 86.84 ± 2.1% in AMNT task (N = 33) and 91.53 ± 0.8% 
(mean ± SEM) in PROB task (N = 41). Subjects who participated in both tasks showed 
slightly better overall performance in PROB task than AMNT task (AMNT:  88.13 ± 
1.7%, PROB: 91.91 ± 0.8%, mean ± SEM, N = 31, p < 0.05, paired t-test). However, 
importantly, when comparing performance only in the zero-bias condition of the 
instructed trials, which served as our reference condition, subjects performed equally well 
(AMNT:  87.53 ± 1.75%, PROB:  89.67 ± 1.37%, mean ± SEM, N = 31, p > 0.05, paired 
t-test).  
Subjects performed both tasks with shorter RT in instructed compared to choice trials 
(AMNT [instructed-choice]: -24.48 ± 2.47 ms, p < 10-9, PROB [instructed-choice]: -38.00 
± 4.24 ms, p < 10-9, mean ± SEM, N = 31, paired t-test) and overall responded faster in 
PROB task than in AMNT task (AMNT-PROB:  21.03 ± 6.62 ms, p < 0.01, mean ± 
SEM, N = 31, paired t-test). However, when comparing only RTs from the zero-bias 
condition, subjects showed no RT difference between tasks (instructed [AMNT-PROB]:  
7.95 ± 7.87 ms, p > 0.05, choice [AMNT-PROB]:  -0.31 ± 8.07 ms, p > 0.05, mean ± 
SEM, N = 31, paired t-test). 
In summary, the AMNT and the PROB task contexts did not lead to performance 
differences in the zero-bias trials, i.e. in the trials which do not differ between the tasks. 
In trials with non-zero bias levels, subjects responded on average more quickly and made 
fewer errors in the PROB task than in the AMNT task. 
Effects of a priori preferability and predictability in instructed behavior 
We first needed to establish whether our manipulations of probability and amount were 
strong enough to be effective. We compared ERs, RTs, and MTs in instructed trials 
between the PROB and AMNT task to test if they depended on the bias degree. If so, we 
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further tested if bias degree led to symmetry in costs and benefits, and if the effect was 
gradually increased with increasing bias degree. In both tasks we found significant effects 
of bias degree on instructed behavior, but with differences in individual aspects, as 
detailed in the following. 
Error rates (ER) depended on the instruction to follow or go against the bias in both 
tasks (Figure 2A). A generalized linear mixed effect model (GLMM) showed higher ERs 
when subjects were instructed to reach against the bias than follow the bias in both tasks 
(interaction between Bias and Congruency: AMNT: t-statistic = 6.07, p < 10-8; PROB: t-
statistic = 10.05, p < 10-9, N = 43). The effect on ERs differed between the PROB and 
AMNT task quantitatively. The ER full model confirmed that the ER cost was 
significantly higher in against-instructed trials in the PROB task than in the AMNT task 
(interaction between Bias and Tasks on against trials: t-statistic = -3.47, p < 0.001). Further 
there were overall significant difference in ER patterns between tasks (interaction 
between Bias, Congruency, and Tasks: t-statistic = -3.96, p < 10-4). 
The ER dependency on the bias degree was symmetric in strength in instructed trials of 
both tasks. Decrease in response to follow instructions was not significantly steeper than 
the ER increase in response to against instructions. (AMNT-against: 95% confidence 
interval CI = [-0.01, 1.03] (increase in percentage of error trials per one bias degree); 
AMNT-follow: CI = [-2.89, -0.97]; PROB-against: CI = [1.41, 3.21]; PROB-follow: CI = [-
3.61, -1.92]). 
ER in neither tasks showed a gradual effect as function of bias degree (Figure 2A).  
Reaction times (RT): depended on the bias degree in both tasks similarly to ERs, but 
partially in a more gradual fashion (Figure 2B). GLMM showed an overall differential 
effect of biasing degree on RT between follow and against instructed reaches in both tasks 
(interaction between Bias and Congruency: AMNT: t-statistic = 9.72, p < 10-9; PROB: t-
statistic = 12.28, p < 10-9). This means the bias degree induced systematic costs and 
benefits for RTs in instructed reaches. Also, the RT full model showed significantly 
different patterns of RTs between tasks (interaction between Bias, Congruency, and Tasks: t-
statistic = 6.23, p < 10-9), and a smaller RT benefit in the AMNT task as compared to the 
PROB task (interaction between Bias and Tasks: t-statistic = -5.65, p < 10-9). 
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FIGURE 2 | Biasing effects on instructed responses. (A) Average error rates (ER): proportion of error trials 
committed during the reach period, (B) average reaction time (RT) difference from average RTs in instructed trials 
of zero-bias condition of each task in all bias levels in AMNT (left) and PROB (right) tasks, (C) average error RT 
difference (zero line indicates average correct RTs in instructed trials of zero-bias condition of each task). Dark 
and light colors represent follow and against responses, respectively. Error bars depict standard errors. (* p < corr 
at 5%, ** p < corr at 1%, *** p < corr at 0.1%, paired t-test with Bonferroni correction). 
RT costs and benefits in the instructed trials of each task were not symmetric. The PROB 
task showed a significantly larger RT benefit of following than cost for going against the 
bias (PROB-against: CI = [16.99, 46.79] (increase in RTs (ms) per one bias degree); 
PROB-follow: CI = [-85.31, -63.71]). Asymmetry was not as strong in the AMNT task, 
since the absolute values of the confidence limits partly overlapped (AMNT-against: CI = 
[12.94, 27.50]; AMNT-follow: CI = [-44.41, -27.39]).  
RTs in instructed trials partially showed a gradual increase in effect strength with 
increasing bias degree (Figure 2B). In the AMNT task, RTs decreased in one significant 
step when subjects were instructed to follow the bias. In the PROB task RTs decreased 
with each step in response to follow instructions with increasing bias level. 
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Analysis of error RTs. Depending on which mechanism explains the decision process, 
RTs in unsuccessful trials can be expected to be either faster or slower than successful 
trials (e.g. Bogacz, 2007; Brown and Heathcote, 2008; Heitz, 2014; Smith and Ratcliff, 
2004). We analyzed error RTs when an instruction to go against a bias was violated; since 
error rates in follow trials were too rare to be analyzed properly. Error RTs depended on 
the bias condition in opposite ways in the AMNT and PROB task. Error RTs showed 
significant differential effects in response to follow or against instructions in the PROB task, 
but not in the AMNT task (interaction between Bias and Congruency: AMNT: t-statistic = -
1.07, p > 0.05; PROB: t-statistic = 2.59, p < 0.01). Due to limited number of errors in 
follow trials of both tasks, slope analyses detected no significant slopes in follow trials 
(AMNT-follow: CI = [-36.90, 67.87]; PROB-follow: CI = [-64.10, 7.51]; not shown). 
Importantly, in against trials, slope analyses revealed significant increase in error RTs with 
bias levels in AMNT task, as opposed to significant decrease in PROB task (AMNT-
against: CI = [8.64, 80.66]; PROB-against: CI = [-127.78, -50.155]; Figure 2C). RT 
differences between individual consecutive bias levels did not reach significance in either 
task, likely due to the limited number of error trials. 
Overall, analysis of the instructed trials showed that manipulation of both preferability 
and predictability were effective and had consequences on RTs and ERs, yet, with 
indications from the error trials analysis that underlying mechanisms might differ.  
Effects of a priori preferability and predictability on free-choice behavior 
The main goal of our study was to investigate the effects of prior probability and expected 
amount on risk-free, reward-balanced choice behavior. We quantified choice probabilities 
(CP), and RTs for the randomly interspersed choice trials. 
Choice probabilities (CP) depended on the bias degree in both tasks (AMNT: t-statistic 
= 2.14, p < 0.05; PROB: t-statistic = 7.90, p < 10-9), however with a significantly smaller 
biasing effect in AMNT task than in PROB task (interaction between Bias and Tasks: t-
statistic = -6.88, p < 10-11). Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc t-tests revealed a graded biasing 
effect in the PROB task, in which choice bias became stronger for each step of bias 
degrees. In contrast, choice bias in the AMNT task showed only a single significant step 
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between balanced and [1/3] bias degree, and no difference between different non-zero 
bias degrees (Figure 3A). 
Choice reaction times were only affected by bias degree in the PROB task. GLMM 
showed a differential effect between follow-against reaches in PROB task but not in the 
AMNT task (interaction between Bias and Congruency: AMNT: t-statistic = -1.91, p > 0.05; 
PROB: t-statistic = 7.02, p < 10-9). The RT full model confirmed significantly different 
patterns of RTs between tasks (interaction between Bias, Congruency, and Tasks: t-statistic 
= 7.16, p < 10-9) with the PROB task showing a significantly larger effect on RT benefits 
when following the bias (interaction between Bias and Tasks: t-statistic = 8.49, p < 10-9). 
In addition, a clear asymmetry of choice RTs was revealed in the PROB task (PROB-
against: CI = [-30.16, -4.44]; PROB-follow: CI = [-92.78, -61.25]). 
 
FIGURE 3 | Biasing effects on free-choice responses. (A) Average choice probability (CP): fractions of choice 
toward the biased direction (at the zero-bias level, as there is no biased direction, fractions of clockwise choice are 
presented), and (B) average reaction time (RT) difference (zero line indicates average RTs in instructed trials of the 
zero-bias condition of each task) in all bias levels in AMNT (left) and PROB (right) tasks. Dark and light colors 
represent follow and against responses, respectively. The error bars represent standard errors. (* p < corr at 5%, ** p 
< corr at 1%, *** p < corr at 0.1%, paired t-test with Bonferroni correction). 
RTs in the choice trials showed a gradual increase in effect strength with increasing bias 
degree only for benefits in the PROB task. Post-hoc tests showed no significant RT 
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differences between individual neighboring bias degrees in the AMNT task but RTs that 
increased gradually with the bias degree in follow-choices in the PROB task (Figure 3B).  
Notably, the RT benefit in follow reaches was comparable between instructed and choice 
trials in the PROB task, while in the AMNT task there was only a benefit for follow 
instructions, not for follow choices (interaction between Bias and trial types: AMNT: t-
statistic = -1.21, p < 10-9; PROB: t-statistic = 7.02, p > 0.05). This means, while 
predictability affected later choice behavior in the same way as instructed behavior, in 
contrast, preferability showed clear effects in instructed behavior but did not generalize to 
the choice behavior. 
No effect of doubling the reward in the AMNT task 
The observed limited effects of preferability as compared to predictability might be due to 
lack of EV contrast. EVs cannot be linearly translated into subjective expected utility 
which is more directly linked to choice (Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954). 
To rule out this possibility, we conducted a control experiment in which we doubled the 
reward amount ratio between high- and low-value options.  
Error rates (ER) depended on the instruction to follow or go against the bias in the 
AMNT-double task. A GLMM showed higher ERs when subjects were instructed to 
reach against the bias than follow the bias (interaction between Bias and Congruency: t-
statistic = 3.86, p = 0.0001; N = 16). ER decrease in response to follow instructions was 
significantly steeper than the insignificant increase in response to against instructions. 
(against: CI = [-0.40, 1.29]; follow: CI = [-5.00, -1.14]). Similarly to the standard AMNT 
task, ERs decreased when subjects were instructed to follow the bias (Figure 4A). 
Reaction times (RT) depended on the bias degree in the AMNT-double task similarly to 
the standard AMNT task. GLMM showed an overall differential effect of biasing degree 
on RT between follow and against instructed reaches in both tasks (interaction between Bias  
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and Congruency: t-statistic = 7.10, p < 10-9). As in the standard AMNT task, asymmetry 
was weak or absent in the AMNT-double task, since the absolute values of the confidence 
limits partly overlapped (against: CI = [14.43, 39.95]; follow: CI = [-60.03, -30.71]). RT 
decrease in follow trials and increase in against trials showed similar pattern as in the 
standard AMNT task (Figure 4B). 
Choice probabilities (CP) showed 
insignificant increase with bias degrees in the 
AMNT-double task (t-statistic = 1.62, p > 
0.05), and no CP difference was detected 
between the standard AMNT and the 
AMNT-double tasks (interaction between 
Bias and Tasks (AMNT vs. AMNT-double): 
t-statistic = 0.1114, p > 0.05).  
Choice RTs were not affected by bias 
degree in the AMNT-double task. GLMM 
showed no differential effect between follow-
against reaches in the AMNT-double task 
(interaction between Bias and Congruency: t-
statistic = -1.91, p > 0.05).  
CPs and choice RTs showed no difference 
between neighboring bias degrees (Figure 
4C-D). 
In summary, doubling of the reward amount 
contrast between high- and low-value 
options did not change the strength of 




FIGURE 4 | Results of AMNT task with double 
reward size (AMNT-double). (A) Average error 
rates, (B) average instructed RT difference, (C) 
Choice probabilities, (D) average choice RT 
difference (zero line indicates average RTs in 
instructed trials of zero-bias condition of each task) in 
all bias levels. Dark and light colors represent follow 
and against responses, respectively. Error bars 
represent standard errors. (* p < corr at 5%, ** p < 
corr at 1%, *** p < corr at 0.1%). 
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Subject sub-grouping based on choice bias 
CPs showed a weaker bias in the AMNT task than in the PROB task on average across all 
subjects. We asked if this was because some subjects showed no bias in the AMNT task, 
while others might show a bias of the same magnitude as in the PROB task. If so, would 
the pattern of RT results for subjects with a strong CP bias in the AMNT task look 
similar to the pattern of RT results in the PROB task? CPs across subjects varied, 
especially in the AMNT task. We subdivided subjects depending on their bias in the 
choice probabilities to test, first, if individual subjects showed a choice pattern contrary to 
the average pattern described above; and second, whether subjects’ choice behavior in 
choice trials would predict the RT patterns in instructed and in choice trials. Using a 
GLMM on each subject’s CP, we distinguished three classes of subjects: CP-biased 
(significant positive slope), CP-unbiased (slope not significantly different from zero), or 
CP-counter-biased (significant negative slope). 
Most subjects in PROB task were CP-biased (33 biased, 8 unbiased, and no counter-
biased). In contrast, the majority of subjects in the AMNT task were CP-unbiased (10 
biased, 20 unbiased, and 3 counter-biased). Out of the 31 subjects who participated in 
both experiments, 27 were biased and 4 were unbiased in the PROB task. Out of these 27 
biased subjects in the PROB task, 9 were biased, 17 were unbiased, and one was counter-
biased in the AMNT task. And out of four unbiased subjects in the PROB task, two were 
also unbiased and two were counter-biased in AMNT task. No subject showed CP-bias in 
the AMNT task and was unbiased or counter-biased in the PROB task. In summary, no 
individual subject showed a reversed pattern of CPs in the AMNT task to the average 
pattern of CPs. 
In the PROB task, RT benefits of instructed follow reaches matched RT benefits when 
choosing follow reaches in choice trials in both biased and unbiased subjects. GLMM 
showed no interaction between Bias and trial types (instructed vs. choice) in either 
subgroup [PROB (biased): t-statistic = 0.82, p > 0.05; PROB (unbiased): t-statistic = 1.49, 
p > 0.05]. The biasing effect differed between subject subgroups on instructed RTs but 
not in choice RTs [interaction between Bias and subgroup: PROB (instructed): t-statistic 
= 2.83, p < 0.01; PROB (choice): t-statistic = 1.06, p > 0.05]. Notably, shorter RTs when  
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choosing against bias seemed to come 
from unbiased subjects while biased 
subjects showed flat RTs in against 
trials of both tasks [AMNT-against 
(biased): t-statistic = -1.96, p > 0.05; 
AMNT-against (unbiased): t-statistic = -
2.78, p < 0.01; PROB-against (biased): 
t- statistic = -1.07, p > 0.05; PROB-
against (unbiased): t-statistic = -2.86, p 
< 0.01].  
In summary, dividing subjects into CP-
biased and CP-unbiased subgroups 
showed that even the minority of 
subjects who were biased in their 
choice behavior in the AMNT task lack 
a biasing effect on choice RTs (Figure 5). This also means they showed significantly 
different RT behavior between the AMNT and PROB tasks and further supports the idea 
that the underlying decision processes are different in both tasks 
Movement times 
Studies on motor planning had previously shown that invalid pre-cueing can affect not 
only RT but also MT (e.g. Leis et al., 2005). While classical DDMs to not consider MT, in 
the context of affordance or motor-oriented models of decision-making, motor 
kinematics can reveal additional insights (Gallivan et al., 2015). The prediction would be 
that having to go against planned movement should require any preliminary motor plan 
to be suppressed and lead to slower movement execution (Cisek, 2012).  
Movement time (MT) analysis. GLMM showed a differential effect on MT between 
follow and against reaches in both tasks, yet the effect in the AMNT task was minimal 
(interaction between Bias and Congruency: AMNT: t-statistic = 2.01, p < 0.05; PROB: t-
statistic = 5.76, p < 10-8). Correspondingly, the MT full model confirmed significantly  
 
FIGURE 5 | Responses of CP-biased subjects in 
AMNT task. (A) Choice probabilities, and (B) average 
choice RT difference (zero line indicates average RTs in 
instructed trials of zero-bias condition) in all bias levels. 
Dark and light colors represent follow and against responses, 
respectively. The error bars depict standard errors. (* p < 
corr at 5%, ** p < corr at 1%, *** p < corr at 0.1%). 
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different patterns of MTs between tasks 
(interaction between Bias, Congruency, and 
Tasks: t-statistic = -5.03, p < 10-6), and a 
substantially higher MT of against reaches 
in the PROB task as compared to the 
AMNT task (interaction between Bias 
and Tasks: t-statistic = 5.70, p < 10-7).   
In the AMNT task, follow and against 
slopes did not significantly deviate from 
zero (AMNT-against: CI = [-3.14, 11.55]; 
AMNT-follow: CI = [-12.82, 0.93]) whereas costs and benefits of MTs in the PROB task 
showed clear asymmetry (PROB-against: CI = [55.92, 107.2]; PROB-follow: CI = [-17.82, -
1.03]).  
Notably, only MT cost in against trials of the PROB task showed gradual biasing effect 
whereas MTs remained unchanged in follow instructed trials in the PROB task (Figure 6), 
choice trials in the PROB task, and all types of trials in the AMNT task (not shown). 
As previous studies showed that motor planning reduces motor variability (e.g. 
Churchland et al., 2006; Harris and Wolpert, 1998; Todorov, 2004), we tested as an 
additional confirmation of the MT result, if there was a biasing effect on endpoint 
variability (EPV), defined as the average distance of reach endpoints to the mean reach 
endpoint for each target location. In congruence with MT results, GLMM showed 
significantly higher EPVs of against reaches in the PROB task as compared to the AMNT 
task (interaction between Bias and Tasks: t-statistic = 2.42, p = 0.01).  
Also consistent with the MT results, EPV only in against but not follow trials of the PROB 
task showed significant deviation from zero (PROB-against: t-statistic = 2.69, p < 0.01; 
PROB-follow: t-statistic = 1.87, p > 0.05) while only follow slope marginally deviated from 
zero in the AMNT task (AMNT-against: t-statistic = -0.15, p > 0.05; AMNT-follow: t-
statistic = -2.29, p < 0.05).  
 
FIGURE 6 | Biasing effects on movement times (MT) 
instructed against trials of the PROB task. Zero line 
indicates average MTs in instructed trials of zero-bias 
condition. Dark and light colors represent follow and against 
responses, respectively. Error bars depict standard errors. (* 
p < corr at 5%, ** p < corr at 1%, *** p < corr at 0.1%, 
paired t-test with Bonferroni correction) 
 
HUMAN PSYCHOPHYSICS  51 
In summary, only when being instructed against a bias in the PROB task, subjects showed 
effects on motor execution, visible by elevated MTs and EPVs with increasing bias 
degree. Neither instructions to go against a bias in the AMNT task nor choosing freely in 
any task had an effect on MTs and EPVs. 
Discussion 
In our rule-based selection task with sequential cueing, we informed participants about 
the probability (PROB task) or reward amount (AMNT task) of a subsequent instruction. 
Using interspersed, equal-valued and risk-free choice trials, we probed to what extent the 
a priori predictability or preferability of the upcoming rule induced a behavioral bias in 
subjects. Our results showed multiple biasing effects of movement planning due to 
predictability when compared to conditions that dealt with preferability of a goal but 
without planning being encouraged. (1) Subjects’ responses were faster and less prone to 
errors in instructed trials when the final instruction matched the more likely or higher-
valued rule (follow trials). (2) Responses were slower and more error-prone when the 
instruction matched the less likely or lower-valued rule (against trials). The strength of 
follow and against effects was in general not symmetric. (3) In the absence of an instruction, 
without any objective advantage, subjects more frequently chose the originally more likely 
rule, while this was true to a much lesser degree for the originally higher-valued rule. 
Subjects gained a reaction time advantage only in case of choosing the originally more 
likely rule, not the originally higher-valued rule. (4) Having to go against the more likely 
rule (but not against the higher-valued rule) slowed movement times and raised endpoint 
variability, while freely chosen movement execution was unaffected by prior expectations. 
Our results indicate a structural difference between decision biases resulting from 
predictability or preferability. These results are not consistent with the idea that the value-
based decision process is a graded version of the probability-based decision process, as 
suggested earlier. Instead our results suggest that preliminary action planning is the major 




HUMAN PSYCHOPHYSICS  52 
Probing bias with neutral choice trials 
Inducing bias with instructed trials and probing bias with choice trials was an important 
feature of our task design that revealed differences between the consequences of 
predictability and preferability. Previous studies have compared the effect of prior 
probability with the effect of reward amount (“potential pay-off”) on choice using partly 
ambiguous sensory evidence (Leite and Ratcliff, 2011; Maddox and Bohil, 1998; Mulder et 
al., 2012; Simen et al., 2009). In one study, subjects had to decide between two 
alternatives of a random dot motion stimulus, the probability or the reward amount of 
which was announced at the beginning of each trial and – different to here – guaranteed 
until the end of the trial (Mulder et al., 2012). Choices were risky due to the uncertainty 
about the evidence provided by the partly ambiguous stimulus. Results showed a weaker 
effect of potential payoff compared to prior probability. However, the fact that the 
difference in value between options was known from the start of each trial might have 
encouraged subjects to preliminarily plan the corresponding action, since in risky choices 
this would on average be advantageous. The fact that both types of prior expectations led 
to RT differences was taken as an indication for a shift of the DDM baseline in both 
cases. The reduced strength of effect for prior value expectations compared to probability 
expectations was accounted for by assuming an intermediate baseline shift but otherwise 
equivalent underlying mechanisms (Bogacz, 2007; Maddox and Bohil, 1998; Mulder et al., 
2012). The competition-between-reward-and-accuracy-maximization (COBRA) 
hypothesis (Maddox, 2002; Maddox and Bohil, 1998) was proposed to explain the 
intermediate baseline shift in these perceptual decision-making experiments. In COBRA 
the reduced biasing effect of payoff manipulation is due to a conflict between (biased) 
reward and (unbiased) accuracy maximizing criteria, while both criteria show (biased) 
synergistic effects in case of probabilistic manipulation (Ashby et al., 1998; Bogacz et al., 
2006; Maddox, 2002; Mulder et al., 2012). While the intermediate-baseline-shift model 
could account for the behavior observed in our instructed trials it does not predict the 
observed patter of CP and RT in the choice trials, as discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
Two features of our experimental design helped to decide whether biases induced by 
predictability and preferability can be accounted for by the same mechanism. First, two 
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sequential cues provided subjects with the necessary information, with the second cue 
either instructing a specific rule (100% evidence) or allowing subjects to choose freely 
between both rules (rule-neutral evidence). In the DDM concept, the onset of the second 
cue (rule-cue), which also signals the subjects to immediately make a reach, marks the 
initiation of the drift process. Obeying causality, this implies that the rule-cue can only 
have an influence on the drift period whereas the baseline could only be set by the prior 
knowledge provided by the pre-cue. Importantly, as the free-choice cue provides no 
additional evidence supporting either rule, an effect of the prior information – either 
probability or reward amount – on the baseline should persist in the choice trials. In 
contrast, any effect of expectation that does not affect instructed and choice trials in the 
same way cannot be mediated by baseline changes but must indicate changes during the 
drift process following the instructive rule-cue. As a second important feature, we varied 
prior expectations gradually. If prior expectations on value are based on the same 
mechanism as prior expectations on probability (except for a scaling factor) then graded 
effects in one case should also result in graded effects in the other case. 
By introducing reward-neutral interspersed choice trials we also avoided confounds 
between planning and motivation. If a priori expected values and later actual values are 
always identical, then motivational effects of the actually different rewards (Dayan and 
Balleine, 2002; Franchina and Brown, 1971; Hassani et al., 2001; Hollerman et al., 1998; 
Mir et al., 2011) cannot be disentangled from the effect of a priori expectations on the 
reward. This makes it difficult to account for potential effects of action planning and 
motivation when assessing the effect of a priori expected value compared to prior 
probabilities. Here we compare a priori preferability and predictability in their effect on 
equal-valued choice trials, thereby avoiding motivational confounds. 
Predictability leads to reduced migration distance 
Our results from the PROB task support the view that prior probability affects migration 
distance in DDM. Equivalent effects of probability bias were observed in instructed and 
choice trials, allowing for a mechanism that starts prior to the rule-cue, i.e. during the 
DDM baseline period. In choice trials, in particular, as subjects always received the same 
reward for each possible choice, the reason that both options were not chosen equally 
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often cannot be due to a reward difference but must result from the biasing effect of the 
prior probability. A reduction of the migration distance to the boundary associated with 
the more likely rule can well explain the ER and RT benefits observed for following the 
biased rule by instruction and by choice, as well as the CP shift in choice.  
Further support for a reduced migration distance towards the threshold of the predicted 
target (biased threshold) is provided by a higher frequency of errors with fast RTs in case 
of instruction to go against the bias. A short migration distance implies that the threshold 
can be reached with small fluctuations towards the biased threshold, which comes at the 
cost of wrongly choosing the option associated with the closer boundary (Bogacz et al., 
2010; Heitz, 2014) thus occur at shorter RTs than correctly instructed responses (Brown 
and Heathcote, 2008; Smith and Ratcliff, 2004). 
However, the reduced migration difference towards the biased threshold cannot have 
been achieved by a pure baseline shift. With a pure baseline shift, one would expect 
symmetric costs and benefits, since the migration distance towards one boundary is 
reduced by the same amount as it is increased for the other boundary (Figure 7A). 
Instead, we found that the ER and RT benefits for following the bias were larger than the 
costs for going against the bias.  
Because of the direction of the asymmetry in our data, we rule out that the biasing effects 
in the PROB task are explained by a bias-proportional anti-symmetric change in drift 
rates. By this, we mean an increased drift rate towards the biased option and decreased 
drift rate towards the counter-biased option, each proportional to the bias degree. In this 
case one would expect a cost-benefit asymmetry opposite to the asymmetry observed, i.e. 
larger RT costs than RT benefits (Figure 7B). This is because in the DDM the RTs are 
reciprocally proportional to the drift rate. Increasing drift rate hence leads to an RT 
benefit that is smaller in absolute value than the RT costs associated with a same-amount 
decrease in drift rate. This is the same logic that explains how a drift-rate which 
symmetrically varies around an average drift rate creates the typically observed left-
skewed RT distributions. While a pure baseline shift is not sufficient to explain the 
behavioral results, the ER and RT data in the PROB task also cannot be explained by a 
pure or an additional bias-proportional anti-symmetric change in drift rate. 
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 Rather, the asymmetry in gradual costs and benefits can be explained with models that, in 
addition to the baseline shift, allow (1) a bias-proportional gradually reduced migration 
distance by a lowered boundary for the biased option or the counter-biased option or 
both (Figure 7C) or (2) a bias-proportional symmetric increase in drift rate towards both 
options (Figure 7D). 
While the behavioral consequences of predictability were largely equivalent between 
instructed and choice trials, there were also two differences. First, RTs were overall 20-
30ms slower in choice trials, and, second, no RT costs were imposed when subjects chose 
freely against the biased rule. Neither difference contradicts the idea of a reduced 
migration distance for the biased option.  
The average RT offset of 20-30 ms is not surprising since instructed trials always 
provided instantaneous and unambiguous evidence whereas choice trials provided rule-
neutral evidence. Higher RTs for choice compared to instruction could be due to: (1) a 
 
FIGURE 7 | Predicted symmetric effect of baseline shift and asymmetric effect of drift rate change. (A) 
Baseline shift of the same magnitude should result in symmetric RT cost-benefit whereas (B) RT shortening 
toward biased reach goal due to drift rate increase (vb+) (from the neutral drift rate: vi) should be smaller than RT 
cost toward counter-biased reach goal due to drift rate decrease (vb−) of the same magnitude (). Partial boundary 
lowering (C) and drift rate increase (D) explanations for asymmetric cost-benefit RTs in instructed reaches. 0, a, v, 
Z represent counter-biased boundary, biased boundary, drift rate, and baseline, respectively. The subscript i 
indicates initial parameters in absence of any bias (non-biased trials) whereas subscript b represents parameters in 
case of bias with higher number depicting higher degree of bias and + vs. − depicting parameters toward biased vs. 
counter-biased boundaries, respectively. 
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slower drift rate due to absence of clear evidence in the choice case (Hanks et al., 2015; 
Roitman and Shadlen, 2002); (2) higher decision thresholds in the case of symmetric 
reward choice (Cavanagh et al., 2011; Cavanaugh et al., 2006; Summerfield and Tsetsos, 
2012); (3) an increased duration of non-decision time, which delays migration initiation, 
due to unclear stimuli (Coallier and Kalaska, 2014; Mulder and van Maanen, 2013); or 
some combination of these possibilities. Only processes that occur with or after the rule-
cue can account for differences between instructed and choice trials since subjects were 
unaware of the trial type prior to the rule-cue. Unless thresholds became adapted with 
presentation of the rule-cue, this would argue in favor of different drift rates for 
instructed and choice trials. As subjects had to respond within a fixed time limit and 
waiting longer would not have provided additional evidence, the exact amount of RT 
offset in choice trials is probably determined by an internal urgency signal (Cisek et al., 
2009).  
The fact that we did not find an increasing RT cost for choices against increasing bias is 
also consistent with the idea of a reduced migration distance and can be explained by the 
stochastic nature of the diffusion process in DDM (Brown and Heathcote, 2008; 
Heathcote and Love, 2012). With neutral evidence provided by the rule-cue, subjects will 
chose against the bias only when the decision variable due to random fluctuations is 
coincidentally around the level of the original baseline for counter-biased trials, or even 
closer to the counter-biased boundary at 
the time of the commitment to a choice. 
With an increasing shift in the baseline 
away from the initial baseline level 
(towards the biased boundary), against 
choices become less and less likely 
(explaining the CPs), but against choice 
RTs are still independent of the degree of 
choice bias since they always start with 
the same distance from the counter-
biased boundary (Figure 8). 
 
FIGURE 8 | Explanation of counter-biased choice. 
Z depicts the range in which the stochastic baseline shift 
operates. Counter-biased choice is possible only when 
the baseline shift in a given trial is still close to the initial 
baseline (lightest gray horizontal dotted line in the 
middle). This explains the pattern of choice RTs against 
the bias that are similar to choice RTs in the zero-bias 
condition. 
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In summary, our results from the PROB task confirm the hypothesis of a reduced 
migration distance due to predictability. This reduction is well explained by the 
combination of a bias-proportional baseline shift and either a bias-proportional reduction 
in threshold separation or a symmetric drift-rate increase. 
Preferability has a different effect on choice than predictability  
A main question of our study was whether planning of an optional action per se is 
responsible for later choice biases. We therefore tested for differences in bias between 
conditions in which an action is more likely to be requested later, compared to when the 
same action leads to a higher potential reward in the unpredictable case that it will be 
requested. Our results from the instructed trials of the AMNT task fit the predictions of 
the intermediate-baseline-shift hypothesis discussed above, while the results from the 
choice trials do not. 
Predictability and preferability cause structurally, not just gradually, different behavioral 
bias. Consistent with earlier findings (Leite and Ratcliff, 2011; Maddox and Bohil, 1998; 
Mulder et al., 2012; Simen et al., 2009) and the intermediate-baseline-shift hypothesis 
(Bogacz et al., 2006), we observed a stronger biasing effect on ER and RTs in instructed 
PROB trials than in instructed AMNT trials. Note that the bias degrees in our experiment 
were carefully matched in terms of a priori expected value between both tasks (see 
Methods). One could still expect different subjective utilities between corresponding bias 
degrees of both tasks, depending on the subject’s level of risk aversion, e.g. devaluing the 
higher rewards of the AMNT task which have only a 50% chance of becoming available 
in the end. Yet, we do not think that differences in expected utility explain the 
quantitative difference in the strength of biasing effects between both task types for two 
reasons. First, doubling of the contrast between high and low reward {3:3 1:5 0.5:8.5 
0:12} in our control experiment did not alter the behavioral findings. Second, our 
maximal RT benefit of approximately 20 ms in the AMNT task matched the magnitude 
observed in a previous study with an even higher reward contrast of 20:1 (Staudinger et 
al., 2011). Rather, the results suggest that however high the reward ratio is, the RT costs 
and benefits driven by reward amount manipulation do not reach the level of RT costs 
and benefits observed with probability manipulation. 
 
HUMAN PSYCHOPHYSICS  58 
Our results suggest that preferability leads to drift rate changes, not to baseline changes. 
First, we should have observed similar patterns of biasing effects in the choice trials and 
the instructed trials of the AMNT task if biasing effects in the AMNT task were mediated 
by baseline shifts. Yet CPs were much weaker and RT differences were absent in choice 
trials of the AMNT task, suggesting an effect that occurs at the earliest at the appearance 
of the rule-cue, i.e., an effect that is independent of baseline shifts. Our results are 
therefore more compatible with the idea that in the AMNT task the bias-dependent RT 
costs and benefits are explained by drift rate adaptations that reflect the final expected 
reward after integration of the rule-cue. Therefore, in reward-balanced choice trials the 
subject's initial expectations are neutralized, leading to a lack of bias-dependent costs or 
benefits. The additional bias-independent fixed offset of RT between choice trials and 
instructed trials is of the same amount (20-30 ms) as in the PROB task, hence is likely to 
have the same mechanistic explanation.  
Second, in the PROB task we found that RT benefits in instructed and choice trials and 
CPs in choice trials gradually increased with increasing levels of predictability. None of 
the three gradual effects was observed with increasing preference in the AMNT task. RT 
benefits in instructed trials and CPs in choice trials increased more or less in a single step 
as soon as the preferability was unbalanced, without a further increase with increasing bias 
degree. These observations contradict the idea that the effect of preferability is just an 
attenuated form of the effect of predictability. 
Taken together, biasing effects due to pure motor-goal preferability are limited compared 
to predictability and likely restricted to processes following the final rule instruction. 
Once the final reward value is known after the rule instruction, adaptation of drift rate 
could reflect motivational effects for the immediately pending action, including shallow 
drift rates corresponding to demotivation when subjects were instructed to reach low- or 
non-rewarded targets. 
Predictability and movement planning 
As we illustrated with the real-world example in the introduction, it is plausible to believe 
that an above-chance likelihood of later being instructed to aim for a specific goal 
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encourages movement planning to achieve that goal. This should be the case in the biased 
trials of our PROB task. In contrast, chance likelihood of either goal renders preliminary 
movement planning toward one of the two remaining options pointless, even with 
varying preference for the two alternatives as in our AMNT task. This assumption was 
supported by our observed movement kinematics. In contrast to experiments requesting 
button presses (Maddox and Bohil, 1998; e.g. Mulder et al., 2012), our subjects performed 
extended reaches, allowing for such analysis. It was only in the PROB task, and not the 
AMNT task, that we found significant increase of MTs and EPVs when subjects had to 
go against an increasing bias. This suggests countermanding of a preliminary movement 
plan only in the PROB task. Based on neuronal evidence from motor planning areas, it 
has been proposed that when monkeys face multiple movement alternatives, the multiple 
candidate actions are simultaneously reflected in the movement planning activity of 
sensorimotor cortex preceding choice (Cisek, 2007; Klaes et al., 2011; Lindner et al., 2010; 
Scherberger and Andersen, 2007); In particular, a non-preferred or unselected action 
might not be completely suppressed before the chosen action is initiated (Cisek, 2012). 
Our MT and EPV results showed an effect on motor execution consistent with the idea 
of subjects having to disengage from a predominating motor plan in favor of a less 
predominating alternative plan in the PROB task only. 
In summary, by dissociating preference-independent action planning (biased PROB trials) 
from action-independent preference (biased AMNT trials), we were able to link the 
processes underlying predictability with action planning within the DDM framework. 
According to this view, our results provide evidence that action planning modulates the 
migration distance in DDM, while preference modulates drift rate. 
Conclusion 
Our results suggest different mechanisms underlying biasing effects of prior predictability 
and preferability in decision-making. This finding supports the affordance competition 
hypothesis (Cisek, 2007); preliminary competitive movement planning in favor of one of 
two potential equal-valued movement options can induce a graded choice bias and 
reaction time advantage, while value-based preferences alone do not. 
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Biased action selection due to imbalanced action preparation. 
In this chapter, we investigated the effect of inducing movement planning in a gradual 
fashion on neural activity in sensorimotor areas, using the PROB task in monkeys. While 
the monkeys were solving the task with reach movements, we recorded neural activities in 
PMd and PRR to monitor reach-movement planning activities in response to different 
levels of predictability. As the reach options were rule-based, 90 °  clockwise or 
counterclockwise to the pre-cue position, we could ensure that the measured neural 
activities were purely motor-plan related. Specifically, we tested whether a preliminary 
action plan mediated by the probabilistic pre-cue would also induce choice bias in 
monkeys, and whether PMd and PRR neurons showed graded representation of both 
alternative rule-based reach goals reflecting graded levels of subsequent choice bias. 
The behavioral results showed that manipulation of the monkeys’ prior using the biasing 
pre-cues induced gradual choice bias despite balanced expected values at the time of 
action selection. The neural data analyses also revealed that the spatial selectivity of 
individual PMd and PRR neurons during motor planning was modulated according to the 
degree of later choice bias, i.e. weak spatial selectivity in balanced trials and increasingly 
stronger selectivity with increasing bias in the animals’ behavior. 
Furthermore, analyses of relative choice signal latencies around the reaction times during 
which action plans turned into chosen action showed choice signals emerged earlier in 
PMd than in PRR. This analysis provided additional results regarding the roles of PMd in 
decision commitment. 
Our finding corroborates the relevance of sensorimotor areas in rule-based motor goal 
planning and action selection. 
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Abstract 
According to an emerging view of action-based decision, at least for decisions involving 
movement responses, decision is regarded as competition between action plans. Neural 
activity in the sensorimotor system has been shown to represent, before the decision is 
made, alternative movement goals with the activity levels that reflect subsequent choice 
preference. However, to our knowledge, no study has so far shown that the effect of 
imbalanced planning alone, without reward contrast between options, could also induce 
selection bias.  
In the present study, we employed rule-based reach task, in which reach goals were not 
physically marked by visual cues but had be inferred based on abstract rules, e.g. in case 
of avoiding an object, in order to dissociate the neural encoding of reach goals from that 
of visual stimuli. Additionally, we induced graded levels of rule predictability using 
probabilistic pre-cues, indicating the likelihood of each alternative rule to be valid at the 
end of the trial (instructed trials) while we randomly interspersed with choice trials, in 
which monkeys could freely choose both available rules, delivering reward with equal 
probability. While the monkeys performed the task, we recorded single unit activities in 
dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) and parietal reach region (PRR), the frontoparietal network 
of reach planning. Here, we test whether graded rule predictability induces graded 
representation of reach goals in PMd and PRR neurons and whether these graded reach 
planning activities would reflect graded selection bias between two reach goals. 
Behavioral results show that graded levels of rule predictability successfully induced 
graded reaction time benefit and choice bias in monkeys despite balanced expected values 
at the time of action selection. Neural results show that the spatial selectivity of PMd and 
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PRR neurons during movement preparation was modulated according to the degree of 
rule predictability and mirrored the degree of subsequent choice bias. Furthermore, 
movement-related activities of both areas, PMd leading PRR in most cases, reflected 
reaction time pattern in response to different predictability levels. The latency result 
supports the role of PMd in the commitment process of sensorimotor decisions. The 
effect of imbalanced reach plans on reach selection provides evidence against serial 
process of decision-making, terminating before the chosen action is planned, while 
supporting the distributed process of decision-making involving action plans once they 
are available. Our findings emphasize the relevance of sensorimotor areas in rule-based 
action planning and decision-making. 
 
Keyword: reach movement, motor planning, bias, prior probability, PMd, PRR, 
sensorimotor areas, rule-based decision-making 
Introduction 
In everyday situations, we often direct our movement towards targets guided by visual 
stimuli, i.e. reaching towards a cup, hitting a baseball, or chasing prey (direct movements). 
However, sometimes the brain has to face a more challenging situation in which motor 
goals are not physically marked by visual stimuli but have to be inferred from visual input 
based on abstract rules (inferred/rule-based movements). For example, we are on a ride 
and suddenly a friendly-looking dog appears on the street. To keep going straight and run 
over the dog (direct movement) will of course not be our option. Intuitively, we would 
rather pass either to the right or left (rule-based motor goals) relative to the dog (the 
visual stimulus). Here, we are interested in the roles of sensorimotor circuits in 
representing rule-based reach movements as well as in choosing between them. 
The frontoparietal circuit for reach movements, comprising reciprocally connected areas 
in the superior lobe of the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and the premotor cortex 
(PMC), is known to contribute to sensorimotor transformation processes (Andersen & 
Cui 2009; Kurata 1991). Specifically, the parietal reach region (PRR) in the medial 
intraparietal sulcus of the PPC, and the dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) show sustained 
motor-goal tuning not only when the impending reach goal is directly cued by visual 
 
MONKEY PHYSIOLOGY  67 
stimuli but also when the reach goal has to be inferred from a spatial cue based on spatial 
transformation rules (Gail & Andersen 2006; Gail et al. 2009; Westendorff et al. 2010; 
Crammond & Kalaska 1994). Both PMd and PRR neurons are therefore believed to be 
involved in sensorimotor transformations for reach movements including integration of 
abstract rules. 
When monkeys are faced with two alternatives, neurons within the sensorimotor system 
also reflect both options during decision-making, with their activities modulated by the 
value of decision outcomes. After then the multiple options are reduced to the final 
choice (Coallier et al. 2015; Cisek & Kalaska 2005; Sugrue et al. 2004; Platt & Glimcher 
1999; Dorris & Glimcher 2004). This evidence ignited the idea that decision-making 
processes parallel the sensorimotor transformation in the sensorimotor system (Cisek 
2007; Gold & Shadlen 2007). Indeed, PMd and PRR neurons have been shown to 
simultaneously encode alternative reach goals depending on subjects’ preference, even 
when selection is based on competitive transformation rules (Klaes et al. 2011). The use 
of abstract transformation rules, which deviate movement directions away from the visual 
stimulus position, provide privileged access to pure motor planning activities, without the 
confound of visual cue representation. This latter finding was thus clear evidence 
confirming that action plans could emerge before the decision termination and reflect 
subsequent choice preference. 
According to previous studies using single-neuron recordings in monkeys, neural 
correlates of reward expectation, reflecting subsequent choice preference, have been 
found in sensorimotor areas (Sugrue et al. 2004; Platt & Glimcher 1999; Pastor-Bernier & 
Cisek 2011). Much less is known about the direct effect of movement planning on choice: 
whether a preliminary movement plan that overlaps with one of the alternatives would 
have an influence on subsequent choice. If the decision process implies a competition 
between motor plans (Cisek 2007; Cisek 2012), imbalanced action planning should 
influence choice behavior. We therefore investigated whether graded degrees of action 
plans, without reward asymmetry between options at the decision moment, would induce 
gradual choice bias in monkeys.  
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To achieve this, we designed a rule-based reach selection task in which instructed and 
choice trials were randomly intermixed (Suriya-Arunroj & Gail 2015). We induced 
predictability by using probabilistic pre-cues, announcing the prior probability of two 
alternative reach goals to be later instructed and rewarded. The pre-cues were meaningful 
only in instructed trials; in choice trials, both options were rewarded with equal 
probability. In contrast to previous experiments on priors (Platt & Glimcher 1999; Yang & 
Shadlen 2007; Sugrue et al. 2004) and Posner’s task (Posner et al. 1980), our instructed 
trials allowed us to induce graded predictability of subsequent rule instructions, hence 
graded levels of movement preparation, and with choice trials we could probe for prior-
dependent choice biases, irrespective of reward expectancy differences at the time of the 
actual decision (Klaes et al. 2011). In our previous study (Suriya-Arunroj & Gail 2015), 
human subjects showed graded behavioral bias in terms of both choice and reaction 
times. By contrasting behavioral bias with another task, providing comparable expected 
values between options but imbalanced movement plans were discouraged, subjects 
showed hardly choice bias and no benefit or deficit in choice reaction times. 
Here, while monkey subjects performed the reach selection task with probabilistic pre-
cueing, we measured activity of PMd and PRR neurons to investigate how rule 
predictability affects the encoding of reach goals, as reflectance of reach plans, in the 
sensorimotor cortices and whether this encoding of reach goals reflect monkeys’ 
subsequent choice behavior. 
Methods 
Rule-based reach selection task 
Two male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta; Monkeys H and K; aged 9 and 11; weighing 
10.34 kg and 9.80 kg) were trained to perform rule-based center-out reaches with 
sequential cueing (Figure 1). In each trial, a peripheral reach goal was located at one of the 
four cardinal locations (0°, 90°, 180°, and 270°; eccentricity 8 cm, subtending a visual 
angle of 12-12.5° at 36.5-38 cm screen distance; technical details below). These locations 
were not marked by visual stimuli, but had to be inferred from a cue by spatial 
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transformation rules (rule-based center-out reach). A pre-cue before and a rule-cue after 
an instructed delay required the monkeys to accumulate information that was sequentially 
provided (sequential cueing), then to reach to the inferred reach goal location on a blank 
space (memory guided reach) (as previously implemented in Suriya-Arunroj & Gail 2015). 
 
Figure 1: Rule-selection task with probabilistic bias manipulation: a trial starts with eye-hand fixation. Then, 
a pre-cue appears at one of the four cardinal locations (top, down, left, right), indicating two potential goals and 
the probability of each goal (big triangle – high probability). After a memory period, the rule-cue appears and 
either indicates one valid target or leaves the options open so that the monkey can freely choose. Both options in 
choice trials provide reward with equal probability. 
Each trial started with a fixation period. The monkey initiated the trial by directing the 
gaze to the eye fixation spot (small red square) and touching the hand fixation spot 
(adjacent white square) at the center of the screen. After a random period of 500-1000 ms 
fixation (uniform distribution), a spatial pre-cue flashed briefly (500 ms) at one of the four 
cardinal locations with an eccentricity of 8 cm from the screen center. The pre-cue 
consisted of two differently colored triangles (magenta and cyan), one pointing to the 
clockwise (cw), the other to the counterclockwise (ccw) direction. The two triangles 
indicated the two possible spatial transformation rules (rule) and hence the only two 
possible reach targets in a given trial, one at 90° cw and one at 90° ccw from the pre-cue, at 
identical eccentricity. The association between rule and color was not constant. Instead, 
the monkey had to remember the two colored triangles and match them with the later 
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single-color rule-cue in order to complete the trial correctly. In addition, the two pre-cue 
triangles could be of different sizes, indicating the likelihood with which the cw and ccw 
rules would be instructed later in the rule-cue (further details below). After a random-
length memory period (500-1500 ms; uniform distribution), the rule-cue appeared. It 
consisted of a box framing the fixation points and was either colored (magenta or cyan; 
instructed trials), or color-neutral (white; choice trials). In the instructed trials, the colored 
rule-cue narrowed down the two potential reach goals to a single correct goal (cw or ccw), 
which was indicated by the triangle in the pre-cue which had the same color as the rule-
cue. The reward probability for the instructed target was always 100%, for the invalid 
target 0%. In the choice trials (25% of the trials), a white rule-cue offered two potential 
reach goals (cw and ccw). Both alternatives were valid choices and were rewarded with 
equal probabilities, independent of the size of the pre-cue and, different to Klaes et al. 
(2011), independent of the previous choice statistics. Simultaneously with the 
presentation of the rule-cue, the hand fixation square disappeared (“go” signal) and the 
monkey had to reach toward the instructed goal (instructed trials) or chosen goal (choice 
trials) within a maximum of 800 ms and hold the goal position for 300 ms (feedback 
period). 
In case of successful target acquisition and reward, the animal received positive feedback 
in the form of a circular patch of the same color as the rule-cue at the target position with 
an encouraging high-pitch tone as well as juice reward. However if he failed, the trial was 
aborted, a circular feedback patch was displayed briefly at the correct reach position and a 
demotivating low-pitch tone was played, followed by 5 s timeout. Aborted trials could be 
due to ocular fixation breaks, incorrect reaches to locations on the screen outside the 
tolerance window (3 cm) around the valid (invisible) target(s), and reaches later than the 
response time limit.  Each unsuccessful trial was reinserted into the trial sequence 
randomly. 
Monkeys were required to keep ocular fixation throughout the trial. Monkey K managed 
to perform the task as requested with good performance (87% correct). In contrast, 
monkey H’s performance was never greater than 50% while fixation was imposed. We 
therefore relaxed the ocular fixation requirement and allowed monkey H to briefly look at 
the pre-cue during the pre-cue period without the trial being aborted (yielding 88% 
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performance). However, fixation of the fixation point had to be re-acquired before the 
pre-cue disappeared (500 ms of pre-cue presentation) and maintained throughout the rest 
of the trial, particularly during motor planning and execution.  
Manipulating the rule predictability 
We aimed to induce a graded level of rule predictability in the monkey without a 
difference in the final value of the two motor-goal alternatives. For this we manipulated 
the probability with which the cw or ccw rule would be instructed by using the relative sizes 
of the pre-cue triangles to announce this probability to the monkey. We chose seven 
predictability levels corresponding to likelihoods of {6:0, 5:1, 4:2, 3:3, 2:4, 1:5, 0:6} for an 
instruction of the ccw or cw rule, respectively. These relative likelihoods were varied in a 
block-wise fashion: eight successful trials of a given predictability level were required 
before the next predictability level was randomly chosen. Two out of these eight trials 
were randomly set to be choice trials and the remaining six trials were instructed with 
different positions of the pre-cue and different assignments between pre-cue color and 
rotation rule. For example, in case of predictability level 0:6 towards cw, the monkey 
received the cue instructing cw reach in all six instructed trials whereas, in case of a bias 
level 5:1 towards ccw, the monkey was offered five instructed ccw trials and one instructed 
cw trial. The monkey always received one reward unit for each correctly performed 
instructed trial. In choice trials, we assigned a random (50%) chance of receiving more or 
less ([1.5 vs 0.5] or [2 vs 0] reward units) to both potential reaches. We did not use 100% 
reward probability for each alternative goal to discourage the monkey from repeating a 
default choice throughout the session and instead maintaining explorative behavior of 
both response alternatives. The expected value (reward probability × reward amount) was 
thus 0.5 × (1.5/2 + 0.5/2) in choice trials with [1.5, 0.5] reward units and 0.5 × (2/2 + 
0/2) for [2, 0] reward units, yielding 0.5 units in all choice trials. Thus, at the 100% 
predictability levels (6:0 or 0:6), the low probability rule had 0% chance of being 
instructed, hence this rule would offer 0% of getting reward in instructed trials and 50% 
chance of receiving high or low reward in choice trials, this resulted in an initial (before 
the rule-cue was shown) expected value of 0×6/8 + 0.5×2/8 = 0.125 reward units for the 
low probability rule. The high probability rule provided a 100% chance of delivering one 
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unit in instructed trials and, again, 50% of getting high or low reward in choice trials, 
resulting in an initial expected value of 1×6/8 + 0.5×2/8 = 0.875 units. Calculating for 
the full range of bias conditions, the ratios of initial expected values (EV) associated with 
the two rules at each predictability level were then {0.875:0.125, 0.75:0.25, 0.625:0.375, 
0.5:0.5, 0.375:0.625, 0.25:0.75, 0.125:0.875}. Note that these initial EVs were only valid 
for the time between the pre-cue and the rule-cue. After the rule-cue, the EV for 
instructed trials always turned to be one unit for the instructed rule, zero for the non-
instructed rule, and 0.5 for both rules in the choice trials. 
Pre-recording balancing procedure 
Since our experiment aimed at quantifying the biasing effects of prior expectations, we 
wanted the monkeys to explore the range of possible choice responses before the start of 
the experiment. For this, we ran an initial balancing session in order to discourage the 
monkeys from repeating the same default reach choices throughout the experimental 
session. The balancing task contained only trials with the zero-bias condition and differed 
from the rule-selection task described above only in the reward schedule that we applied 
on the choice trials. Instead of rewarding both options with random probability, we used 
the bias-minimizing reward schedule (BMRS). In the BMRS the reward probabilities for 
choice targets were calculated based on the monkeys’ choice history. The less often a 
target was freely chosen in the previous two choice trials, the higher the reward 
probability in favor of this target was (Klaes et al. 2011):  
p(Rcw)=F(nccw –ncw) 
p(Rccw)=F(ncw –nccw) 
where ncw is the total number of rewarded cw reaches and nccw is the total number of 
rewarded ccw reaches. F was defined as: 
! ! =
1, ! > 1
2/3, ! = 1
1/2, ! = 0
1/3, ! = −1
0, ! < −1
. 
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The balancing task was run until the monkey made at least two cw and two ccw reaches at 
each pre-cue position, which means at least 16 choice trials. As choice trials accounted for 
33% of all trials in the balancing task, the session then comprised a minimum of 48 
successful trials. 
Setup and data acquisition 
The monkey was seated in a chair facing an LCD screen (19 inch ViewSonic LCD 
VX922; 5 ms off–on–off response time; screen distance of 36.5-38 cm). The monkey 
chair had a front plate at the level of the monkey’s chest that could be opened in front of 
his dominant hand to allow reach movements onto the transparent touch sensitive screen 
(IntelliTouch, ELO Systems, CA, USA), which was directly mounted in front of the LCD 
screen. The luminance of all instructive stimuli was in the range between 12-13 cd/m2, 
measured using a luminance meter (Minolta, LS-100, Japan; measured at eye level with 40-
cm distance from the screen, when positioning color cues at top position; 90° from 
screen center with eccentricity of 9 cm). Throughout each trial, gaze direction was always 
constrained as long as the central fixation point (red square) was on the screen. For this 
purpose, the eye positions were recorded by an infrared camera placed above the screen 
(224 Hz CCD camera; ET-49B; Thomas Recording). Hand position had to be maintained 
on the central fixation point (white square) before the go-signal, or at the reach target 
after the go-signal. Both hand fixation and reach target allowed a tolerance window of 3 
cm (4.5-4.7° VA) radius. A real-time LabView program running on a PXI computer 
(National Instruments) was used to control the tasks as well as to register all stimulus 
properties, event timing, and behavioral responses in each trial. 
Behavioral data analysis 
We analyzed whether the different levels of rule predictability induced a bias in error rate 
(ER), reaction time (RT), and choice probability (CP). With bias we mean a difference of 
any of these behavioral parameters in choice trials depending on whether the actually 
conducted behavior (the chosen action) matched or did not match the action which 
initially (by means of the pre-cue) had to be expected to be requested more likely in case 
of an instructed trial. Note that ‘bias’ is most meaningfully defined in choice trials, since 
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only in choice trials the final expected values are equal between both response options, 
and hence any behavioral differences cannot be accounted for by objective differences 
between both options. Nevertheless, we apply the ‘bias’ terminology also to differences of 
behavioral parameters as a function of rule predictability in instructed trials, since these 
behavioral differences must be the consequence of differences in the a priori cognitive 
state before the go-cue.  
To analyze bias, we merged all the trials with different reach directions (i.e. different cue 
positions) and resorted the data such that ERs, RTs, and CPs were shown as a function of 
the absolute value of the pre-cued bias level, independent of the cw and ccw rules but 
dependent of whether the reach was conducted towards the same (follow) or the opposite 
(against) direction as indicated by the bigger pre-cue triangle (bias direction). This grouping 
resulted in one neutral ‘zero-bias’ condition plus three different bias conditions. We 
quantified bias conditions by the absolute normalized difference between the two initial 
EVs associated with each bias level [higher EV - lower EV / higher EV + lower EV]. We 
refer to this difference as bias degree and the four levels were {0 0.25 0.5 0.75}. Note that 
follow and against responses were defined only in non-zero bias conditions. The cw reaches 
were arbitrarily considered as follow reaches in zero-bias condition for convenience of 
presentation but without relevance for the conclusions. 
RTs were defined as the time between the onset of the go-signal and the release of the 
hand from the touch screen. RTs were corrected for monitor display and touch screen 
latencies. Trials with very short RTs were excluded from RT analysis as the monkey might 
have prematurely released the screen before the rule-cue was perceived but those trials 
were not aborted online during task execution. As off-line rejection threshold we used the 
maximum of the following two values: 2.5 times the interquartile ranges below the 25% 
quartile of the RT distribution within a recording session or 100 ms. 
In the error rate (ER) analysis, we counted the percentage of wrong selection trials in 
which the monkey violated the instruction by reaching to the non-instructed alternative of 
the two potential targets. ERs in instructed trials were split into follow and against in the 
same way as in the RT analysis. Wrong trials were not defined in choice trials, as any 
choice was considered correct. Other types of errors, like errors in response timing, 
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fixation breaks, or selection of orthogonal goals, were rare and were not analyzed 
separately. 
In the choice probability (CP) analysis, in the three non-zero bias degrees, CPs were 
defined as the fraction of correct choices following the bias direction. 
Additionally, on the basis of the drift diffusion model (DDM), a decision-making model 
conceptualizing decision process as a gradual accumulation of evidence until the decision 
variable reaches one of the decision bounds (e.g. Ratcliff 1978; Ratcliff et al. 1999), bias 
can be explained by a shorter migration distance, either due to a baseline shift (Ratcliff 
1985) or a bound shift (Ratcliff 1978), or a change in drift rate (Ratcliff 1981). In case of 
bias due to baseline shifts, DDM predicts short wrong RTs, i.e. erroneously reach the 
closer bound when having to reach the correct farther one, whereas it predicts long 
wrong RTs when the bias is mediated by drift rate changes (Simen et al. 2009; Leite & 
Ratcliff 2011). We also analyzed the wrong RTs in order to reveal the bias mechanism 
induced by the predictability manipulation. 
With a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM; the ‘fitglme’ function implemented in 
MATLAB R2014b) we quantified influences of bias degrees on ERs and RTs. Full models 
included the bias degree (Bias: continuous variable), the response congruency (Congruency: 
categorical responses; follow vs against bias reach direction), and the interaction term as 
fixed effects. Monkey subjects were included as random effects (random slopes for Bias 
and Congruency) to account for variance of biasing effects across monkeys. The likelihood 
of the models including or excluding different variables was compared using the Matlab 
function ‘compare(model1, model2)’. Our final model was: 
X ~ Bias * Congruency – Congruency + (Bias:Congruency | Monkeys),   (M1) 
to test for differential effects of bias between follow-against responses on ERs (binomial 
response) and RTs with possible interactions between Bias and congruency. 
When there was a significant biasing effect, post-hoc tests in the form of t-tests with 
Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons, were performed to compare each pair of 
successive bias degrees. 
 
MONKEY PHYSIOLOGY  76 
We tested for a biasing effect on CP using a separate full model without the Congruency 
term as there was no follow-against distinction: 
CP (binomial response) ~ Bias + (Bias | Monkeys),     (M2) 
followed by post-hoc tests for multiple comparisons.  
Finally, we analyzed wrong RTs using the model: 
RT ~ Bias*Congruency*Success - Congruency + (Bias:Congruency:Success | Monkeys), (M3) 
followed by post-hoc tests for comparison between all neighboring bias degrees. 
Animal preparation and recording procedure 
All experiments complied with institutional guidelines on Animal Care and Use of the 
German Primate Center and with European (Directive 2010/63/EU) and German 
national law and regulations, and were approved by regional authorities where necessary.  
Both monkeys were first implanted with a titanium head holder that was custom-fit to the 
head based on computer-tomographical surface reconstruction of the skull (3di GmbH, 
Jena, Germany). After being trained with the task, the monkeys were implanted with two 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) compatible recording chambers above PMd and PRR, 
in the left hemisphere contralateral to the monkeys’ right dominant hand. One chamber 
was placed above PRR (Horsley Clarke coordinates: -12.50/-10.00 mm (monkey 
H/monkey K) lateral; -13.50/-18.50 mm anterior), the other chamber above PMd (-
19.00/-13.00 mm lateral; 22.00/20.00 mm anterior). Chamber placement was guided by 
pre-surgical structural MRI and confirmed by postsurgical MRI, showing the implanted 
chambers relative to the brain and guiding the placement of recording electrodes (Supp. 
Figure 1). Sustained and direction-selective neural responses during memory-guided 
center-out reach planning were used as a physiological signature in both areas to confirm 
the imaging-based positioning (further details on direction selectivity profiles below). All 
surgical and imaging procedures were conducted under general anesthesia and proper 
analgesia. 
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Extracellular neural recordings were conducted from up to five microelectrodes 
simultaneously in each cortical area using a five-channel Microdrive (“mini-matrix”; 
Thomas recording, Giessen, Germany). In most sessions, simultaneous recordings were 
conducted in both areas. The raw signal from each electrode was pre-amplified (20×; 
Thomas recording), bandpass filtered, and amplified (154 Hz to 8.8 kHz; 400-800×; 
Plexon, Dallas, TX), while being subjected to on-line spike-sorting (Sort Client; Plexon). 
In addition to spike times, all spikes waveforms were digitized (40 kHz), recorded, and 
subjected to off-line control of sorting quality and stationarity (Offline Sorter; Plexon). 
Neural data selection and directional selectivity profiles 
All recorded units with sufficiently good isolation, stability, and activity (firing rates > 5 
Hz in any task epochs; see details on analyzed epochs below), regardless of their task-
relatedness or specific tuning properties, were included in the neural data analyses unless 
explicitly stated otherwise. Neuronal responses from successful trials were analyzed. 
As known from previous studies, spatiotemporal selectivity profiles (“tuning”) of 
individual neurons in PMd and PRR can change over time from cue related to motor 
related (Westendorff et al. 2010; Gail et al. 2009; Crammond & Kalaska 1994). Neural 
selectivity was computed to reveal cue-related, planning-related, and movement-related 
responses of individual neurons. We computed the selectivity of single-cell spike rates for 
the direction of the pre-cue/motor goal at different times during the trials. The analysis 
time windows were: 300 ms before pre-cue onset (baseline), 300 ms after pre-cue onset 
(pre-cue), the last 300 ms before the rule/go-signal (motor-goal), the time from the 
rule/go-signal until the reach offset (movement). This basic selectivity analysis included 
only the data from the extreme bias trials where the definite motor-goal was announced 
as soon as the pre-cue appeared, independent of cw and ccw rules (Supp. Figure 2). 
Directional selectivity was quantified with a directional tuning vector (DTV). The DTV 
for visual-related (for baseline and pre-cue epochs) and movement-related (for motor-
goal and movement epochs) properties was calculated relative to the cue location and 
reach direction, respectively. The DTV is defined as the vector average across all center-
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out cue/reach directions !! (unit vectors) weighted with the corresponding mean spike 
rates !!" of neuron j as follows: 
!"#! =  !!"!!!!!! . 
The direction of the DTV defines the preferred direction (PD) of a neuron. The PD can 
take any value between 0° and 360°, i.e., 0° corresponds to a rightward cue/reach 
position. Significance of directional tuning was tested with a nonparametric one-way 
ANOVA (Kruskal–Wallis) with the four different cue/reach directions as groups and 
sample sizes defined by the number of identical trial repetitions (p <  = 0.01). 
We characterized the neurons according to their selectivity over the course of the trial. 
We labeled neurons with significantly tuned cue-related response during the pre-cue 
presentation as visually tuned neurons (Vis), with tuned movement-planning activity 
during the memory period, prior to the movement, as motor-goal neurons (Mot), and 
with tuned activity during the movement as peri-movement neurons (Mov). Each neuron 
could have multiple labels. We provide the frequency of occurrence of the different 
neuron types in Figure 4. Any further analyses were dependent on motor-planning 
activity. Therefore, only motor-goal tuned neurons were used in most of the following 
analyses, unless indicated otherwise. 
Neural population tuning 
In order to test whether planning activities on average depended on bias degrees, we 
computed tuning functions relative to the bias direction independent of pre-cue position 
and reach direction (Figure 2A). When visualizing the data during the pre-cue and the 
memory period, we sorted the trials into four conditions, according to four bias degrees. 
For visualization of the data during the reach period, we split the data into 15 conditions: 
four instructed follow reaches, three instructed against reaches (absence of against 
instruction in the extreme bias condition), four chosen follow reaches, and four chosen 
against reaches. 
We visualized neural population tuning in two ways. First, we aligned the interpolated 
tuning profiles for each motor-goal neuron relative to the PD in the late memory period 
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(last 300 ms), normalized to the maximal activity of full-bias trials at the neuron’s PD, 
then averaged the aligned and normalized tuning function across all motor-goal tuned 
neurons (Klaes et al. 2011) (Figure 6A). Second, we plotted non-interpolated normalized 
activities of each motor-goal tuned neuron at different bias degrees against rotated bias 
directions, bias directions relative to each neuron PD (Figure 6A - insets). Note that the 
population tuning plots were used only for illustrative purposes and that we refer to 
interpolated firing rates and real PDs, which can take any value between 0° and 360°, only 
for illustrative purposes. The quantitative analyses were based on the real neural activities 
restricted to the four discrete directions (up, down, left, right) which we had sampled in 
our task. The preferred direction of a neuron was then defined by the direction toward 
which the motor-goal evoked the maximum response, denoted PDmax. 
 
FIGURE 2 |  Single neuron examples. (A) Tuning functions relative to biased directions. The biased direction is 
defined as the direction pointed to by the bigger pre-cue triangle independent of pre-cue location, e.g. for the upward 
biased direction, the pre-cues can be either on the left (cw) or the right (ccw) side. In the zero-bias condition, cw 
direction was set to be biased direction. Activities from late memory period of each neuron in trials with the same 
biased direction were averaged in order to compute the tuning function for all bias conditions. (B) PMd and (C) PRR 
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Time-resolved spiking activities 
To illustrate the temporal dynamics of population tuning, we computed spike densities by 
convolving each spike with a causal kernel defined as: 
! ! =  !! − !!!!!
∗  1−  !
!!
!! ∗  !
!!
!! ,  
 where ! !  is the spike density at the time point t. The rise time constant !! was set to 2 
ms, and the decay time constant !! was set to 50 ms.  
Average spike densities across trials with identical conditions were sampled at 1 ms 
resolution and aligned to the onset of either pre-cue, go-cue, or reach onset (adapted 
from Westendorff et al. 2010). 
Analysis of graded modulation of motor planning activity 
We characterized the graded modulation of motor planning activity in two ways. First, at 
the population level, we computed the non-normalized mean firing rate of all motor-goal 
tuned neurons during the last 300 ms of the memory period at PDmax, OD, and 
orthogonal trials. Among the orthogonal trials, we dissociated trials in which the bias 
direction was towards PDmax + /2 (plus, Op) and PDmax - /2 (minus, Om), 
respectively. In order to assess graded planning activity, we tested whether bias degrees 
influenced planning activity in a graded fashion by using, first, a GLMM, including the 
effect of bias degrees (Bias), bias directions (BiasDir: PDmax vs. OD), as well as the 
interaction term as fixed effects and individual units as random effect as follows, 
Activity ~ Bias * BiasDir + (Bias * BiasDir | Units),     (M4) 
then t-tests with Bonferroni correction for post-hoc comparisons.  
Second, at the single cell level, we assessed the ‘gradedness’ of each individual neuron by 
extracting trial-by-trial normalized firing rates at the PDmax and OD. Then we used a 
linear model, 
Activity ~ Bias * BiasDir,          (M5) 
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to test whether neuronal activity was significantly modulated at the PDmax and/or at the 
OD with bias degrees. Significant positive slope at the PDmax indicates neuron’s response 
that increases with increasing bias towards its PDmax and significant negative slope at the 
OD means a neuron decreases its response with increasing bias towards its OD. Next, we 
quantified the proportion of individual neurons that showed a significant effect in both 
PDmax and OD, only in PDmax, only in OD, or no significant modulation and plotted all 
neurons according to their slope at the PDmax and OD. In the plot, neurons that show 
only significant effect at the PDmax would gather along y-axis whereas neurons that show 
only significant effect at the OD along x-axis. We analyzed the distribution of all neural 
categories by transforming Cartesian coordinates of each neuron into angular coordinates 
(0°: OD-, 90°: PDmax+) then test for unimodality using Hartigans’ dip test (J. A. Hartigan 
& P. M. Hartigan 1985). 
Analysis of neural coactivation 
Between each pair of motor-goal tuned neurons recorded in the same session, we 
computed Pearson correlation coefficients of the planning activities (late memory) across 
all trials (signal correlations) as a function of the distance between the neurons’ PDs. The 
dependency of signal correlation from PD distance was computed separately for each bias 
degree. We were interested particularly in the effect of predictability on the signal 
correlation of neuron pairs having opposite PDmax, since these are most informative 
about co-encoding of two potential motor goals (see Results). We used a GLMM, 
including Bias as a fixed effect and neuron pairs as a random effect as follow, 
 CorrCoef ~ Bias | pairs,          (M6) 
then t-tests (Bonferroni-corrected) for post-hoc comparisons. 
Analysis of choice predictive activities & receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
We choice trials, we investigated to which extend planning activities during the memory 
period could predict monkeys’ subsequent choices. We gathered all choice trials and, for 
each single unit, sorted the trials into PDmax, Op, OD, and Om trials (identical to Analysis 
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of graded modulation). In addition, we split the conditions into Reach-in and Reach-out choices, 
for reaching into versus out of the neurons’ PDmax, respectively.  
First, we tested the difference between Reach-in and Reach-out choices (ReachDir) using 
GLMM,  
Activity ~ Bias * BiasDir * ReachDir + (Bias * BiasDir * ReachDir | Units),   (M7) 
followed by post-hoc comparisons using Bonferroni-corrected t-tests.  
Second, we computed an ROC for each neuron at each bias degree. The area under the 
ROC determines levels of choice predictability, where 0.5 corresponds to chance level, 1.0 
to perfect predictability of choice based on neural response differences. We computed the 
within-condition ROC, i.e. Reach-in vs. Reach-out choices in Bias-in and Bias-out trials 
separately, to test how well we could predict follow vs. against choices at different bias 
degrees. Also, we computed the between-condition ROC, i.e. Bias-in vs. Bias-out conditions, to 
test how reliable we could predict Reach-in choice in Bias-in trials vs. Reach-out choice in 
Bias-out trials. 
Analysis of neural response latencies and reaction times 
Previous studies (Churchland & Shenoy 2007; Johnson et al. 1999; Suminski et al. 2015) 
that fractions of premotor neurons exhibit complex changes in their activities at the 
transition from planning to movement epochs. We employed a multivariate Euclidean 
distance analysis, which is more suited for analysis of complex activities during reach 
movements. For this analysis, we could include all single units we recorded in each 
cortical area without selection based on their tuning properties. First, we computed spike 
densities by convolving each spike train with a Gaussian kernel, for stronger smoothing, 
as compared to causal kernel, in order to work with neural velocity, of width  = 50 ms 
(Westendorff et al. 2010), as follows 
! ! =  !!!!!× !
!!!
!!! .  
Then, we computed Euclidean distance, without dimensionality reduction (adapted from 
Ames et al. 2014), between trials in which monkeys reached two opposing reach goals at 
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each pre-cue location (up, down, left, right) and each condition (all bias degrees, 
instructed vs. choice, follow vs. against). We then averaged the neural distances across cue 
locations to get one distance per condition. We estimated the variability of the neural 
distance by bootstrapping (N = 10,000 resampled distances per condition). Next, we 
quantified the neural response latencies by calculating the time bin, after the go-cue onset, 
in which the distance reached the maximal velocity (MVT: maximal velocity time). The 
difference in latencies between two cortical areas of interest for each condition was tested 
by permutation tests; thereby we randomly reassigned each neuron to one of the brain 
areas such that the number of units in both sets matched the original sample size (N = 
10,000 samples). The percentage of random permutations leading to a latency difference 
larger or equal to the original sample served as the p-value and when the p-value was less 
than 5%, we considered the latency difference significant. 
Similarly, we quantified the peak latencies by calculating the time bin in which the slope 
became lower than 0.3 (typical slope when the neural distance started to reach its peak or 
plateau; PT: peak time). We did not use the maximum neural distance because the PRR 
population showed no peak but a plateau in neural distance during reach movements. The 
peak latencies between two cortical areas were compared against RTs and the difference 
was tested by permutation tests as described above. 
Results 
The main goal of the study was to test whether graded predictability would induce graded 
reach plans of two rule-based motor goals, reflected by graded neural encoding of these 
potential motor goals in the frontoparietal sensorimotor network and whether the graded 
reach goal encoding can explain subsequent monkeys’ choices. We first tested whether 
the pre-cued motor-goal predictability led to behavioral bias based on error rates (ER), 
reaction times (RT), and choice probabilities (CP), performed by two monkeys in 89 
sessions (monkey H, 50 sessions; monkey K, 39 sessions). Then, we tested for 
predictability-dependent neural modulations in directional reach goal selectivity in PRR 
and PMd. 
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Biasing effects of motor-goal predictability on monkeys’ behavior 
Predictability of the more likely motor-goal instruction enhanced instructed as well as 
freely chosen reaches towards the biased direction, and weakened opposite reaches. 
Error rates: Generalized linear mixed models (GLMM; M1) showed, with increasing bias 
degrees, increasing difference in ERs between the trials in which the rule-cue instructed to 
reach against the initial bias (against trials) and the trials in which the rule-cue agreed with 
the initial bias (follow trials) (interaction between Bias and Congruency (against - follow): t-
statistic = 29.59, p < 0.001). Additionally, ERs showed a gradual increase in against and 
decrease in follow trials along the whole range of bias degrees (against: t-statistic = 53.92, p 
< 0.001; follow: t-statistic = -21.26, p < 0.001; pairwise comparisons shown in Figure 3A). 
Reaction times: mixed model analyses (M2) showed a significant differential effect on 
RTs between against and follow trials (interaction between Bias and Congruency: t-statistic = 
17.21, p < 0.001) and, consistent with ER results, slower RTs when the monkeys were 
instructed to reach against the bias and faster RTs when the instruction followed the 
initial bias (increase in RTs (ms) per one bias degree: against: estimate ± SE = 30.12 ± 
1.25, t-statistic = 24.02, p < 0.001; follow: estimate ± SE = -46.63 ± 0.61, t-statistic = -
76.31, p < 0.001; Bonferroni-corrected t-tests shown in Figure 3B). 
Wrong RTs: GLMM (M3) showed a significant decrease in wrong RTs response to 
against instructions when the monkeys erroneously followed the bias, and an increase in 
response to follow instruction when he erroneously went against the bias (interaction 
between Bias and Congruency (against - follow): estimate ± SE = -57.11 ± 1.64, t-statistic = -
34.87, p < 0.001). The GLMM also confirmed short error RTs (“fast errors”) in against 
trials and “slow errors” in follow trials (against (correct - wrong): estimate ± SE = 86.34 ± 
2.45, t-statistic = 35.17, p < 0.001; follow: estimate ± SE = -47.97 ± 1.97, t-statistic = -
24.40, p < 0.001) (Figure 3C). 
Choice probabilities (CP): GLMM analysis also indicated a biasing effect on CPs in the 
choice trials; the probability of choosing follow increased with the bias degree (t-statistic = 
8.17, p < 0.001) and Bonferroni-corrected t-tests confirmed graded biasing effects; the 
choice bias became gradually stronger as a function of bias degree (Figure 3D). With the 
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strongest bias level monkeys almost exclusively (89 %) chose the biased reach direction, 
even though there was no objective advantage over the opposite direction in the choice 
trials. 
 
FIGURE 3 | Biasing effects on the monkeys’ behavior. (A) Average error rates (ER), (B) average reaction 
times (RT) difference (zero line indicates average RTs in instructed trials of zero-bias condition), (C) average 
wrong RT difference of instructed trial at all bias levels are shown. (D) Average choice probabilities (CP) and (E) 
average choice RTs at all bias levels are shown. Dark colors represent follow reaches and light colors represent 
against responses. Error bars depict standard errors. Each panel displays fitted equation using GLMM for each 
trace. (*p < corr at 5%, **p < corr at 1% , ***p < corr at 0.1%; Bonferroni-corrected t-test). 
Choice RTs also showed differential biasing effect between follow and against trials 
(interaction between Bias and Congruency: estimate ± SE = 70.93 ± 8.55, t-statistic = 8.30, 
p < 0.001) with slight increase in choice RTs when the monkeys chose against the bias 
and gradual RT advantages with follow choices increasing with bias degrees (follow: estimate 
± SE = -43.12 ± 14.76, t-statistic = -2.92, p < 0.01; against: estimate ± SE = 25.63 ± 1.75, 
t-statistic = 14.61, p < 0.001). Figure 3E shows post-hoc multiple comparisons between 
neighboring conditions. 
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In summary, the monkeys performed faster and made fewer errors in instructed follow 
trials compared to instructed against trials, mostly in a graded manner with increasing bias 
degree. They also chose the biased option more frequently, with shorter RTs, when 
allowed to freely choose. The behavioral results therefore indicate that the pre-cues were 
effective in biasing the monkeys’ behavior in a two-fold way: First, instructions that 
match the prior expectations create a behavioral benefit, and non-matching instructions 
create costs. The behavioral bias confirms graded levels of preparedness in response to 
graded predictability, induced by the probabilistic pre-cueing. Second, the bias shows in 
choice trials despite balanced reward at the moment of decision, i.e., despite lacking 
objective advantage, thereby justifying the term ‘bias’. 
Neural motor goal selectivity 
We recorded extracellular single-neuron spiking activities from 561 cells in dorsal 
premotor cortex (PMd) (monkey H, 238; monkey K, 323) and 517 cells in parietal reach 
region (PRR) (monkey H, 248; monkey K, 269) while the monkeys performed the rule-
based reach selection task. We distinguished between (a) visually encoding neurons 
spatially selective during the pre-cue presentation, (b) motor-goal encoding neurons 
selective to directions for pending reaches during the late memory period, and (c) 
movement encoding neurons selective to reach directions during the movement, where a 
neuron can contribute to multiple categories (see Methods and Figure 4). 53% of PMd 
(297/561) and 50% of PRR (261/517) neurons fulfilled the criteria for motor-goal 
encoding and were subjected to all following analyses. All neurons contributed to the 
latency analysis (see below). 
A subset of neurons showed selectivity profiles that evolved over different task epochs. 
Neural categorization analysis revealed multiple differences among neurons in both areas. 
For example, while ~50% of neurons in both areas were selective in the motor-goal 
period, a two-fold larger fraction in PRR (49%) than PMd (26%) also showed selectivity 
during visual cue presentation. Interestingly, in PMd ~20% of the motor-goal plus 
movement neurons changed their preferred direction (with a minimal angle difference of 
90°) from planning to movement period (Supp. Figure 2). In PRR large changes in PD 
between motor-goal and movement only occurred in 4% of neurons. More importantly 
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for the purpose of this study, the majority (~70%) of neurons in both areas that showed 
selectivity during the visual cue period and the motor-goal period kept their PD constant 
between both periods. As the visual cue and the motor goal locations were never 
overlapped in our task, this means that most neurons which were active during pre-cue 
presentation became inactive during movement planning, and vice versa. Therefore, the 
visual-to-motor-goal PD consistency confirms that during the motor-goal period, neural 
activity is motor-goal related, and does not reflect visual memory of the spatial pre-cue 
(Gail & Andersen 2006; Gail et al. 2009; Westendorff et al. 2010; Klaes et al. 2011). 
 
FIGURE 4 | Neural categorization in PMd and PRR. Venn diagrams show percentage of neurons of 
different types (Vis: visually tuned neurons, Mot: motor-goal tuned neurons, Mov: peri-movement neurons). For 
neurons that showed multiple tuning properties, fractions of neurons that keep tuning direction, change tuning 
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Graded encoding of potential motor goals in PMd and PRR 
As has been previously shown (Cisek 2007; Coallier et al. 2015; Klaes et al. 2011), neural 
selectivity in PMd and PRR is consistent with the idea of encoding potential movement 
options in ambiguous choice situations. Here we confirm that bimodal choice signals are 
in fact motor-goal related (characterized by sustained activation despite the absence of 
visual targets at the motor-goal locations) and provide evidence that potential motor goal 
encoding is modulated by prior probabilities consistent with an induced behavioral bias, 
and thereby is suited to support the idea of graded encoding of two potential plans 
simultaneously. 
The time-resolved population activities in the current experiment showed initial cue-
related activities during the pre-cue presentation, sustained activities during the memory 
period, and movement-related peaks around the movement time. Especially the average 
activities prior to movement onset were modulated by the bias level in both areas (Figure 
2B-C & Figure 5A). We compared the population response in all bias levels over the 
course of the trials with several important first observations to be made (for detailed 
quantitative analyses and further results see Analyses of graded planning activity and below).  
First, average responses were highest when a pre-cue with highest bias level indicated a 
likely reach goal towards the neurons’ PD (dark red traces; Bias-in). Neural responses were 
intermediate when two competitive reach goal alternatives were equally valid (light-color 
traces), and lowest when the extreme biasing pre-cue pointed away from the PD (dark 
blue traces; Bias-out). Second, in the zero-bias condition (light-color traces), the average 
population activity represented two separate rule-based potential motor goals at two 
opposite directions. This is seen by the fact that during zero-bias motor planning the 
activity for motor goals towards the PDmax and OD were higher than for motor goals 
towards the orthogonal directions (grey dotted traces) and higher than during baseline. 
These two patterns (gradation and bimodal encoding at intermediate gradation level) 
occurred in the same population of neurons with an experimentally controlled trial-by-
trial bias. More than our previous results in which two similar scenarios were shown in 
two separate datasets, in one of which the monkeys showed an accidental bias (Klaes et  
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al. 2011), these results support encoding of graded motor goal preference in individual 
neurons in PRR and PMd. Third, during the reach period, the PRR neural population 
showed elevated activities selectively at the PDmax whereas PMd showed high activities in 
all reach directions, which was probably due to the fact that many PMd neurons changed 
their tuning directions from planning to reach epoch (Figure 4 and Supp. Figure 2). Forth, 
in both brain areas, Reach-in activities reached similar peak levels around the time when 
 
FIGURE 5 | | Population average of spike density functions. (A) Population average of spike density functions 
throughout trial. The average data at maximum (PDmax: red traces), opposite (OD: dashed blue traces) and orthogonal 
(Orth: dotted grey traces) directions from different bias conditions are presented. Due to multiple traces, we omitted 
error bars in these plots for visibility. Grey shaded areas correspond to the duration of pre-cue presentation, when the 
data are aligned to pre-cue onset (left column), and dashed vertical lines correspond to the moment when the rule cue 
appears (middle column), and when the reach movement is initiated (rigth column). Before the rule-cue appears, there 
is no physical distinction between follow and against reaches or instructed and choice trials; the data are plotted jointly 
before the rule-cue but split into instructed vs. choice and follow vs. against reaches after the rule-cue. Only the follow 
choice trials are shown. (B) Population average of spike density functions of all choice trials aligned to go-cue onset, 
with average reaction times. The average data at PDmax (red traces) and OD (dashed blue traces) from different bias 
conditions are presented. Small dots above the curves represent averaged reaction times in follow and against trials of 
each bias condition and horizontal bars represent standard errors. Grey shaded areas correspond to the duration of go-
cue presentation. 
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the movement was initiated despite starting from different levels of planning activities in 
different bias conditions (Figure 5B). In the context of drift-diffusion model, this finding 
supports a baseline shift hypothesis, leading to higher choice probabilities and faster 
reaction times towards the biased option as observed in the behavioral results. 
Analyses of graded planning activity 
After showing how motor-goal predictability modulates responses during the whole 
motor planning period, we next analyzed how modulation of planning activity depended 
on the bias direction and bias degrees, first at the population level, then at the level of 
individual neurons.  
We compared neural activity levels during the last 300 ms of the memory period, for all 
bias directions and all bias degrees, to assess directional modulation of PMd and PRR 
neurons as a function of bias degree. Neuronal populations in both brain areas on average 
showed increasing activities with increasing bias towards neurons’ PD (Bias-in) and 
decreasing activities with increasing bias towards the OD (Bias-out) (Figure 6A). 
Confirmed by GLMM, activities in response to bias towards the PDmax showed a 
significant increase that depended on bias degree (PMd: estimate ± SE = 8.11 ± 0.64, t-
statistic = 12.63, p < 0.001; PRR: estimate ± SE = 7.08 ± 0.55, t-statistic = 12.89, p < 
0.001) while the OD showed a significantly negative slope (PMd: estimate ± SE = -6.14 ± 
0.54, t-statistic = -11.42, p < 0.001; PRR: estimate ± SE = -5.09 ± 0.50, t-statistic = -
10.09, p < 0.001; Figure 6B). No significant slope was detected for the orthogonal 
directions in PMd (p > 0.1). PRR showed slight significant slopes (Op: p < 0.05; Om: p < 
0.01) but no significant graded effect when tested post-hoc. No significant difference 
between both brain areas was found in this respect (p > 0.05). Also, the gradation 
between bias conditions for both brain areas looks very similar. When the data from each 
monkey were analyzed separately, subtle differences in non-linear dependencies of 
planning activities during the memory period from motor-goal predictability remarkably 
mirrored each monkey’s pattern of choice biases (Supp. Figure 3). Notably, the two reach 
goal directions orthogonal to the two potential motor goals mark fixed points of the 
directional population tuning, i.e., they are not modulated by motor-goal predictability. 
Figure 6B confirmed that neural responses to orthogonal reach goals were mostly  
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unaffected by bias degrees.  
Individual neurons could contribute in different ways to the population-level results 
which showed increasing responses when there is a bias towards the PD and decreasing 
responses for a bias towards the OD, while orthogonal directions were on average 
unaffected. The bipolar modulation pattern could either be implemented in an equivalent 
fashion at the level of individual neurons. Alternatively, separate groups of neurons could 
be responsible for the enhancement when bias direction and PD match, on the one hand, 
and the reduction when bias direction and OD match, on the other hand. At the single 
 
FIGURE 6 |  Analyses of graded modulation. (A) Average normalized tuning function during the late memory 
period (300ms) of all motor-goal tuned PMd (left column) and PRR (right column) neurons. In the insets are 
shown unsmoothed population tuning (see Methods). Shaded areas correspond to standard errors of the mean. Note 
that vertical arrows are for illustrative purpose; red arrows in (A) refer to PD whereas red traces in (B) refer to 
PDmax. (B) Multiple comparison of (non-normalized) average firing rates at maximum direction (PDmax; red), 
opposite direction (OD; blue), and two orthogonal directions (Op (brown) and Om (yellow) for PDmax + /2 and 
PDmax - /2, respectively). Each panel displays fitted equation using GLMM for each trace. Error bars depict 
standard errors. (*p < corr at 5%, **p < corr at 1% , ***p < corr at 0.1%; Bonferroni-corrected t-test) 
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unit level, we found that the majority of PMd (60%) and PRR (76%) neurons were either 
up-regulated in Bias-in trials or down-regulated in Bias-out trials, but not both. Only one 
fourth of PMd neurons and one tenth of PRR neurons showed graded modulation in 
both directions.  
Figure 7 shows the lack of co-emerging biases at the PDmax and OD responses; most 
neurons coalesced along the PDmax+ and OD- axes and not in the upper-right quadrant 
along the unity line, which would have to be expected in case of correlated up- and down-
regulation. The results strongly suggest a separate down-regulation of the explicitly 
disregarded motor-goal option (as opposed to unaffected neutral positions) and up-




FIGURE 7 |  Neural gradedness: slopes of activity modulation with bias conditions in the maximum 
direction (PDmax) and the opposite direction (OD) of PMd (left) and PRR (right) neurons. The upper-right 
quadrant reflects increasing activities (positive slope) of PDmax responses and decreasing activities (negative slope; 
inversed x-axis) of OD responses. Red data points: neurons that showed significant modulation of both PDmax and 
OD responses with bias conditions; blue: significant bias-dependent modulation of PDmax responses; green: 
significant modulation of OD responses; grey: no significant modulation. The insets show the angular distribution of 
all neurons in each area, with the Hartigans’ dip test results. 
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Analysis of neural co-activation 
In principle, it was possible that the monkeys in each trial, even in zero-bias trials, 
prematurely generated an unambiguous movement plan towards one of the two potential 
reach goals soon after having seen the pre-cue and corrected the plan if needed once the 
final instruction was provided with the go-cue. If, additionally, they alternated between 
opposing premature plans, then on average neural directional selectivity would 
deceptively result in graded levels of activities and bimodal tuning during ambiguous 
movement preparation. Therefore, for demonstrating proper dual encoding of two 
potential motor goals simultaneously, it needs to be ruled out that the bimodal population 
tuning in the zero-bias conditions (Figure 6A) is an effect of averaging neural responses 
over trials with randomly alternating bias of the animal towards only one of the two 
potential motor goals in each trial. To achieve this, we sought evidence for a trial-by-trial 
co-encoding of two opposing reach directions during planning by analyzing response 
correlations in oppositely tuned neurons. We computed trial-by-trial signal correlation of 
all pairs of motor-goal tuned neurons recorded simultaneously in the same experimental 
session. In case of alternating premature plans, we expected to observe that neuron pairs 
with opposite PDmax should show negative signal correlation during motor planning 
throughout all bias conditions. This is because the neurons are oppositely tuned and 
whenever the animal has an unambiguous plan towards only one direction, only one 
neuron can be active and the other inactive, i.e. they are anti-correlated. If, however, the 
monkeys planned both alternative motor goals, then in trials in which the two plans 
overlapped with the PDs of the two neurons these should be active, and in trial with 
potential motor goal orthogonal to the PDs they should be both less active. Hence, the 
signal correlation should become less negative or even positive in the zero-bias condition, 
since in this case correlation marks a mixture of expected weak signal correlations and 
unknown (positive or negative) noise correlations induced by the trial-to-trial direction-
independent neuronal response fluctuations. Some pairs of opposing neurons in PMd and 
PRR did show positive correlation in low bias conditions (Figure 8A), but not in biased 
conditions, consistent with the idea of proper co-encoding of two potential motor goals. 
Example pairs of neurons are shown in Figure 8B. On average over all neurons, GLMM 
results confirmed significant decrease in signal correlation between opposing neurons 
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with decreasing bias degree (PMd: estimate ± SE = -0.22 ± 0.02, t-statistic = -11.36, p < 
0.001; PRR: estimate ± SE = -0.14 ± 0.03, t-statistic = -5.12, p < 0.001). PMd showed 
slightly stronger decrease than PRR (interaction between Bias and brain areas (PMd - 
PRR): estimate ± SE = -0.08 ± 0.03, t-statistic = -2.25, p < 0.05; Figure 8C). 
 
FIGURE 8 |  Neural coactivation analysis. (A) Trial-by-trial signal correlation between each pair of PMd (left) and 
PRR (right) neurons recorded in the same experimental session, plotted against difference in PD between neurons at 
each bias degrees (low - high bias degrees: red - green - blue - purple data points). Dark color points depict 
significantly positive or negative correlation. Some neurons with large distance in PD (right half of each plot) showed 
positive signal correlation in zero-bias condition (dark red dots on the right half above the zero-line). (B) Examples of 
neuron pairs with small (left) and large (right) difference in PDs (low - high bias degrees: light - dark traces). (C) 
Multiple comparison of average signal correlation in all bias degrees. Each panel displays fitted equation using GLMM 
for each trace. Error bars depict standard errors. (*p < corr at 5%, **p < corr at 1% , ***p < corr at 0.1%; 
Bonferroni-corrected t-test) 
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Choice predictive activities & ROC 
In the conditions with high motor goal predictability, the average activities in OD trials 
were even lower than the activities at the orthogonal directions. In the context of drift-
diffusion models one might wonder how such low level of baseline activity prior to the 
demanded choice commitment could allow the observed against choice behavior, which 
the monkeys showed more often (Figure 3D) than they selected orthogonal directions (< 
0.1%), which were not parts of the valid options.  
We investigated which cognitive state led to against choices by analyzing the planning 
activities in only the choice trials. We sorted the trials according to subsequent choice: 
Reach-in (reach direction matched neurons’ PDmax) vs. Reach-out (reach direction away from 
the PDmax). Note that the combinations of Bias-in followed by Reach-in and Bias-out 
followed by Reach-out were follow trials whereas the combinations of Bias-in followed by 
Reach-out and Bias-out followed by Reach-in constituted against trials. In follow trials, which 
formed the majority of the choice trials, GLMM results confirmed positive biasing effect 
on neural activities in case of Bias-in as observed in previously in the grand average results 
(Bias-in & Reach-in: PMd: estimate ± SE = 8.25 ± 0.64, t-statistic = 12.92, p < 0.001; PRR: 
estimate ± SE = 7.11 ± 0.56, t-statistic = 12.76, p < 0.001) and the opposite effect in case 
of Bias-out (Bias-out & Reach-out: PMd: estimate ± SE = -6.40 ± 0.54, t-statistic = -11.84, p 
< 0.001; PRR: estimate ± SE = -4.98 ± 0.49, t-statistic = -10.13, p < 0.001). Importantly, 
prior to against choice, the biasing effect declined but remained significant (Interaction 
between Bias and Congruency in against trials (Bias-in – Bias-out): PMd: estimate ± SE = 4.05 
± 0.69, t-statistic = 5.89, p < 0.001; PRR: estimate ± SE = 3.32 ± 0.81, t-statistic = 4.11, 
p < 0.001) and did not reverse, i.e. the biasing effect in Bias-in trials were still positive and 
Bias-out trials still negative [Bias-in & Reach-out: PMd: estimate ± SE = 4.70 ± 0.57, t-
statistic = 8.18, p < 0.001; PRR: estimate ± SE = 2.81 ± 0.46, t-statistic = 6.14, p < 
0.001; Bias-out & Reach-in: PMd: estimate ± SE = -3.10 ± 0.45, t-statistic = -6.87, p < 
0.001; PRR: estimate ± SE = -4.03 ± 0.73, t-statistic = -5.52, p < 0.001] (Figure 9A).  
Furthermore, we tested the discriminability of against and follow choices by assessing the 
area under the ROC for each unit separately in Bias-in and Bias-out trials (ROC within 
condition; Reach-in vs. Reach-out discrimination) based on trial-by-trial activity levels  
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during late motor planning prior to the go-cue. The average discriminability stagnated 
around 0.6 across bias levels with insignificant biasing effect in both areas (p > 0.9; 
GLMM; Figure 9B). On the other hand, when we tested ROC separately in against and 
 
FIGURE 9 |  Analyses of choice predictive response.  (A) Multiple comparison of average firing rates at PDmax, split 
into Reach-in and Reach-out (Bias-in & Reach-in (follow): solid red; Bias-in & Reach-out (against): dashed orange), OD (Bias-out & 
Reach-out (follow): solid blue; Bias-out & Reach-in (against): dashed green), and orthogonal directions (dashed grey). Each panel 
displays fitted equation using GLMM for each trace.  (B) Average area under the ROC curves discriminating follow and 
against trials in all bias levels (within-condition ROC). (C) Average area under the ROC curves discriminating Bias-in and Bias-
out trials (between-condition ROC). Error bars depict standard errors. (*p < corr at 5%, **p < corr at 1% , ***p < corr at 
0.1%; Bonferroni-corrected t-test). 
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follow trials (ROC between conditions; Bias-in vs. Bias-out discrimination), we retrieved the 
expected ROC discriminability being low between both options in zero-bias conditions 
and increasing with increasing bias degree (Figure 9C). 
Neural choice signal latencies 
Receiving the color-neutral rule-cue, the animals were signaled to make a choice 
immediately. We investigated whether PMd and/or PRR neurons showed movement-
related activities that signaled the chosen option prior to the overt movement initiation. 
Individual neurons which did not reach predefined significance criteria could still have 
contributed to a choice signal at the population level. To not reject these contributions, 
we used a multivariate approach including all recorded neurons. The Euclidean distances 
of the trajectories in the neural state space between opposite reach goals of each bias 
degree and reach congruency is shown in Figure 10A-B. The neural distance measure 
looks overall similar to the population activity levels (Figure 5B) but has the additional 
advantage for the analysis of the movement period that all neural distance traces reached 
clear movement-related peaks useful to assess peak latencies (which was not the case for 
the difference between Reach-in and Reach-out activity levels in PMd spike densities; data 
not shown). 
Neural response latencies were measured as the time at which the neural distance curves 
reached their maximal velocity or the peak (see Methods). The maximal velocity latencies 
were faster in PMd than in PRR (latencies PMd < PRR; negative differences) in all cases, 
confirmed by permutation tests (Figure 10C-left). Additionally, the neural peak latencies, 
the time at which the neural distance started to level out, of PMd also preceded those of 
PRR (Figure 10C-right).  
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FIGURE 10 |  Analyses of choice signal latencies. (A) Neural distance of PMd and (B) Neural distance of 
PRR aligned to go-cue onset (left) and movement onset (right) at different bias degrees (shades) and split into follow 
(blue) – against (red) trials. Only choice trials are shown. Reaction times (RTs), peak times (PTs), and maximal 
velocity times (MVTs) are shown above the curves with corresponding colors. Shaded areas represent go-cue 
duration when the neural distances are aligned to go-cue and vertical dashed lines represent the movement-onset 
time when the neural distances are aligned to the movement onset. (C) Maximal velocity times (MVTs; left) and 
peak times (PTs; right) of PMd and PRR neural distances relative to go-cue and reach onset, respectively. RTs are 
also shown with MVTs. Histograms depict permutation test results for PMd and PRR latency difference at each 
bias degree, positions according to bias degrees on the x-axis (bottom – follow trials, top – against trials). Each 
histogram is centered at zero. The red lines depict the actual latencies between PMd and PRR (PMd - PRR) at each 
condition. Pairs of dashed lines in each histogram represent the interval covering 95% of the permutation 
distribution. (*p < corr at 5%, **p < corr at 1% , ***p < corr at 0.1%; permutation test). 
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Discussion 
In response to a parametric manipulation of prior motor-goal probability in a rule-based 
action selection task, monkey behavior showed decreased error rates (ER), faster reaction 
times (RT), and increased choice probabilities (CP) in a graded manner in favor of the 
biased reach option. The opposite was true for reaches against the biased option. 
Behavioral costs and benefits of prior predictability occurred despite both motor-goal 
options providing equal reward at the time of commitment to the choice and they 
occurred in instructed as well as choice trials. In parallel with behavioral indications of the 
bias, neural activities in PMd and PRR showed graded directional selectivity, mirroring 
gradual choice bias between two rule-based reach alternatives at the level of the neural 
population. At the level of single units, most PMd and PRR neurons showed bias-
dependent modulation at either the preferred direction or the opposite direction, but 
rarely both. In addition, the graded choice signal latencies in PMd always preceded 
latencies in PRR and depended on motor goal predictability similar to RTs. The results 
suggest that prior motor-goal probability can induce graded levels of motor planning 
activities and that imbalanced planning can subsequently drive choice bias in reward 
neutral decisions. Our results are consistent with the idea of shifting the baseline in drift-
diffusion models (DDM) in sensorimotor cortices as a neural mechanism of prior. 
Encoding of potential motor-goals in cortical sensorimotor areas  
In line with previous studies (Cisek 2007; Klaes et al. 2011; Sugrue et al. 2005; Platt & 
Glimcher 1999; Yang & Shadlen 2007; Lindner et al. 2010), we observed parallel activity 
of two alternative spatially selective neural populations in the fronto-parietal reach areas 
PRR and PMd when the monkey was provided with two potential reach options. We 
ensured that the graded neural activities reflect genuine motor planning information due 
to three central features of our experimental design: First, we spatially dissociated the 
memory of the visual cue from the motor-goal by introducing the cw and ccw rotation 
rules, analogous to memory-guided anti-reaches (Crammond & Kalaska 1994; Gail & 
Andersen 2006; Gail et al. 2009; Westendorff et al. 2010) and anti-saccades (Munoz & 
Everling 2004; Zhang & Barash 2004; Gottlieb & Goldberg 1999). We thereby ruled out 
graded visual memory encoding of target stimuli with variable stimulus value or salience. 
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Second, we combined a majority of instructed trials with randomly interleaved choice 
trials to encourage sustained preliminary planning of two potential actions (Klaes et al. 
2011; Klaes et al. 2012). We thereby avoided immediate pre-mature choices of the animal, 
which would likely have occurred if we only had memory-guided choice trials. In addition, 
by sequentially providing parts of the information, we avoided dealing with lack of 
planning, which could have occurred if we provided all the information only once before 
the decision time. Third, in contrast to most other binary choice studies, we sampled the 
neurons’ spatial selectivity profiles not just for trials with each neuron’s PD coinciding 
with the two potential motor goal positions, but also two orthogonal positions (four 
directions total). This allowed us to quantify the bimodality of the neural population 
responses as a contrast between potential motor goal locations and neutral locations 
(Cisek & Kalaska 2005; Klaes et al. 2011). We could thereby show that the observed 
responses in the zero-bias trials were spatially selective for the two potential motor goals 
rather just marking a spatially unspecific response enhancement. In combination, the 
three measures ensured that the observed spatially selective neural responses reflected 
spatial properties of the preliminarily planned action during the instructed delay between 
pre-cue and final instruction, i.e. that we observed encoding of potential motor-goals. 
Graded predictability induces graded levels of behavioral bias and action plans 
With our task design we successfully controlled the monkeys prior expectation about the 
valid rule, and hence the action likely to be taken, in a graded fashion trial by trial. 
Differently to previous studies on potential reach goal encoding (Cisek & Kalaska 2005; 
Klaes et al. 2011), the probability of the later cw/ccw-rule instructions was reliably 
announced by a pre-cue. We previously found that, in humans, this leads to a trial-by-trial 
manipulation of subjects’ prior expectations on which rule to apply and hence the action 
to be taken (Suriya-Arunroj & Gail 2015). Such manipulation of prior rule expectation in a 
rule-based decision-making task is equivalent to prior expectations on the appearance of a 
stimulus in perceptual decision-making (Mulder et al. 2012; Leite & Ratcliff 2011; Maddox 
& Bohil 1998; Simen et al. 2009). We confirmed the effectiveness of the prior 
manipulation in our monkey by showing graded prior-dependent ERs and RTs in 
instructed trials and, most importantly, prior-dependent CPs plus RTs in choice trials. In 
our task design, the prior information was not essential for human and monkey subjects to 
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successfully complete the trials; they received a clear instruction at the end of each 
instructed trials and they received equal reward for both options in all choice trials. The 
observed behavioral bias suggested that once the prior information is available, we 
unavoidably make use of them and plan our actions accordingly.  
From the biased behavior we conclude that the monkeys in the time following the pre-
cue and preceding the rule-cue planned both movements with graded bias towards the 
more probable goal, in the way we intended. The striking similarity in prior-dependent RT 
costs and benefits between instructed and choice trials further supports the notion that 
the observed behavioral outcome is due to effects that are common to both instructed 
and choice trials, hence should occur before the final rule instruction.  
We strongly believe that our graded prior manipulation induced biased action plans and 
not biased attentional effect. First, attention facilitates the selection of relevant sources of 
information by sensitivity control (Gottlieb & Balan 2010; Knudsen 2007). As we never 
showed visual target at the reach goal location, enhanced stimulus sensitivity at the reach 
goal location had no behavioral relevance. Furthermore, a previous study (Lebedev et al. 
2004) showed that, when monkeys were faced with two saccade alternatives: one 
physically marked and one remembered, the majority of prefrontal neurons represented 
attended saccade locations, i.e. the cued ones, and not the remembered ones. Following 
this idea, in absence of physical targets in our task, the PMd and PRR activities observed 
during the memory period likely did not represent attended reach targets, but intended 
reach goals. Second, the color contrast we used for our rule-cues were far beyond 
discrimination threshold and we do not believe that higher performance observed when 
monkeys were instructed to reach following the initial bias was due to monkeys’ better 
perceptual discrimination of the color of the biased rule-cue. Third, recent progress on 
studies of distinction between feature-based attention and feature-based expectation made 
the case that, in the ideal observer framework, stimulus probabilities should not enhance 
discrimination sensitivity but, instead, adjusts the detection criterion towards the more 
expected category (Summerfield & Egner 2016; Lauwereyns 2011).  
We therefore conclude that, in response to different biasing pre-cues, the monkeys 
develop and maintain graded levels of potential action planning during the delay period, 
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allowing us to interpret the observed neural responses as reflectance of biased action 
planning. 
In a related previous study of our lab, one dataset from two monkeys showed strongly 
biased movement planning activity, matching subsequent choice bias, while another, 
separately recorded dataset from the same two animals showed balanced planning activity, 
mirroring subsequent unbiased choice (Klaes et al. 2011). Our current results go beyond 
the previous findings in four important ways. First, both potential motor goals in the 
current study had to be inferred from a spatially incongruent pre-cue. The behavioral bias 
observed here is thereby due to our controlled manipulation of prior, not due to 
uncontrolled differences in task-difficultly between congruent and incongruent stimulus-
response mappings such as those found in pro- and anti-reach tasks. Also, there is no risk 
that the observed neural responses reflected a spatial memory of the pre-cue which may 
have interfered with spatial neural encoding of the future motor goal in either of the two 
potential motor-goal locations. Second, by introducing a trial-by-trial bias we could 
confirm that it is the same population of PMd and PRR neurons that is active during both 
balanced or partially biased planning of two potential motor goals and planning of 
unambiguously selected motor goals. In addition, we could reveal single neurons’ 
heterogeneous modulation patterns in response to probabilistic bias manipulation. Third, 
by explicitly cueing the choice trials with a color-neutral rule-cue, we could compare RTs 
between choice and instructed trials to demonstrate their identical dependency on prior. 
Previously such a comparison was prevented by the fact that choice trials were indicated 
to the monkeys by omitting the presentation of the rule-cue, creating a discrepancy 
between instructed and choice trials and a risk of animals postponing their response in 
choice trials while waiting if a rule-cue was yet to come. Forth, we can here correlate 
graded behavioral bias effects with graded changes in neural response. We could thereby 
more explicitly test the hypothesis that motor planning is not the consequence of choice, 
i.e. does not reflect a binary outcome of a motor goal selection process, but rather reflects 
an inherent competitive process leading or contributing to the selection process 
(affordance competition; Cisek 2007). 
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Neural response latencies reflect reaction time differences 
An open question in sensorimotor research is the mutual role of parietal and frontal lobe 
sensorimotor structures in motor planning and choice (Hanks et al. 2015). With graded 
prior manipulation, we also observed graded motor goal representation in both brain 
areas, PRR and PMd. Our analysis of graded directional modulation showed no obvious 
differences between the two brain areas in the encoding of potential motor goals in the 
late memory period. PMd and PRR neural latencies captured RT pattern equally well, i.e. 
reduced latencies in follow trials and increased latencies when the more firmly planned 
movement had to be countermanded. 
In contrast, the analysis of neural response latencies suggests major differences in the 
onset latencies of neural choice signals between PRR and PMd.  Inconsistent with 
previous studies (e.g. Roitman & Shadlen 2002), we found motor-related peaks in 
premotor (in all except follow reaches) and parietal neurons after the movement initiation 
in monkey H. In contrast to experiments requesting eye movement responses, our 
monkeys performed more extended and effortful reach movements. This provided us 
with a finer time resolution to study neural latencies in relation to movement initiation 
between brain areas. The observed late-coming peak activities in both areas argue against 
considering peak activities as decision commitment signal in sensorimotor areas. 
Conclusion 
The predictability of a required action that was provided by prior probability of a rule-cue 
was translated into different levels of preparedness represented by different levels of 
motor planning activities in sensorimotor areas. Subsequently, these graded levels of 
preparedness in sensorimotor areas result in graded behavioral bias in monkeys, as 
previously described in humans (Suriya-Arunroj & Gail 2015). Our observed neural 
encoding during the instructed delay is consistent with the idea that prior probability is 
reflected in a shifted baseline in the framework of drift diffusion models (DDM: e.g. 
Ratcliff 1978; Smith & Ratcliff 2004), leading to higher choice probability and shorter 
reaction times of biased action. When equipotent potential action alternatives are 
available, both, PMd and PRR showed dual representation of both action goals, 
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suggesting a stage of processing at which the two alternative response options are not yet 
integrated into a single decision variable, but at which both options might be engaged in a 
competitive “race”. Parallel representation of available movement options is believed to 
be the process through which action cost can be integrated into the decision mechanism 
(Cisek 2012). This is in contrast to situations of good-based decision-making in which 
action-independent choices might be accomplished outside sensorimotor structures, e.g. 
prefrontal cortex, before the chosen option is passed to the sensorimotor cortices for 
planning of a corresponding action (Padoa-Schioppa 2011). Competitive motor planning 
in sensorimotor cortex hence likely contributes to action selection in ambiguous rule-
based choice situations, independently of target value, which is consistent with the 
affordance competition model of decision-making. 
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SUPP. FIGURE 1 |  Chamber positions and recording coordinates. (A) PMd and PRR chambers: rotated view from 
the monkey’s left side to see both chambers on the same plane (B) PMd and PRR areas: rotated view to visualize both 
areas on the same plane. (C-D) Recording coordinates in PMd and PRR chambers. The area of each pie chart corresponds 
to the number of neurons of different types at each coordinate. Note that the sizes of the pie chart are not comparable 
between areas; the biggest pie chart in PMd represents 23 cells vs. 32 cells in PRR. Motor Goal: motor-goal tuned neurons, 
Visual: visually tuned neurons, Movement: peri-movement neurons, Vis-mov: neurons showing visual tuning and 
movement tuning but untuned during memory period (see further details in Neural data selection and selectivity profiles). 
 





SUPP. FIGURE 2 |  Example tuning profile. (top panel) Raster plots show neural activities at the different cue directions, 
when aligned to the pre-cue onset (baseline and pre-cue), and reach directions, when aligned to the go-cue onset (motor-goal 
and movement). (middle panel) Spike density functions, in identical arrangement as the rasters are shown. (bottom panel) 
Tuning functions corresponding are shown. Cue-related tuning is computed relative to cue positions (baseline: 300 ms before 
pre-cue onset; pre-cue: 300 ms after pre-cue onset) whereas movement-related tunings are relative to reach directions (motor-
goal: 300 ms before rule-cue onset; movement: rule-cue to movement offset (touch)). The example neuron shows evolving 
tuning properties across periods with tuning direction changes from 226° and 193° in pre-cue and motor-goal epochs 
(difference less than 90°) to 20° in movement epoch. p-values are results of Kruskal-Wallis test. 
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SUPP. FIGURE 3 |  Planning activities reflect monkeys’ choice bias. (PMd) Multiple comparison of (non-
normalized) average firing rates of motor-goal tuned PMd neurons of monkey H (left) and monkey K (right) at maximum 
direction (PDmax; red), opposite direction (OD; blue), and two orthogonal directions (Op (brown) and Om (yellow) for 
PDmax + /2 and PDmax - /2, respectively). (PRR) average firing rates of motor-goal tuned PRR neurons, organized in 
an identical way as PMd. (Choice) average choice probabilities (CP) of monkey H (left) and monkey K (right) in all bias 
levels. (*p < corr at 5%, **p < corr at 1% , ***p < corr at 0.1%; Bonferroni-corrected t-test) 
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General discussion 
In this final section, the findings of the human psychophysics and monkey physiology 
studies are summarized and discussed in a broader context.  
The human psychophysical study focused on a comparison between the influence of 
initial predictability and initial preferability of available options on decision-making when 
both options became equally valued at the decision moment.  
Parts of our results are in line with results of previous studies, in which prior probability 
and potential payoff were used to bias subjects’ behaviors, and stronger effects of prior 
bias were found compared to a manipulation of potential payoff (Maddox & Bohil 1998; 
Simen et al. 2009; Leite & Ratcliff 2011; Mulder et al. 2012). According to the rise-to-
threshold model for decision mechanisms, both bias manipulations were suggested to 
induce a baseline shift with the shift driven by payoff bias being about half of the 
magnitude of the shift due to prior bias (Maddox 2002; Bogacz et al. 2006). 
In contrast to existing work, the choice trials in our task design provided a new 
perspective on subjects’ responses that had not been reported before. Graded choice bias 
and choice reaction times (RT) in the PROB task mirrored the prior probability. This 
means that the preliminary action plan could drive choice bias by shifting the baseline 
depending on how reliable the plan was. If the findings from other labs hold and the 
payoff manipulation in the AMNT task induces the same underlying mechanism as the 
prior manipulation in the PROB task but with a smaller effect size, we should have 
observed at least some degree of RT shortening when subjects chose the biased target in 
the AMNT task. This was however not the case; the choice RT pattern in AMNT task 
was bias-independent. We therefore ruled out the previous halfway shift explanation. 
Instead, we argued in favor of a drift rate change to explain the behavioral bias in 
instructed trials of our payoff manipulation experiment. 
Interestingly, we found matching-like behavior resulting from planning but not expected 
value. This finding suggests that choice bias, accompanied by reduced reaction times, that 
had previously been interpreted as a ‘match’ of expected value (Sugrue et al. 2004; Lau & 
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Glimcher 2008; Platt & Glimcher 1999) could actually be due to preliminary action plans 
for which previous experiments often did not control. 
Finally, it is worth noting that rise-to-threshold models have previously mostly been 
applied to perceptual decision-making tasks, with temporal integration of evidence. We 
found that the parameters typically used in these models did not fit well to the data from 
our experiment, especially the AMNT task. Further extensions of current decision-making 
models that could better account for the data in the AMNT scenarios would be of great 
interest and would certainly add another important dimension to our current 
understanding of decision-making mechanisms. 
The monkey physiology experiment also revealed biased behaviors, both in RTs and 
choice probabilities, in response to predictability. Importantly, the neural activities in PMd 
and PRR represented reach plans in a graded fashion depending on the bias level that was 
previously pre-cued and reflecting the degree of later choice bias the monkey displayed. 
In addition, we were able to confirm that both biased and balanced reach plans as 
previously shown in separate datasets by Klaes et al. (2011) could be represented by same 
neural population in both PMd and PRR.  
The fact that PMd and PRR neurons encode graded planning activities depending on the 
level of predictability of each reach goal supports the relevance of sensorimotor areas and 
motor planning activities to the decision-making process. The good-based model of 
decision-making, in which the decision process is finalized in the prefrontal cortex and 
the decision outcome is fed into the sensorimotor areas to plan the movement, would 
neither predict any representation of motor-goal alternatives in the sensorimotor areas 
nor any influence of planning on subsequent free-choice behaviors. 
We also looked beyond the planning period in our analyses of the relative latencies of 
movement-related responses in PMd and PRR. The result showed that final motor goal 
selection appears to be represented earlier in PMd than PRR. This result confirms PMd 
role in decision commitment. 
Overall, it was intriguing to observe behavioral bias in our experimental paradigm, not 
only in humans but also in monkeys. The subjects could have solved the task perfectly 
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well without pre-cue sizes taking into account. In instructed trials, they anyway receive the 
instruction to be followed or, in choice trials, receive reward for either movement with 
equal probability. The robust bias seen in measured behaviors suggests that predictability 
is a temping source of information and anticipation is unavoidable; monkeys and humans 
could not help but plan once the prior information was available, even though it was 
provided as an accessory in the pre-cue. 
In everyday life, we often have to decide between options with unclear values, which 
could be due to minimal contrast of the values or the complexity of values, and in many 
cases we have no idea whether the decision we have made was right or wrong. We face 
such ‘hard choice’ situations, in which we cannot easily rank the options, more often than 
we might think. Action plans which bias equally valued choices, could be interpreted as 
our ‘default’ plans or habits that might be able to bias our everyday hard choice and could 
contribute to the contemporary idea of ‘irrationality’ in economic decisions. 
Taken together, this dissertation provided both behavioral and neural evidence that action 
planning can be encouraged by the predictability of future events and that choices can be 
biased when the movement plan overlaps with one of the movement alternatives. It 
uncovered novel findings on the influence of prior probability and reward expectation on 
decision, provided novel perspectives on decision-making process, and paved the way for 
subsequent experiments. This thesis further highlights the relevant role of movement 
planning in the decision-making process and supports the idea that both processes share 
common neural mechanisms. 
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AMNT  (reward) Amount  (task) 
BMRS   Bias-Minimizing Reward Schedule 
Ccw    Counterclockwise 
CI    Confidence Interval 
COBRA   COmpetition-Between-Reward-and-Acuracy-maximization  
CP    Choice Probability 
Cw    Clockwise 
DDM   Drift-Diffusion Model 
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DMI    Directional Modulation Index 
dmPFC   Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex 
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DV    Decision Variables 
ER    Error Rate 
FEF    Frontal Eye Field 
GLMM   Generalized Linear Mixed Models 
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IT    Inferotemporal cortex 
LIP    Lateral Intraparietal area 
MDP    Medial Dorsoparietal area 
MIP   Medial Intraparietal area 
Mot    Motor-goal tuned neurons 
Mov    Peri-movement neurons 
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ms    Millisecond 
MT    Movement Time 
M1    Primary motor area 
OD    Opposite direction 
OFC    Orbitofrontal Cortex 
PD    Preferred direction 
PFC    Prefrontal Cortex 
PMC   Premotor Cortex 
PMd    Dorsal Premotor Cortex 
PMv    Ventral Premotor Cortex 
PO    Parieto-Occipital area 
PPC   Posterior Parietal Cortex 
PROB   Probabilistic (task) 
PRR    Parietal Reach Region 
RT    Reaction Time 
SE    Standard Error 
SNc    Substantia Nigra pars compacta 
SPL    Superior Parietal Lobule 
STD    Standard Deviation 
VA    Visual Angle 
Vis    Visually tuned neurons 
vlPFC   Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex 
vmPFC   Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex 
VTA    Ventral Tegmental Area 
V1    Primary visual area 
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